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Editor's Note
In response to the 1972 recommendations of the National Commission 
on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, most states substantially 
broadened coverage and increased benefits for injured workers. The cost 
increases associated with these reforms have brought workers' compen 
sation to the forefront in the debate over labor market regulatory policy. 
Substantial changes to workers' compensation continue, although the at 
tention has shifted from the relatively straightforward issues of coverage 
and benefit levels to subtle and difficult matters such as permanent par 
tial disability benefit arrangements, disease compensation, ad 
ministrative efficiency, and competitive rate-making.
One of the alleged virtues of workers' compensation is the flexibility 
and learning from others afforded by the decentralized state-run pro 
grams. Unfortunately the ongoing reform debate in virtually every state 
is taking place in isolation from the experiences and lessons of others. 
The papers in this volume begin to fill that void by reporting and analyz 
ing a range of workers' compensation issues that are key to every state's 
disability income policy. The emphasis is on what can be learned from 
the experience of other jurisdictions. The papers were presented at a con 
ference held at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, in 1983.
James Chelius
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The Status and Direction 
of Workers' Compensation
An Introduction to Current Issues
James R. Chelius
Institute of Management and Labor Relations 
Rutgers University
The substantial increase in injury rates during the 1960s 
that gave rise to widespread federal involvement in occupa 
tional safety and health also spawned a period of significant 
change in the workers' compensation system. The Occupa 
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 provided for a national 
commission to study workers' compensation. 1 This commis 
sion recommended that the states broaden coverage and in 
crease benefits. Eighty-four specific suggestions were made, 
19 of which were deemed essential to the commission's no 
tion of a well-functioning workers' compensation system. If 
the states did not meet the 19 essential recommendations, the 
commission urged that federal standards be issued and the 
states forced to comply. Most states responded to either the 
commission's vision of the appropriate way to improve the 
workers' compensation system or perhaps to the threat of 
federal involvement. Substantial changes were made in both 
coverage and benefit levels. These changes, however, were 
not sufficient to meet all of the 19 essential recommenda 
tions. Several bills mandating federal standards were in 
troduced in Congress but none passed.
2 Status and Direction
The substantial changes of the 1970s in workers' compen 
sation coverage and benefits, together with increased system 
usage by workers, resulted in dramatic increases in employer 
costs. Burton and Krueger (see chapter 7) estimate that 
workers' compensation costs as a percentage of payroll in 
creased over 80 percent from 1972 through 1978, approx 
imately double the increase from 1950 through 1972. 
Whereas the initial response to the commission's recommen 
dations was a series of relatively straightforward changes in 
coverage and benefit levels, the resulting cost increases 
generated pressure for attention to the more subtle aspects of 
workers' compensation.
Issues such as eligibility for permanent partial benefits, 
pricing regulation, and administrative arrangements that 
were largely ignored in the initial round of reform following 
the commission's report became the focus of a second wave 
of reform that continues. Workers' compensation, 
therefore, is an increasingly important and changing aspect 
of the labor market regulatory environment. Every indica 
tion is that this importance and fluidity will continue.
Evaluation of any regulatory policy is desirable; however, 
it is usually difficult. One source of difficulty, particularly 
for recent labor market regulatory initiatives such as OSHA, 
is that they are uniformly applied throughout the country. 
Such a universal policy, whatever its advantages as a 
regulatory technique, does not provide for ready com 
parisons. One of the advantages of the state-based workers' 
compensation system is that one can compare the various 
state laws and evaluate their effectiveness and efficiency. 
This potential advantage of the state systems has not been 
utilized to any significant degree. The workers' compensa 
tion laws of each state tend to operate and even change in 
isolation from the experiences of others.
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The conference from which this book arose is the first in a 
series examining the workers' compensation system. The 
goal is to provide scholars and practitioners with the insights 
of the workers' compensation experience in a variety of 
jurisdictions.
There are three main themes examined in this review of 
current issues in workers' compensation. We first describe 
and analyze the process of reforming workers' compensation 
with papers on a variety of states that have recently 
undergone attempts at significant change. While only some 
of these efforts have resulted in comprehensive change, there 
is much to be learned from failed as well as successful at 
tempts. Of course, the process of change is not distinct from 
the attempted or actual outcome of the reform process. 
Several of the papers primarily focusing on the process of 
reform give us significant insight into the nature of the 
workers' compensation system in these states. A second 
group of papers examines the ongoing operation of several 
key states. These essays specifically examine the regulation 
of insurance rates, the differences in employer costs, and the 
administrative structure of New Jersey, New York, and Con 
necticut. The third section of the book deals with one of the 
most difficult of workers' compensation issues—occupa 
tional disease. These papers address how workers' compen 
sation currently deals with this problem and suggest 
guidelines for directing future change.
In addition to these three basic themes, a final essay 
broadens our perspective by presenting information about 
the unusual accident compensation scheme used in New 
Zealand.
The Process of Workers' Compensation Reform
The difference between reform and tinkering seems to de 
pend on whether one is for or against the changes. Virtually
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every state makes some changes in its compensation statute 
annually; however, without getting more specific, the notion 
of reform as used here is of a fairly major change in the 
system with no connotation as to the desirability of the 
change.
The papers on the reform process examine a range of state 
experiences—California (Alan Tebb), Michigan (H. Allan 
Hunt), Minnesota (Steve Keefe), Florida, Louisiana, New 
Mexico, Delaware, and Alaska (John Lewis). While the 
political process is never a tidy one, several themes do 
emerge. First, research and the resulting insights into the 
specific problems of a state's system provide a necessary 
beginning to the reform process. Second, educating a wide 
range of individuals, including study commission members, 
key employer and labor leaders, and legislators, is also 
critical. Finally, substantive communication among the 
leaders of the various interest groups cannot be completely 
replaced by dialogue among their specialized representatives.
The necessary research for reform need not be 
sophisticated scholarly treatises; often the only requirement 
is that it adequately document what is happening in the 
system. The recurrent theme of research as a precondition 
for substantial change is well-illustrated by the Minnesota 
experience described by Keefe. For several years the high 
cost of workers' compensation made it an important 
political issue. However, no response to industry complaints 
was forthcoming, in part because the only publicized 
evidence for high costs was a series of anecdotes on 
payments to undeserving individuals. Only when credible 
data were developed, indicating that Minnesota was indeed a 
high cost state, did the reform effort develop momentum. 
Interestingly, the most cogent basis for cost comparison was 
with neighboring Wisconsin—a key competitor for many 
Minnesota industries. The research effort also pointed to the
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primary reason for the high costs. Whereas early reform pro 
posals focused on general benefit levels, the analyses 
demonstrated that it was the amount of disability compen 
sated rather than benefit levels that made Minnesota costs 
high.
The analyses documented that in Minnesota compared to 
Wisconsin: (1) the rate of permanent total disability per lost- 
time injury was 20 times higher; (2) the average duration of 
temporary total disability was 50 percent longer; (3) the fre 
quency of permanent partial disability cases was 60 percent 
higher; (4) the average payment for partial disability was 20 
percent higher even though the scheduled benefits were 
similar; and (5) the average medical cost per case was 50 per 
cent higher. Based on these findings, it became obvious that 
the fundamental cost problem with the Minnesota system 
was not a high benefit schedule per se. The importance of 
such fundamental research is retold in the successful reform 
efforts of Florida and Louisiana and the failures of 
Delaware and New Mexico.
Educating key actors in the reform process is also crucial 
to success. One of the first requirements is to educate 
members of the ubiquitous study commissions as to the fun 
damentals of workers' compensation. Without such 
knowledge, commission members tend to get locked into the 
specific proposals of the groups they represent. As events 
change and bargaining intensifies, such rigidity frequently 
blocks useful compromises. Legislators comprise another 
group that invariably requires such attention. An attempted 
workers' compensation reform that tries to reduce the long 
time frequently required for education is likely to be unsuc 
cessful.
A closely related issue is the requirement of dialogue 
among the leaders of the affected interest groups. While this 
is perhaps obvious, the papers reviewing recent state changes
6 Status and Direction
reveal several interesting points. Because of the complexity 
of workers' compensation in general, and in particular the 
obscurity of the currently debated nonbenefit issues, many 
affected parties have delegated their role in the reform pro 
cess to specialists. While this is typically not a problem, the 
papers note that in several states, labor unions frequently 
turned to their workers' compensation attorneys for advice 
on reform. However, since many of the proposed reforms in 
clude attempts at reducing the amount of litigation, the at 
torneys have an inherent conflict of interest and have often 
been a source of organized labor's opposition to reform. A 
similar delegation of authority on the employer's side was 
one of the reasons cited by Tebb as contributing to the 
languishing of reform efforts in California during the 1970s. 
Apparently senior management relied solely on trade 
associations to represent their interests just at the time when 
the associations lost many of their senior lobbyists. The 
point, therefore, is that it is desirable for leaders of business 
and labor to understand and communicate on workers' com 
pensation.
One must not be so naive as to assume that once the 
"right" people begin a dialogue, all roadblocks to reform 
will be erased or even smoothed. However, there are many 
aspects of reform that can yield gains for both employers 
and employees. Taking advantage of these potential mutual 
gains, and fashioning optimal compromises on other aspects 
where both gains and losses are necessary, is greatly 
facilitated by the direct involvement of key leaders. Unfor- 
tunatly such attention is frequently lacking.
These papers on the reform process give us many insights 
into the dynamics of the states described, as well as pro 
viding evidence for the broad theme of what brings about 
reform. Anyone with an interest in substantial workers' 
compensation change must be prepared to deal with the 
issues addressed by these authors.
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The Regional Experience in Workers' Compensation
Given the joint sponsorship of the conference by univer 
sities in the States of New Jersey, New York, and Connec 
ticut, it was appropriate to focus the attention of one session 
on the operation of workers' compensation in these states. 
The issues addressed—cost differences, pricing regulation, 
and administration—are important concerns in all jurisdic 
tions. The general context of the issues represents the bulk of 
the analysis, with the three states serving as examples.
The importance of thorough and well-documented 
research has already been noted. An excellent example of 
such analysis is the interstate cost comparison data presented 
by John F. Burton, Jr. and Alan Krueger. They begin by 
describing some inappropriate measures of cost differences 
among the states (earned premium-to-payroll ratios and 
average premiums per state). While the incorrectness of these 
measures may seem obvious once their inadequacies are 
demonstrated, such measures are in fact frequently used. 
The reason for the scarcity of valid data on costs becomes 
apparent upon examining the Burton and Krueger technique 
for constructing such measures—it is very complicated. The 
authors make a convincing case as to why such an elaborate 
procedure is necessary. Without attempting to summarize 
their technique, it should be noted that they take into ac 
count factors such as industry mix, payroll limitations, 
premium discounts, dividends, experience rating, expense 
and loss constants, and schedule rating.
The resulting cost data, across years and states, are then 
reviewed to demonstrate some of their more important uses. 
For example, it is noted that from 1950 through 1983 
workers' compensation costs as a percentage of payroll 
almost tripled, with a particularly large increase in the period 
from 1972 through 1978. The apparent increase in the in 
terstate variation of workers' compensation costs over time
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and even since the National Commission's recommendations 
is also an interesting finding, particularly in light of the com 
mission's goal of greater equality across states.
While a formal statistical analysis of the reasons for these 
cost differences is beyond the scope of their paper, Burton 
and Krueger present some preliminary evidence on this im 
portant issue. Using New Jersey, New York, and Connec 
ticut as examples, they compare the relative costliness of 
these states over time with the level of benefits available to 
injured workers. They conclude ". . . that changes in 
benefit levels are an important determinant of changes in the 
employers' costs of workers' compensation. ..." The im 
portance of other potential factors such as coverage, use of 
state insurance funds and self-insurance, and administration 
of the law are left for future analysis.
This paper also yields an interesting insight into a key 
aspect of the reform process. Certainly one of the important 
phases of this process is to determine changes that can yield 
gains for both workers and employers. Unfortunately, at 
least in the short run, many changes simply benefit one party 
at the expense of the other. However, data on the cost 
response to the New Jersey reform of 1979 indicate that 
benefits to most injured workers increased while employer 
costs declined. The thrust of the reform was to de-emphasize 
the role of minor permanent partial disability payments by 
requiring objective evidence of disability. While fewer 
workers are now receiving such benefits one would not im 
agine that, given the standard of eligibility, this is a signifi 
cant problem for deserving individuals. Interestingly, the 
general level of benefits increased at the same time as relative 
employer costs were decreasing. This concern about the 
handling of permanent partial benefits is a key aspect of the 
reform debate in many states, including several of those 
discussed in the first section.
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The paper discussing pricing is also quite timely as these 
issues are currently being debated in many states. Reflecting 
the general deregulatory trend in other lines of insurance as 
well as other sectors of the economy, the fundamental ques 
tion is the appropriate role of competition in the pricing of 
workers' compensation insurance. Arthur Williams first pro 
vides a very readable account of the rate determination pro 
cess—a review necessary for all but those thoroughly steeped 
in this arcane subject. The rate regulation process—ranging 
from prior governmental approvals to open competition—is 
then described. A final section of the paper summarizes three 
of the specific issues forming the heart of the debate on price 
regulation of workers' compensation insurance: the 
arguments for and against open competition, the ap 
propriate role of investment income in regulated rates, and 
the use of excess profit statutes.
While most of the arguments for and against open com 
petition are the same as those used in other areas of regula 
tion, from bus fares to liquor prices, the unique aspect of the 
workers' compensation debate concerns whether the data 
base used to calculate rates will be less reliable under com 
petition. Opponents of deregulation are concerned that com 
petition will lead to a withering away of the rate-making data 
base pooled from most insurance companies. It is difficult to 
imagine why insurance companies would not want to main 
tain such a valuable pricing tool even if it were not mandated 
by regulation; however, in the spirit of neutrality, Williams 
chooses not to reveal his interpretation of the validity of the 
arguments.
The role of investment income in regulated rate-making is 
significant in workers' compensation because of the time 
lapse between collection of premiums and the dispersal of 
benefits. While the role of income earned on such in 
vestments would be moot under genuine open competition,
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its importance in the various regulated price environments 
will continue. The difficulties of determining a fair or effi 
cient price without significant help from the marketplace are 
well illustrated by the debate on the appropriate role of in 
vestment income.
The final issue addressed by Williams is that of excess pro 
fits statutes. While only a minor part of the workers' com 
pensation system, with only Florida currently having such a 
law, the issue may become more important if more states 
deregulate workers' compensation insurance. Such statutes 
can be used as a mechanism for easing into more competition 
in rate-making by serving as a guarantee that the deregulated 
firms will not generate "windfall" profits.
The efficient administration of workers' compensation is 
an important but extremely difficult issue addressed in the 
paper by Monroe Berkowitz. He reflects on the frustration 
of developing guidelines for how workers' compensation 
should be run, echoing the common theme of the "overuse" 
of litigation. It is ironic that most commentaries on workers' 
compensation emphasize the inefficiency of its extensive use 
of lawyers, while many other legal areas point to the 
"streamlined" workers' compensation system as a model to 
be emulated. Unfortunately, the characteristics of efficient 
administration remain illusive; Berkowitz, however, offers 
the hope that ongoing conferences and resulting books such 
as this one can provide a vehicle for invigorating the search 
process. Certainly excellent essays on the operation of 
workers' compensation such as the ones contained in this 
section will foster the process by which those concerned 
about workers' compensation will learn from the views and 
experiences of others.
Occupational Disease
One of the most significant of workers' compensation 
problems is how to deal with occupational disease victims.
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Unfortunately, the magnitude of the problem has only 
recently been appreciated. For many years occupational 
disease was seen largely as a phenomenon of the past with 
the major problems resolved. 2 The growing awareness of 
work-related health problems and in particular the asbestos 
issue have intensified the search for an effective and efficient 
mechanism to deal with these issues. There is currently a 
series of bills before Congress that propose to circumvent the 
state workers' compensation system by establishing a federal 
occupational disease compensation program.
The papers presented at the conference demonstrate the 
inadequacies of the current system as well as the difficulties 
of coming up with a solution. Donald Spatz illustrates the 
nature of the compensation problem with its most visible 
manifestation—asbestos. Most state workers' compensation 
laws have significant roadblocks that make it quite difficult 
for victims or survivors to collect benefits. These "artificial 
barriers" include recency of employment rules and statutes 
of limitations that are frequently inconsistent with the laten 
cy periods of occupational disease. The performance of 
workers' compensation within a state with no such barriers 
(New Jersey) illustrates that even at its best, the current 
system does not appear to be fairly compensating victims. 
The data on three groups of workers clearly indicate that the 
problem goes well beyond the law per se. Fewer than half of 
the victims or survivors of asbestos-associated diseases even 
filed a claim. The failure to claim benefits was particularly 
striking among a group of workers with typically short term 
exposures in a factory that closed in 1954. Only nine sur 
vivors of the 87 workers who died from asbestos-associated 
diseases filed workers' compensation claims. Apparently, 
the lack of recognition of the association between asbestos 
and disease was not as limiting a factor as was the lack of 
knowledge that the survivors were potentially eligible for 
benefits. Even among those filing claims, the settlements
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were frequently delayed and severely compromised. It is dif 
ficult to come to any other conclusion than that the workers' 
compensation system has difficulty coping with occupational 
diseases.
The papers by Donald Elisberg and Peter Earth present 
guidelines and suggestions for how the problem of occupa 
tional disease can be handled. Even if one does not agree 
with their solutions, the systematic discussion is very helpful 
since it presents the agenda with which any reform must 
cope.
Elisberg reviews five basic elements of any effective oc 
cupational disease compensation system. One of the issues 
that must be addressed is the appropriate role of the federal 
government. Elisberg argues for a federal preemption of 
disease compensation based on the advantages of uniformi 
ty, the difficulty of communicating complex issues of disease 
causality to state agencies, and the political problems of get 
ting comprehensive legislation in many states. A second 
basic element is the appropriate role of presumptions for 
determining whether particular diseases should be 
automatically considered to arise out of and in the course of 
employment. Such presumptions are designed "... to 
eliminate the concept that in each individual case an entire 
system of proof need be offered to establish both the illness 
and its causal relationship to employment." It is argued that 
presumptions have gotten a bad name because of their 
politicization under the Black Lung law but that such subor 
dination of medical criteria need not occur.
Another basic element of occupational disease compensa 
tion is benefit levels. Elisberg argues that pain and suffering 
should be compensated since work disincentives are not like 
ly to be as troublesome as they are with injuries. It is then 
argued that claims handling could be made simple by the use 
of impartial medical panels to determine causality and the
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degree of disability. Adjudication would be further minimiz 
ed under this proposal by funding the program with a 
mechanism such as a tax that does not give employers an in 
centive to challenge claims. Elisberg is concerned that any 
kind of an insurance mechanism would encourage employers 
or their associations to challenge legitimate claims in the 
hope of holding down premiums.
In addition to addressing some of the same basic issues, 
Earth raises several others, including the problem of ex 
clusive remedy. Surely any occupational disease reform that 
bars tort suits must make the workers' compensation system 
"... more accessible to potential users." Barth feels such a 
quid pro quo is a useful element of disease compensation 
reform. One of the problems with achieving such a com 
promise—the reliance of organized labor on the advice of 
their attorneys—surfaced in the earlier discussion of the 
reform process. "The trial bar has no apparent interest in 
having future lawsuits by workers or survivors barred in 
disease cases. Any promise of a more effective workers' 
compensation system holds less interest for them than main 
taining and expanding the right to sue." Whatever one's 
view of the optimal role of litigation, it is clearly an issue that 
needs to be addressed if victims and their survivors are to be 
fairly compensated.
The New Zealand Experience
The final paper broadens our perspective on workers' 
compensation issues by reviewing the radically different New 
Zealand system. Barbara Mclntosh begins her analysis by 
describing the legal arrangements by which all individuals 
are covered for 24 hours a day. The results of a survey of 
employer perceptions about the system are then analyzed. 
Three government funds are used to finance compensa 
tion—the Earner's Fund for all employed and self-employed 
persons (on and off the job), the Motor Vehicle Fund for all
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persons injured in motor vehicle accidents (including on-the- 
job injuries) and a Supplementary Fund for all others. The 
Earner and Motor Vehicle Funds are essentially self- 
supporting from levies on employers and vehicle owners 
respectively. The Supplementary Fund is financed from 
general tax revenues. The employer levies for work injuries 
and diseases vary by industry although they are sharply con 
strained by minimums and maximums. The quite minor 
Safety Incentive Bonuses are the only version of experience 
rating used. The costs of earners' nonwork injuries are 
spread among all employers. Benefits are generous, with 100 
percent of earnings up to $600 (NZ) per week currently 
covered.
The results of extensive interviews with New Zealand 
senior executives indicate that the compensation scheme is 
not perceived as a key factor influencing safety decisions. 
More significant influences were government safety rules, 
employee concerns, and local union demands. While the ex 
ecutives did not feel the legislation was a hindrance to their 
operations, they did feel that more accidents are reported 
and longer time taken off as a result of the compensation 
scheme.
Conclusion
The very fact that workers' compensation has lasted for 
over 70 years indicates it has strengths as a device for dealing 
with an important social problem. Similarly it is hard to deny 
that it has significant weaknesses. Whatever one's view of 
the balance of these strengths and weaknesses, the papers in 
this volume will provide insights into the current state and 
desirable directions for workers' compensation.
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NOTES
1. The Report of the National Commission on State Workmen's Com 
pensation Laws (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972).
2. A classic study published in 1954 stated ". . . for industry as a whole, 
problems of air pollution, industrial poisoning, silicosis, dermatitis, or 
other occupational health hazards are less pressing today than disability 
and absenteeism due to general illness." Herman Somers and Anne 
Somers. Workmen's Compensation (New York: John Wiley, 1954) p. 
218.

The Minnesota Experience 
with Workers' Compensation Reform*
Steve Keefe
Commissioner, Department of Labor and Industry 
State of Minnesota
The Problem and the Political Environment
From 1975, when it first became a hot political issue, the 
debate over workers' compensation in Minnesota has been 
characterized by more heat than light. Employers' com 
plaints about high costs were initially supported mainly by 
anecdotal information about abuses in individual cases, and 
proposed solutions were more intuitive than based on any 
particular strategy of addressing high cost impact areas. 
Upon examination, anecdotal stories of abuses frequently 
turned out to have been exaggerated. One collection of 25 
"horror stories" presented by employers to a legislative 
committee in 1977 as evidence of the excessive liberality of 
Minnesota judges led to an investigation which discovered 
that 14 of the 25 cases had never been before judges but had 
rather been decided without litigation by insurance com 
panies on their own motion. Intuitive solutions frequently 
turned out, upon adoption, not to have any substantial im-
*This paper was originally scheduled to be presented at the conference, however, the final 
legislative debate on the reforms coincided with the conference and Mr. Keefe was unable 
to make the presentation.
17
18 The Minnesota Experience
pact on costs of the system. A list of proposals by the in 
surance industry in 1979 had all been adopted by 1981 
without any apparent substantial impact on costs. While 
complaints tended to focus on payments to undeserving in 
dividuals, proposed solutions tended to focus on across-the- 
board benefit cuts.
By the early 1980s, analytical understanding of what was 
different about the Minnesota system and whether that 
system was actually more costly began to become available. 
A legislative study in 1979, 1 a study by the insurance division 
in 1981, 2 and a study by the Citizens League in 1982 3 began 
to point at key aspects of the nature of Minnesota's workers' 
compensation problem. In addition, the studies identified 
another problem, perhaps equally severe, of poor service to 
injured workers.
Comparisons of average workers' compensation rates 
from state to state were at first used to determine the degree 
of the Minnesota problem. It was quickly discovered that 
these comparisons were misleading because of the important 
effects of differences in industrial mix from state to state and 
from socio-economic differences which lead to differences in 
litigation and system utilization from state to state. Further 
more, parallel state-to-state comparisons ignored the real 
competitive problems which individual businesses face. Na 
tionwide average workers' compensation rates are far less 
important to employers than the actual workers' compensa 
tion rates in similar classifications in states where the 
employers' competition is found.
More detailed examination of rates on a classification-by- 
classification basis by Insurance Commissioner Michael 
Markman in 1981 4 showed that Minnesota workers' compen 
sation rates were indeed substantially higher than rates in 
surrounding states, even though not particularly higher than 
rates in some more heavily industrialized states on the East
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and West Coasts. In fact, the study showed workers' com 
pensation rates averaging 70 percent higher in Minnesota 
than in our neighboring state of Wisconsin, which has a 
quite similar industrial and socio-economic mix as well as a 
somewhat similar average benefit level. Furthermore, the 
Markman study showed that differences in compensation 
rates tend to be more pronounced in those industries with the 
highest rates, particularly in classifications containing large 
numbers of small businesses. This creates particular 
economic problems because those are the very businesses 
which find their competition in the neighboring State of 
Wisconsin, and in which workers' compensation rates are a 
more important competitive factor. For example, the 
lumbering industry, found heavily in both northern Min 
nesota and northern Wisconsin, has a workers' compensa 
tion rate of almost $50 per $100 of payroll in Minnesota. 
Although the average increase in Minnesota over Wisconsin 
rate levels is 70 percent, a number of rate classifications had 
differences of as much as 200 or 300 percent.
Analysis of the reasons for these differences in Minnesota 
as compared to Wisconsin turned up interesting information 
about the impact of benefit levels. Maximum weekly benefit 
levels in both states are quite similar. The Citizens League 
study showed that scheduled awards for various bodily parts 
turned out to be quite similar for an average wage earner in 
each state, although there is a broader range and therefore a 
higher maximum (and a lower minimum) in Minnesota than 
in Wisconsin. The Minnesota cost-of-living escalator turns 
out to have an impact on rates of only approximately 1 per 
cent or 2 percent once investment income is taken into con 
sideration as it is in the Minnesota rating structure (although 
not yet in the Wisconsin rating structure).
The 1977-79 legislative study5 suggested one reason for 
these differences when it found a strong correlation between
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average workers' compensation rate levels and litigation 
rates in various states, including Minnesota and Wisconsin. 
As of 1979, the Minnesota litigation rate was approximately 
three times that of Wisconsin (petitions for hearing 
amounted to approximately 10 percent of first reports of an 
injury in Minnesota as opposed to barely 3 percent in 
Wisconsin). The Markman report zeroed in more precisely 
on the reasons for the substantially higher costs in Minnesota 
when it discovered that the Minnesota system has the follow 
ing important differences from Wisconsin in frequency and 
severity of disability:
• The rate of permanent total disability cases per lost time 
injury is approximately 20 times as high in Minnesota as 
it is in Wisconsin (63 permanent total cases per 10,000 
lost time injuries in Minnesota as opposed to 3 in 
Wisconsin).
• The average duration of temporary total disability in 
Minnesota is approximately 50 percent longer than it is 
in Wisconsin.
• The frequency of permanent partial disability cases is 
approximately 60 percent higher in Minnesota than it is 
in Wisconsin.
• The average payment for partial disability is 20 percent 
higher in Minnesota than it is in Wisconsin (in spite of 
the apparent similarity in the two state schedules).
• The average medical cost per case is approximately 50 
percent higher in Minnesota than it is in Wisconsin.
Analysis of the two state systems seems to show that the 
major reason for the difference in the cost of compensation 
for work-related disability in Minnesota as compared to 
Wisconsin is not the level of compensation so much as it is 
the amount of disability compensated.
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In order to determine the reasons for the difference in the 
amount of disability actually being compensated in Min 
nesota, a great deal of attention has been given to com 
parisons of the state's system with that used in the State of 
Wisconsin and to the methods used by a number of 
businesses in Minnesota that have managed to substantially 
reduce the costs of their own workers' compensation pro 
gram within the structure of the existing Minnesota laws and 
benefit levels by changing their internal company practices.
In Minnesota, a significant number of private companies, 
usually larger self-insuring employers (although larger com 
panies purchasing insurance have also enjoyed these im 
provements), have recently reformed their internal workers' 
compensation programs and accomplished savings of 
anywhere from 20 percent to 50 percent of their workers' 
compensation costs. These company-sponsored programs 
usually contain an important safety component. Com- 
panywide commitments to preventing accidents in the first 
place are extremely effective in dealing with the workers' 
compensation costs.
More modern loss control methods adopted after the fact 
also seem to have a substantial impact on reducing the actual 
disability that needs to be compensated. By instituting 
vigorous early intervention and return-to-work programs, 
aggressive Minnesota employers have found that they can 
substantially reduce the disability resulting from even serious 
injuries. Such programs also seem to result in improved 
employer-employee relations and substantially reduced 
litigation rates.
The State of Wisconsin seems to accomplish similar results 
by having an active early intervention philosophy of state ad 
ministration of the workers' compensation law. This ad 
ministration seems to accomplish the same kinds of substan 
tially better return-to-work rates and substantially lower
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litigation rates that are accomplished individually by certain 
companies in Minnesota. 6
This analysis of the workers' compensation problem in 
Minnesota suggests a possible solution to the political prob 
lem surrounding workers' compensation as well as to the 
policy problem of how to control workers' compensation 
costs for employers and, incidentally, how to improve the 
system from the point of view of workers at the same time. 
Since attention to the amount of disability in the system 
seems to offer much more promise for controlling workers' 
compensation rates, and since the level of disability is just as 
much a problem for employees and, therefore, their union 
representatives, it should be possible to develop a coalition 
of business and labor support for certain programs designed 
to both reduce costs and improve service.
This political strategy was suggested by the Citizens 
League study in Minnesota and adopted by the new ad 
ministration of Governor Rudy Perpich, elected in 
November 1982, which, incidentally, hired the chairman of 
the Citizens League study as Commissioner of Labor and In 
dustry to take responsibility for the administration's 
workers' compensation legislative program.
The strategy adopted by the administration was to develop 
a workers' compensation program which would reform the 
workers' compensation system in order to improve service, 
reorganize the benefit structure to encourage return-to-work 
programs, both on the part of employers and injured 
employees, and reduce the costs to the employers by reduc 
ing the amount of disability that needs to be compensated. 
The point was to change the conception of the system from a 
closed, win/lose system where, if premiums are to go down, 
benefits must go down, to an open system where a win/win 
solution is possible with premium costs going down while in 
jured workers enjoy an increase in the sum of benefits and
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wages as a result of less frequent and severe duration of 
disability.
It was believed that the amount of political warfare that 
had been engaged in over the past several years over the 
problems in the system was actually contributing to the prob 
lem by exaggerating the perception of employers and 
employees of the system as an adversary system where 
employees and employers are necessarily at odds. Successful 
workers' compensation administrators insisted on the 
necessity of good employer-employee relationships and a 
mutual sense of trust in order to accomplish effective 
rehabiliation and return-to-work programs, particularly in 
the case of serious or difficult injuries such as back condi 
tions.
Although major reform legislation was adopted by the 
legislature7 incorporating the concepts recommended by the 
administration, a major part of that political strategy, that 
of getting business-labor agreement in support of the 
changes, was a failure, at least in part. The state's major 
labor organization actively opposed the legislation, at least 
its key provision, and few other labor organizations were 
willing to come forward in any public way to support the 
legislation. At first, however, prospects seemed much better. 
The initial strategy was begun by seeking out a wide variety 
of key leaders among business, labor, insurance, legal, 
medical, and rehabilitation groups and trying to sell the con 
cept of a reorganization of the system based on good activist 
management like that of Wisconsin and a redesign of the 
benefit structure which would maintain overall benefit levels 
but provide increased incentives for employers to provide 
return-to-work programs and for employees to accept jobs 
offered. The relatively good credibility of the recent studies 
of workers' compensation and the implications of their 
analyses of the nature of the Minnesota problem were par-
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ticularly helpful in gaining business and insurance support 
for the administration strategy.
The studies were viewed with a great deal more suspicion 
by organized labor, but preliminary agreement with the 
strategy of developing a business-labor compromise pro 
posal was obtained from that quarter as well. Various service 
groups involved in workers' compensation, i.e., defense at 
torneys, rehabilitation consultants, medical personnel, and 
so on, were particularly receptive to the approach suggested 
by the administration with the exception of the Trial 
Lawyers Association, which viewed proposed changes in 
benefit structure with suspicion.
In an attempt to follow the Wisconsin model, the 
Workers' Compensation Advisory Council was reactivated 
and populated with appointments representing key leaders 
from business, labor and insurance groups as well as a 
sprinkling of expertise from the medical and legal com 
munities. This group spent many hours working over detail 
ed proposals to reform and improve administration, in 
troduce nonadversarial means of resolving disputes and pro 
vide more objective means for establishing compensation for 
permanent partial disabilities. This commission was not, 
however, able to face in any constructive way the very dif 
ficult benefit issues that most students of workers' compen 
sation felt needed to be addressed in order to accomplish a 
major reform of the system. The public nature of the ad 
visory council forum, combined with the high degree of 
hostility and mistrust engendered by recent bitter political 
battles, seemed to make it impossible for the Advisory Coun 
cil to come to grips with these issues.
As a result, talks were opened between a key spokesman 
for business and a key spokesman for labor in an attempt to 
put together a compromise package on the benefit issues that 
would make the rest of the compromise being worked on by
The Minnesota Experience 25
the Advisory Council acceptable to both sides. These talks 
proceeded productively for some time but eventually broke 
down over a fundamental quandry in the political positions 
of the two groups. Labor felt obliged to resist any benefit 
cuts but was prepared to make moderate compromises if it 
could accomplish in the same legislation a state compensa 
tion insurance fund. Business was vigorously opposed to the 
idea of a state compensation insurance fund but was willing 
to consider it if substantial benefit reform was offered. 
Labor was unable to face substantial benefit cuts even in 
return for a state compensation insurance fund.
The solution proposed at that time by the administration 
was a recommendation of the Citizens League study design 
ed to be a major reform in the benefit structure without be 
ing a major cut in benefit levels. This so-called two-tiered 
benefit system (an attempt at a synthesis of the strong points 
of wage loss compensation for permanent partial disability 
and more traditional schedule-type systems) was first con 
sidered of academic interest only. It became clear, however, 
that it provided the only possible solution to the fundamen 
tal political problem of business demanding major benefit 
change and labor unable to agree to major benefit cuts. 
Talks proceeded on the details of the two-tiered benefit 
structure system for some time, with most parties hopeful 
that some solution could be reached. At one point most peo 
ple believed an agreement over the whole package had been 
reached, but when the parties sat down the next morning to 
ratify the agreement, it turned out that labor was not 
prepared to accept the two-tiered system without a further 
substantial benefit increase which was clearly unacceptable 
to the administration as well as to business and insurance in 
terests.
It was widely believed at that time that vigorous opposi 
tion to the two-tiered benefit structure system from the 
plaintiffs' attorneys was instrumental in convincing labor of
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the inadvisability of supporting that concept. Although in 
vited by the administration to participate in the development 
of the two-tiered system, plaintiffs' attorneys refused and in 
stead fought it vigorously, mainly by lobbying key leaders in 
organized labor. Although AFL-CIO leaders denied being 
influenced by attorney pressure, it was well known that the 
key labor spokesman had been embarrassed two years earlier 
when trial lawyers used their wide influence in local unions 
to attack a business-labor compromise bill.
Even without labor support, business groups approached 
the administration and offered to support the administra 
tion's compromise package as a balanced approach to solv 
ing the workers' compensation problem. The governor and 
significant majorities in both houses in Minnesota are 
Democrats, and it was believed that even though a com 
promise could not be reached with labor, any legislation 
would have to be perceived as moderate and friendly to labor 
in order to have a chance at passage.
As a matter of fact, the administration-sponsored legisla 
tion with the support of business and insurance groups as 
well as the medical association and other support organiza 
tions, not only passed both houses by overwhelming votes, 
but actually received a majority of the Democratic votes in 
each house as well as all of the Republican votes. Some 
smaller union groups expressed public and private support 
for the so-called compromise legislation, including the most 
radical steelworkers' union on the Minnesota Iron Range, 
home territory of Governor Perpich.
Although labor vigorously opposed the two-tiered system 
for compensating permanent partial disability, they did con 
tinue to support the rest of the bill, including some modest 
benefit reductions, and the state compensation insurance 
fund which passed in separate legislation. Although the bat 
tle to pass the legislation was extremely hard-fought and at
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times quite bitter, there seemed to be a general agreement to 
avoid tampering with the noncontroversial sections of the 
bill as long as the political dispute could be limited to the 
two-tiered system. As a result, the product of the Workers' 
Compensation Advisory Council, even though not formally 
agreed on by them, was maintained essentially intact.
The Two-Tiered System for Compensating 
Permanent Partial Disability
The most controversial and unusual aspect of the legisla 
tion finally passed in Minnesota was the new two-tiered 
system for compensating permanent partial disability which 
developed out of the Citizens League study of workers' com 
pensation completed in 1982. The system attempts to be a 
synthesis of the advantages of wage loss systems and tradi 
tional schedule systems for compensating permanent partial 
disability.
In my view, a view ultimately shared by the Citizens 
League study committee which I chaired, the most compel 
ling arguments for wage loss systems are the equity 
arguments raised against schedule systems. Studies of the 
amount of workers' compensation benefits paid as com 
pared to actual economic losses in wages and medical costs 
by various workers in certain states have clearly shown that 
some employees are compensated much more than their ac 
tual economic loss while others are compensated much less. 
This inequity tends to be consistent in that those employees 
with the most serious injuries and the highest economic 
losses are paradoxically those who are most undercompen 
sated by typical schedule systems.
On the other hand, rehabilitation experts argue that 
systems for compensating disability of any sort tend to con 
tribute to the degree of disability by reducing the normal
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economic incentives for return to work. Schedule systems 
seem to offer an advantage over wage loss systems in that 
they discontinue the dependency relationship between the 
worker and the insurance company at the earliest possible 
opportunity. That minimizes the effect of compensation on 
functional overlay and incentives for return to work. 
Schedule systems also minimize the necessity for insurance 
companies to maintain relatively large numbers of open 
reserves against the potential of future wage loss, a very ex 
pensive proposition in the current insurance rating system.
Wage loss systems are also touted as reducing litigation by 
eliminating the attraction of large lump-sum payments to 
litigants and their attorneys.
These claims have not been established in practice as yet. 
It is still too early to assess the impact of wage loss on 
Florida's litigation problem. Michigan and Pennsylvania, 
two states which have had wage loss systems for some time, 
have not enjoyed low litigation rates although the litigation 
problems in those states may be, in part, the result of socio- 
economic factors. Litigation rates tend to be higher in more 
heavily industrialized, urbanized areas as compared to 
socially conservative rural areas. 8 Nevertheless, wage loss 
has not resulted in low litigation rates in those states. It can 
be argued that the ongoing dependency relationship between 
the insurance company and the claimant inherent in the wage 
loss system creates an endless source of reasons for litiga 
tion. If the only way of preventing that litigation is by not 
providing adequate money to support fees for the claimant 
to hire expert help, that is not a fair way to control litigation.
The state that has the best success at avoiding litigation, 
given its socio-economic makeup, is probably the State of 
Wisconsin, with a relatively high degree of industrialization 
and a startlingly low litigation rate. 9 The Wisconsin system
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benefits from a very detailed set of disability schedules which 
avoid litigation over degree of disability by minimizing the 
grounds for dispute over degree of disability.
The Minnesota two-tiered system for compensating per 
manent partial disability attempts to resolve the equity issues 
raised against scheduled systems by wage loss supporters. 
John Burton, for example, has shown that in Wisconsin, 
Alabama and Florida (before wage loss), with systems 
similar in structure to permanent partial disability systems, 
workers with more serious injuries tend to have their actual 
economic losses less well-compensated than those with less 
serious injuries. The new Minnesota system attempts to cor 
rect this equity problem by distinguishing between minor and 
serious injuries, and by distinguishing between those workers 
who are able to return to employment quickly and easily and 
those who are unable to do so.
Litigation control is accomplished through authority of 
the Department of Labor and Industry to develop detailed 
disability schedules to eliminate causes for dispute. 
Testimony from the medical community indicates that 
disputes over degree of disability tend not to reflect disputes 
over diagnoses but rather differences in medical opinions 
over what disability results from a given medical condition. 
The Medical Association is providing substantial support to 
the Department in developing schedules which will list 
specific conditions (e.g., laminectomy with good result—15 
percent) by the effective date of the Act—January 1, 1984.
The system provides better equity for more serious injuries 
through a sliding scale of compensation for degree of 
disability (see appendix 1). As a result, 60 percent disability 
of the body pays substantially more than four times as much 
as 15 percent of the body.
In addition, the employer is liable for a lower permanent 
partial disability award if he makes the employee a suitable
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job offer within 90 days after the date of maximum medical 
improvement. The job offered need not be the employee's 
old job, but it must meet rehabilitation standards which in 
clude such aspects as permanency, benefits, salary levels and 
so on. The basic rehabilitation test is that the new job help 
the employee to recover an economic status as close as possi 
ble to the one that he enjoyed before the accident. Tem 
porary partial disability payments to make up partial wage 
loss are available indefinitely. The job offered need not be 
with the old employer. Any job found by the employee dur 
ing a 90-day period after maximum medical improvement 
qualifies.
If the job offer is made within the prescribed time period, 
the employee is entitled to an impairment award which is 
somewhat smaller than the current permanent partial 
disability award. The impairment award is based on a dollar 
amount for the whole person, with no difference resulting 
from differences in wage levels. This provides the same com 
pensation for a rich person's hand as a poor person's hand if 
each is able to return to his old job or another job like it.
If the job offer is not made during the prescribed time 
period, the employee is entitled to a substantially larger 
economic recovery benefit which is based on the degree of 
disability and his wage at the time of the injury. That benefit 
vests on the expiration of the 90-day period and the 
employee is entitled to it regardless of whether he finds a job 
or not in the future.
On the other hand, either the impairment or the economic 
recovery benefit is paid to the employee as a lump sum only 
when he goes to work (the impairment benefit when he ac 
cepts the job offer, the economic recovery benefit when he 
finds a job on his own). If the employee does not choose to 
go to work for whatever reason, he begins receiving either 
award as a weekly benefit replacing temporary total disabili 
ty payments.
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Under the old Minnesota system, temporary total disabili 
ty benefits continue for an unlimited period of time as long 
as a worker suffers disability as a result of his injury. This 
gives Minnesota, in effect, a wage loss system in addition to 
a fairly generous schedule system. Cost control is only ac 
complished by insurers working with employees to make sure 
that they continue to make a diligent effort to seek work. 
Lack of cooperation with a rehabilitation plan or lack of a 
diligent effort to seek work is grounds for termination, but 
suits over termination of benefits are frequently lost by 
employers and insurers. This system results in a constant 
train of cutoffs followed by litigation followed by reinstate 
ment followed by cutoffs, making effective rehabilitation 
unlikely and contributing to the relatively high incidence of 
permanent total disability and the relatively long duration of 
temporary total disability in Minnesota as compared to 
Wisconsin.
The new two-tiered system replaces the stick of the 
employer's threats to cut off benefits with the economic in 
centive of lump-sum payment when the employee finds a job 
on his own. Rehabilitation services are available to the 
employee during that time, but the insurance company no 
longer has any substantial economic interest in forcing the 
employee to look for work. The employee's incentive to look 
for work is the same as the incentive which makes most of us 
work—simple financial gain.
The details of the Minnesota two-tiered benefit system are 
discussed in more detail in the Appendices.
Other Major Provisions in Minnesota Legislation
Medical Monitoring System
To get control of medical costs and medical utilization 
under the workers' compensation system in Minnesota, a
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substantial system of medical monitoring has been establish 
ed based on peer review systems in use in other sectors.
A panel consisting of medical providers, employer 
representatives, employee representatives, and the general 
public will review charges for medical services as well as 
utilization of those services, and relative quality of clinical 
results, and establish standards which will serve as max- 
imums for what insurance companies will be required to 
reimburse. Providers who are found to be abusing the 
system, either by overcharging or overtreating without good 
clinical results, will be disqualified from reimbursement by 
the system.
Medical testimony over degree of disability in litigated 
cases will be submitted by report only unless the workers' 
compensation judge orders the doctor to testify in court. 
Standardized medical report forms will be designed which 
provide the information necessary to determine where the in 
jury fits in the disability schedules to reduce the need for 
substantial judgmental issues to be considered in court.
Mandatory Rehabilitation in Minnesota
Under the new law, insurers will be required to do an 
assessment of whether there is a need for rehabilitation after 
60 days of lost time in the ease of most injuries and 30 days 
of lost time in the case of back injuries. A study of the 
rehabilitation system had shown that a number of fairly 
serious back cases were going one to two years before being 
referred to rehabilitation as a result of conservative treat 
ment practices by inexperienced providers. Any employee 
who is not able to return to his former job will be entitled to 
rehabilitation services. When there is a dispute over primary 
liability, rehabilitation services will be provided by the state 
and charged to the insurer if primary liability is established.
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Nonadversarial Methods 
of Resolving Disputes
Substantial increases in staffing of the Department of 
Labor and Industry patterned after staffing levels in Wiscon 
sin will provide much more extensive assistance to injured 
employees, employers and claims adjusters who require help 
under the new law. Department employees, both compensa 
tion specialists and rehabilitation specialists, will be trained 
in mediation techniques so that they can help to resolve 
disputes. Departmental attorneys who had filed claims peti 
tions against employers on behalf of employees will be phas 
ed out over a period of years and replaced with nonadver- 
sarial support for injured workers. Employees whose 
disputes with insurance companies cannot be resolved by 
normal departmental procedures will be referred to a new 
full-time mediation department which will attempt to ac 
complish settlement. Settlement judges will examine claim 
petitions submitted for cases where settlement out of court 
seems probable, and will require the parties to come in to set 
tlement conferences even before the normal pre-trial con 
ferences. The major emphasis upon nonadversarial methods 
of resolving litigation is intended not only to avoid the cost 
associated with litigation but also to avoid the bitterness 
engendered by adversarial methods and their resulting 
detrimental effects on rehabilitation and return-to-work pro 
grams.
Deregulation of Workers' Compensation 
Insurance Rates
Effective January 1, 1984, there will be no further state 
regulation of workers' compensation rates. The new system 
is essentially a "file and use system" similar to the regulation 
system for other lines of insurance in Minnesota. This 
deregulation is a result of a phased-in process that began two
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years ago as a result of 1981 legislation. The Workers' Com 
pensation Rating Association (Minnesota's industry- 
supported rating bureau) will not be permitted to publish 
proposed rates. Normal anti-trust laws will apply to the in 
surance industry in spite of federal exemptions, and infor 
mation available from the Rating Association will be limited 
to pure premium determinations. Competition between in 
surance companies under partial deregulation has already 
resulted in substantial discounts to more attractive 
employers. It is widely believed that the increased competi 
tion resulting from deregulation will encourage insurers to 
experiment in rehabilitation and return-to-work programs, 
as well as to reward those employers who are successful with 
such programs with lower premiums.
There is considerable evidence that these effects are pre 
sent already. Testimony from employers to legislative com 
mittees in 1983 indicated that a wide variety of discount 
plans are being offered by insurers in an attempt to gain 
market share. Over 20 insurers have filed plans offering dis 
counts of from 5 to 20 percent off manual rates, and more 
are expected to do so.
Conclusion
There is no question that it is easier politically for organiz 
ed labor to oppose reforms in workers' compensation 
systems designed to control costs. Workers' compensation is 
a complicated technical area, and most laymen assume that 
costs and premiums are directly linked. Although that is not 
necessarily true, as the experience in Wisconsin has clearly 
shown, it is certainly easier for labor to oppose those changes 
which offer promise of reducing costs. Such opposition has 
the side effect of increasing the credibility of the legislation 
with businessmen who also assume that benefits must be cut 
in order to save premium dollars.
The Minnesota Experience 35
In spite of the relatively acrimonious political debate over 
workers' compensation in Minnesota, there is some reason 
to believe that the initial strategy of developing a rapproche 
ment between business and labor may still be possible. The 
Workers' Compensation Advisory Council is being con 
sulted extensively by the department in the development of 
administrative rules to implement the new act, and there is 
some reason to hope that the substantial improvements in 
service to injured workers may win friends in organized 
labor as the act becomes effective.
The two-tiered system may be of some interest to students 
of workers' compensation in other states as an attempt to 
meet the equity issues so correctly raised by wage loss pro 
ponents as well as providing a system which minimizes its 
contribution to the total disability to be compensated.
Even if the theory of the two-tiered system is sound, it may 
not work unless case law decisions are consistent with the 
philosophy of the new system. Having noticed that previous 
Supreme Court decisions relied heavily on a law review arti 
cle by Senate Counsel after the passage of the major 1979 
legislation, the Department of Labor and Industry is prepar 
ing a detailed law review article with a wide variety of 
hypothetical cases in order to provide guidance both for 
practitioners in the field as well as (we hope) for judges faced 
with difficult precedent-setting decisions. 10
It is hoped that the new system will offer a way that the 
state can provide a generous system of compensation for in 
jured workers at a cost which permits its employers to be suf 
ficiently competitive with their counterparts in other states, 
that they can maintain the jobs for those employees, both 
before and after they have been injured.
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Appendix 1 
Overview of the 1983 Workers' Compensation Law
H.F. No. 274*
This summary deals with the major provisions of Minnesota Laws 1983, 
Ch. 290, the amendments to Minnesota's Workers' Compensation Law.
The 1983 amendments are intended to restructure and redistribute 
benefits, to improve the administration of the system, and to lower the 
workers' compensation costs of Minnesota employers. A schematic of 
events and benefits is presented in appendix 2.
Permanent Partial Disability
Sections 44-64. Economic recovery compensation and impairment com 
pensation replace permanent partial disability benefits and eliminate 
temporary total benefits after maximum medical improvement is reach 
ed. Whether impairment or economic recovery is payable for permanent 
partial disability depends on whether the employer makes a job offer 
meeting statutory criteria. Impairment compensation is paid if a job of 
fer is made; the payment is a lump sum if the offer is accepted, and is 
weekly if the offer is rejected. Economic recovery compensation is paid 
weekly if no job offer is made. The total economic recovery compensa 
tion payable is intended to be greater than the lump-sum impairment 
compensation, creating an incentive for the employer to make a job of 
fer. The new system does not become effective until the Commissioner of 
Labor and Industry has promulgated rules for establishing the percent 
age of loss of function to a body part. Greater detail is provided in the 
section-by-section analysis which follows.
Section 59. Economic recovery compensation for permanent partial 
disability is payable where no suitable job offer has been made within 90 
days after the employee has reached maximum medical improvement or 
has completed an approved retraining program. Temporary total com 
pensation cannot be paid concurrently with economic recovery compen 
sation. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 3p.
Section 44. The amount of economic recovery compensation is 66 2/s per 
cent of the weekly wage at the time of injury, subject to the statutory
*This summary was prepared by Joan Volz, vice president and general counsel, Workers' 
Compensation Reinsurance Association.
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maximum. The number of weeks of compensation is determined by 
multiplying the percent of disability to the body as a whole by the 
number of weeks set forth in the new statutory schedule. The new 
schedule is presented in appendix 3. For example, a 25 percent disability 
is multiplied by 600 weeks to give 150 weeks of compensation. A 100 per 
cent disability is multiplied by 1,200 weeks, giving a maximum of 1,200 
weeks of economic recovery compensation. The amendment does not 
become effective until the Commissioner of Labor and Industry has 
adopted rules scheduling the percent of disability to the body as a whole 
caused by the loss of particular members. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 
3a.
Section 60. Economic recovery compensation is paid weekly. If an 
employee who is receiving economic recovery compensation returns to 
work for at least 30 days, remaining economic recovery benefits are paid 
in a lump sum. The periodic payments are not subject to the annual ad 
justment of Minn. Stat. § 176.645. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 3q.
Section 48, 49, 65. Impairment compensation for permanent partial 
disability is payable where a job offer meeting the statutory criteria has 
been made. Temporary total compensation cannot be paid concurrently 
with impairment compensation.
The job offer must be made within 90 days after the employee has reach 
ed maximum medical improvement or has completed a retraining pro 
gram. The job offered must be within the employee's physical 
capabilities and must result in an economic status similar to that which 
the employee would have had without the disability.
The job offer may come from an employer other than the employer at 
the time of injury. If the job differs from the employee's old job, the of 
fer must be in writing. The employee must act upon the job offer within 
14 days. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 3e. The job offer may be made 
prior to reaching maximum medical improvement. Minn. Stat. § 
176.101, subd. 3f. Whether a job offer meets the statutory criteria may 
be resolved in an administrative conference. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 
3v.
Section 45. The amount of impairment compensation is determined by 
multiplying the percent of disability to the body as a whole by the 
statutorily scheduled amount. The new schedule for impairment com 
pensation is listed in appendix 4. For example, a 25 percent disability is 
multiplied by $75,000, giving an impairment amount of $18,750. A 100 
percent disability is multiplied by $400,000, making the maximum im-
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pairment compensation $400,000. As with economic recovery compensa 
tion, the impairment compensation provisions are not effective until 
rules have been adopted. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 3b.
Section 50. Impairment compensation is paid in a lump sum 30 days after 
the employee returns to work. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 3g.
Sections 47, 48, 59, 63. Temporary total compensation is payable until 90 
days after reaching maximum medical improvement or ending an ap 
proved retraining program, whichever is later. It ceases when the 
employee returns to work. If there is no permanent partial disability, the 
employee receives 26 weeks of economic recovery compensation in the 
absence of a job offer. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subds. 3d, 3e, 3p, 3t(b).
Sections 55-57. Refusal of a job offer affects the type and timing of 
benefit payments. Impairment compensation is paid weekly rather than 
in a lump sum, although a subsequent return to work entitles the 
employee to a lump-sum payment of the balance. Temporary total com 
pensation ceases. The amount of the weekly impairment compensation is 
equal to the amount of temporary total compensation the employee was 
receiving. An employee who refuses a job offer but later works at a lower 
paying job cannot receive temporary partial compensation or rehabilita 
tion. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subds. 31-3n.
Section 58. Permanent total disability entitles the employee to both per 
manent total benefits and impairment compensation. The impairment 
compensation is paid at the same interval and amount as permanent total 
compensation. Impairment compensation ceases when the total amount 
to which the employee is entitled has been paid. As under current law, 
permanent total compensation under the new law is paid weekly and is 
subject to annual escalation and the social security offset. The weekly 
impairment compensation, however, cannot be escalated or offset by 
social security. Permanent total compensation cannot be offset by any 
impairment or economic recovery compensation the employee may have 
received. Economic recovery compensation ceases when an employee is 
determined to have permanent total disability. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, 
subd. 3o.
Sections 52, 54, 63. Monitoring period compensation is payable to an 
employee who accepts a job offer, returns to work, and is later laid off 
because of economic conditions. The layoff must occur prior to the ex 
piration of the monitoring period, which begins to run upon the 
employee's return to work. The amount of weekly monitoring period 
compensation is equal to the amount of weekly temporary total benefits
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the employee was receiving. The compensation is paid during the balance 
of the monitoring period, or, if it is less, the monitoring period minus im 
pairment compensation already paid. For this purpose, impairment com 
pensation is converted to weeks by dividing it by the employee's compen 
sation rate for temporary total disability. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subds. 
3i and 3t(a). Where the layoff is due to seasonal conditions, the employee 
may continue receiving temporary partial disability compensation and 
may, if eligible, also receive unemployment compensation. Minn. Stat. § 
176.101, subd. 3k.
Sections 46, 62. The maximum impairment and economic recovery com 
pensation payable cannot exceed the maximum payable for a disability to 
the body as a whole. After receiving maximum economic recovery or im 
pairment compensation, an employee is entitled to further economic 
recovery or impairment compensation only if a greater permanent partial 
disability is sustained. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subds. 3c and 3s.
Section 63. The maximum economic recovery compensation is at least 
120 percent of the impairment compensation that would be received if 
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Appendix 3 
Schedule for Economic Recovery Compensation
Multiply Percent of Disability by Scheduled Weeks
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Appendix 4 
Schedule for Impairment Compensation






































The 1982 Changes in California
Alan Tebb
General Manager
California Workers' Compensation Institute
Background
It is my pleasure to discuss the 1982 amendments to the 
California workers' compensation law. The planning com 
mittee has asked that I summarize those changes and 
describe why the law was amended, the short term results of 
the legislated changes, and the potential long-range conse 
quences of that action.
It is inappropriate, however, to characterize the 1982 
legislative changes in California as "reform," the central 
theme of this conference. There were changes in the Califor 
nia law—indeed, massive changes—but with minor excep 
tions, the 1982 amendments did little to make the California 
compensation program more equitable, effective, or effi 
cient. Instead, my remarks might more properly be labeled, 
"The Political Realities of Workers' Compensation 
Reform," an object lesson in what happens when employees 
and employers abrogate their responsibility to participate in 
the establishment of public policy in the workers' compensa 
tion arena.
By way of background, the California law extends to 
about 600,000 employers employing 11 million covered
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workers. Compensable injuries approximate 1.3 million an 
nually, of which 375,000 are "disabling," i.e., one or more 
days lost time, and of that latter number perhaps 70,000 
work injuries result in permanent residual impairment. The 
state agency's role has been essentially passive, in large part 
limited to adjudication after a dispute has developed, and 
the bulk of its $30 million-plus budget pays for 120 referee 
teams resident in 23 offices throughout the state. Given this 
emphasis, litigation is pervasive in the California workers' 
compensation system, marked by a high degree of involve 
ment by attorneys and forensic physicians.
California Workers' Compensation Institute research 
studies establish that the costs of workers' compensation 
litigation in California exceeded $350 million in 1981. That 
total includes attorneys' fees for employee and employer, ex 
penses of medical testimony and other direct out-of-pocket 
costs incident to the litigation, but excludes benefits paid to 
workers. My purpose in mentioning this is to underscore the 
interests of other players when workers' compensation 
reform is considered, and the difficulty in making any 
changes that are perceived to affect these interests.
The 1982 Amendments
The 1982 amendments to the California workers' compen 
sation law were the first substantive changes in 10 years. 
There had been some procedural modifications during this 
period, but attempts at major revision were frustrated by the 
balance of power among the special interest groups. The 
practical effect was that organized labor's drive for higher 
benefits could be stalled by the employer lobby unless labor 
accepted the employers' demand for a quid pro quo, which 
labor was unwilling to do. Similarly, changes sought by the 
employer community were not possible without including a 
substantial benefit package, and the dominant employer
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groups thought the price too high. Both labor and manage 
ment had veto power and exercised it.
The balance shifted in 1982, due more to the entry of some 
additional players, specifically, the trial bar, than any 
change in political power, and the result was enactment of a 
workers' compensation benefit-reform package. The most 
visible feature of the package is a sharp increase in benefits. 
Over a two-year period, benefit levels will rise $660 million, 
while costs to employers will increase by nearly $1 billion. 
That represents the largest benefit increase in California 
history, if not the largest benefit increase in the history of 
workers' compensation.
I have no particular problem with the size of the benefit in 
crease, but I do have concerns with its distribution. More 
than 90 percent of the new benefit dollars will increase in 
demnity levels for permanent partial disability—the benefit 
sector most fraught with litigation and, accordingly, most 
fruitful for trial attorneys and forensic doctors—while leav 
ing maximum weekly benefits for total disability, both tem 
porary and permanent, woefully inadequate (i.e., less than 
60 percent of the statewide average wage). The 1982 benefit 
increases magnify the maldistribution of California workers' 
compensation benefits, a maldistribution I feel confident in 
predicting will require wrenching change within the current 
decade.
The reform part of the package—the quid pro quo for the 
employer community—included enactment of a provision re 
quiring factual issues in litigated claims to be determined by 
a preponderance of the evidence. Trial judges and the ap 
pellate courts over time had accepted the liberal construction 
imperative too literally in the view of many employer 
observers, and this change was an attempt to restore balance. 
The law still must be construed liberally, but the facts must 
be determined by a preponderance of evidence.
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Second, the legislation provided a statute of limitations on 
the vocational rehabilitation benefit. In 1974 California 
became the first state to adopt mandatory vocational 
rehabilitation as part of its workers' compensation law. The 
1974 enactment, however, was something less than a 
paragon of clarity, and there was a substantial question as to 
whether the benefit was open-ended or had to be exercised 
within a specific period of time after the injury. The benefit- 
reform package opted for certainty.
The most important of the reform elements was a buttress 
ing of the exclusive remedy doctrine. A series of court deci 
sions held that the employment relationship did not shield an 
employer from civil liability if the employee's injury was at 
tributable to the employer's other "capacity," e.g., as a 
manufacturer. Thus, a California employee injured in the 
course of employment by a defective product produced by 
the employer was entitled to workers' compensation benefits 
and, additionally, could bring a civil action for damages 
against the employer as a manufacturer. The 1982 legislation 
overturned these holdings, restoring the reciprocal conces 
sions of employees and employers to their original 
balance—and, according to one estimate, saving employers 
$1 billion in additional costs over the next five years.
That in general was the package. It resulted from the in 
terplay of a number of factors:
• No significant benefit increases in 10 years;
• A series of adverse appellate decisions;
• The growing political influence of the trial bar;
• The decline in the legislative muscle of the employer 
community and, to a lesser degree, statewide labor;
• Sharp differences in the priorities of the principal 
players and an inability to resolve the differences.
It was an interesting exercise in pragmatic politics, albeit one 
which requires looking backward.
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The Politics of Workers' Compensation
In 1971, the dominant employer organization and the in 
surance industry were instrumental in negotiating a signifi 
cant revision to the California workers' compensation 
system through an "agreed bill" that granted substantial 
benefit increases in exchange for major concessions by 
organized labor. Five years later, in 1976, another modest 
reform package was enacted, but this time the negotiating 
parties were limited to organized labor and the insurance in 
dustry. No employer group was actively involved in the ef 
fort—not because employers didn't have a stake, but mainly 
because of a collective inability to agree upon any pressing 
reforms in exchange for increased benefit levels.
What had happened in that five-year period? At the risk of 
oversimplifying, the major change was the end of involve 
ment by chief executive officers and other senior manage 
ment types representing employers. For whatever reason, 
responsibility for social insurance issues was transferred to 
middle level managers and, ultimately, the entire subject was 
left in the hands of the institutional employer organizations. 
At the same time employers who had been legislatively active 
(and their trade associations) lost their senior professional 
lobbyists to death and retirement and thus lost their input to 
legislative leaders.
Organized labor's role also underwent a change with the 
legislative emergence of local unions. Many of the locals 
relied heavily upon the advice of local compensation 
claimants' attorneys whose interests, vis-a-vis labor's, were 
not always consonant in workers' compensation issues. 
Statewide labor was still a force, but its positions were in 
creasingly muted or neutralized by what local unions were 
telling legislators.
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Some indication of the shifting in relative strength came in 
1977 when the insurance industry secured passage of con 
troversial legislation that altered the allocation of liability 
among multiple defendants in cumulative injury and occupa 
tional disease claims over the combined opposition of the 
employer community and organized labor. The key to its 
enactment may have been that the economic interests of the 
trial bar were unaffected.
By the 1980 session, the employer community had become 
inflexible. In theory, employers continued to adhere to the 
strategy of no benefit increases without commensurate 
reform. In reality, however, they had become entrenched 
around a policy of no change whatsoever. So the insurance 
industry and statewide labor, with the governor's office as 
marriage broker, began discussions leading to a major 
overhaul of the compensation system. The package included 
substantial benefit increases (totaling only about half the 
cost of the 1982 bill) in exchange for building more certainty 
and objectivity into the determination of permanent partial 
disability, and thereby sharply curtailed the system's 
dependence upon lawyers and forensic doctors. It was a 
game but unsuccessful effort because the trial bar, working 
through local union officials, was able to present the ap 
pearance of a divided labor camp; because employers were 
unwilling to pay higher benefits; and because of the 
unreconstructed egos of some of the parties.
Nevertheless, the pressure continued to build. The courts 
began to respond to benefit inadequacy through a series of 
decisions eroding the exclusivity of workers' compensation. 
During the 1981 legislative session, the employer and insurer 
lobby introduced a measure to restrict the courts' expanded 
definition of the "dual capacity" doctrine. It passed the 
Senate, but the Assembly Speaker would not permit its 
passage without a large increase in benefits, a price
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employers were unwilling to pay. In November, after the ses 
sion recessed, the Supreme Court handed down its decision 
in Bell vs. Industrial Vangas, 30 Cal 3d 268, which 
transmuted dual capacity into double jeopardy for 
employers.
As the 1982 session opened, the real parties weren't talk 
ing. Organized labor refused to consider an amendment to 
the dual capacity issue "because that's not a comp issue." 
Employers were reluctant to negotiate with labor without 
dual capacity being considered, and were unwilling to 
negotiate directly with the trial bar because of the magnitude 
of the benefit increases being advanced. That left the in 
surance industry and the trial bar as the only players with an 
ostensible community of interest, so their discussions began.
Originally the insurer representatives functioned as sur 
rogates for the employer groups, keeping them informed of 
developments while attempting to convince them of the need 
for movement, given the Assembly Speaker's commitment to 
pass a benefit bill—with or without other reforms. Over 
time, however, the insurer-employer relationship broke 
down because of a series of economic decisions made by the 
employer association:
• First, a decision not to support the permanent partial 
disability reforms proposed by the insurance industry 
(and bitterly resisted by the trial bar) because the ex 
pected savings couldn't be quantified. Throughout, the 
thinking seemed to be, "If benefits are increased by X 
million dollars, we need Y million back in reforms."
• Second, a decision to forego legislative repeal of the 
dual capacity doctrine and wait until the next session 
when the political climate might be more favorable, a 
wistful vision that never came to pass. This approach 
conflicted with the priorities of compensation insurers 
which felt, I think correctly, that the real reason for
52 The 1982 Changes in California
backing off was the high price tag associated with dual 
capacity repeal.
• And, finally, the employer trade associations were 
limited in the amount to be included in the benefit 
package. They couldn't make the ante. And in politics, 
as in poker, the rules dictate that when you fold your 
hand, you don't get any more cards.
With employers dropping out of the game, a series of 
amendments were drafted by the remaining principals, incor 
porated into an Assembly-passed bill in the Senate, and 
enacted into law within two weeks after surfacing.
The Impact of the Amendments
The immediate results—good news or bad news, depen 
ding upon your perspective—include containment of the 
dual capacity doctrine and removal of a threat to the legal 
underpinnings of the workers' compensation system, a 
change that will result in significant savings in loss and legal 
costs. The limitation on the vocational rehabilitation benefit 
similarly will save some unnecessary expense and permit in 
surers and employers to close files. Binding the trier of fact 
to a preponderance of evidence test has the potential to make 
workers' compensation more professional by introducing a 
standard of judicial objectivity where one didn't exist 
before. And the upgrading of disability benefits may con 
vince the civil courts that it isn't necessary to create legal fic 
tions to accomplish substantial justice for injured workers.
On the other hand, California employers are faced with 
escalating costs, upwards of 30 percent, without any mean 
ingful substantive change in the workers' compensation law. 
More litigation, fueled by higher benefit levels, can be ex 
pected. Minimum weekly benefits were adjusted dramatical 
ly and the result may be longer periods of disability for the
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low wage earner. Moreover, the higher benefits may signal a 
change in benefit utilization and an acceleration in the asser 
tion of so-called "stress" claims once the economic recovery 
is achieved.
The long term consequences of the 1982 legislation are 
more difficult to divine. All I can do is speculate, but I 
believe there will be at least two observable effects—or 
noneffects, as the case may be.
• First, no real changes in the California workers' com 
pensation system in the immediate future, despite the 
extant inequities, leakages and waste. Legislators have 
an excuse—"we dealt with comp last year"—and many 
find compensation legislation politically unattractive. 
Absent an agreed bill, comp is a "bad" vote for one or 
more of a legislator's constituencies. Legislators 
generally would prefer to avoid the issue unless they're 
pushed, and there's no one pushing them—which brings 
me to my second, equally dour projection.
• There will be no meaningful changes until the real 
stakeholders—organized labor and employers—initiate 
the movement.
Organized labor, in many instances, has permitted its role 
to be co-opted by attorneys. The complexities of workers' 
compensation are little understood by labor leaders, par 
ticularly at the local union level, and there is a tendency in 
what appears to be a highly legalistic system to yield to the 
"expert," that is, a lawyer. The interests of organized labor 
in workers' compensation legislation are not always conso 
nant with the interests of claimants' attorneys, protestations 
of the latter to the contrary notwithstanding. Unfortunately, 
the dichotomy hasn't been recognized, much less 
acknowledged.
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The other factor in the formula, the employer community, 
is at least as troubling. Today employers complain about be 
ing frozen out of the legislative negotiations, but the truth is 
that they voluntarily isolated themselves. Unless they 
demonstrate a willingness to participate in the political arena 
where the workers' compensation policy decisions are made, 
the legislative decisions will continue to be dictated by the 
scorekeepers and linesmen.
Conclusion
Obviously, my remarks are pertinent only to California. I 
suggest, however, that the 1982 experience in California may 
have application to other jurisdictions, and the differences 
are more of degree than substance.
If there is a lesson, it is that workers' compensation is a 
statutory creature. Changes, no matter how well-reasoned 
and researched, cannot be accomplished in academe, by 
studies, or by the imprimatur of blue ribbon commissions. 
Real change requires legislative action in a political environ 
ment. Until that lesson is accepted, reform—that is, im 
provement—of the workers' compensation system cannot be 
realized.
Two Rounds of Workers' 
Compensation Reform in Michigan
H. Allan Hunt
Manager of Research
W. E. Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research
By the mid-1970s Michigan's workers' compensation 
system for workers disabled by injuries or illnesses arising 
out of their employment was approaching a crisis. 1 Relative 
to neighboring states, Michigan's workers' compensation in 
surance rates had risen alarmingly after 1958 according to 
John Burton's employer cost statistics. Table 1 shows that 
from 1958 to 1975 workers' compensation insurance rates 
nearly tripled in Michigan, while they doubled in Illinois and 
Ohio and held relatively constant in Wisconsin and Indiana. 
Over this period Michigan's rates rose from 20 percent below 
average to 35 percent above average for the 28 states for 
which consistent data are available. 2
Of course there was another reason to be considering 
reform in workers' compensation systems in the mid-70s. 
The Report of the National Commission on State 
Workmen's Compensation Laws was published in 1972. The 
appointment of that National Commission had reflected 
substantial congressional dissatisfaction with the status of
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state workers' compensation systems. The Commission, 
after due consideration, found that state laws generally did 
not provide adequate, prompt, or equitable systems for com 
pensating disabled workers. It offered a set of 84 recommen 
dations for the improvement of these systems; 19 of these 
were deemed so important as to be "Essential Recommenda 
tions." The National Commission urged that if the states 
had not complied with this restricted list by July 1, 1975, 
Congress should take steps to guarantee compliance. 3
Table 1
Standardized Insurance Manual Rates for


















































SOURCE: John F. Burton, Jr., Workers' Compensation Cost for Employers, Research 
Report of the Interdepartmental Workers' Compensation Task Force, Vol. 3, U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, June 1979, table 12, p. 28. 
a. For 45 selected insurance classes, weighted by U.S. payroll distribution. Entries repre 
sent the standardized percentage of payroll that would be charged for workers' compensa 
tion insurance coverage, 
b. Unweighted.
c. Unweighted average for 28 states where NCCI data are available for each of the listed 
years.
This reform atmosphere was reflected in the appointment 
by William G. Milliken of a Governor's Workmen's Com 
pensation Advisory Commission in 1974 to: (1) review the 
report of the National Commission and other federal in 
itiatives in the occupational safety and health area;
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(2) evaluate the adequacy of the Michigan system; and
(3) "recommend legislation to alter or amend the existing 
laws to ensure a just, fair and equitable workmen's compen 
sation program for Michigan." 4 Unfortunately, it did not 
prove to be a feasible assignment. The letter of transmittal 
from Dean St. Antoine, Chairman of the Governor's Ad 
visory Commission, began with the following paragraph:
It is with regret that I must inform you that your 
Workmen's Compensation Advisory Commission 
has been unable to reach agreement upon a com 
prehensive set of recommendations for the im 
provement of workers' compensation in Michigan. 
Every effort was made, but the obstacles were in 
surmountable. 5
In essence, the report of the Commission consisted of a 
discussion of the issues, accompanied by recapitulations of 
the positions adopted by employer and employee represen 
tatives. The document does not suggest a "near miss" on 
negotiating workers' compensation reform; the parties were 
far apart on issues ranging from the definition of disability 
to the statute of limitations.
After this failure to negotiate reform in face-to-face con 
frontations on the Governor's Advisory Commission, ef 
forts to forge a labor/management compromise on workers' 
compensation reform continued in the legislature. The most 
notable of these was Senate Bill 1285, introduced in 
December 1977 after extensive private discussions. This 
bipartisan proposal made a broad attack on alleged abuses 
of workers' compensation as well as altering the benefit for 
mula to reflect after-tax earnings and instituting a retrospec 
tive inflation adjustment plan. However, the compromise 
coalition eventually collapsed when the Senate Labor Com 
mittee began amending the package, and no legislation was 
enacted. As will be seen later, this bill contained many of the 
elements of the eventual reforms enacted in 1980. 6
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Assessing the situation as it existed in 1978, a number of 
observations can be made. First, the cost of workers' com 
pensation in Michigan was very high. According to Pro 
fessor Burton's results displayed in table 2, Michigan ranked 
3rd highest nationally in standardized workers' compensa 
tion insurance rates for manufacturing employers, more 
than 80 percent above the average figure for other states. For 
a group of general employers (table 3), Michigan ranked 7th 
highest, 44 percent above average. 7
Manual rates are sometimes viewed with suspicion in 
Michigan because of the large proportion of self-insureds in 
the state. In recent years, approximately 40 percent of in 
demnity payments have been made by self-insured 
employers. For that reason, it is also valuable to look at total 
benefit payments in the workers' compensation programs.
Table 4 shows that according to data published by Daniel 
Price of the Social Security Administration on actual 
benefits paid by all employers in the various states, Michigan 
ranked 12th in benefit cost relative to payroll, 21 percent 
above the average for the nation as a whole. 8 The cost of 
workers' compensation in Michigan was undeniably high.
Ironically, Michigan's benefit schedule in 1978 was quite 
low. In that year, the maximum benefit available to 
Michigan claimants (if their earnings and number of 
dependents were sufficient to warrant it) was $171 a week. 
As shown in table 5, this maximum benefit ranked 28th 
highest among the states, i.e., lower than the median. When 
the maximum benefit is expressed as a proportion of each 
state's average weekly wage, Michigan actually ranked even 
lower, 39th in the nation. 9 Results from the Michigan Closed 
Case Survey (an Upjohn Institute data base of 2,200 
Michigan workers' compensation cases closed in 1978) con 
firm these figures on income replacement levels in 
Michigan's system. The average weekly payment case in 1978
Reform in Michigan 59
received 58 percent of weekly earnings, not the nominal 67 
percent called for in the statute. 10 Thus it is also undeniable 
that benefit levels in Michigan, at least as measured by week 
ly payments, were low.
Table 2
Adjusted Manual Rates (per $100 of payroll) 

































































































































































































































SOURCE: Calculated from Martin W. Elson and John F. Burton, Jr., "Workers' Com 
pensation Insurance: Recent Trends in Employer Costs," Monthly Labor Review, March 
1981, table 1.
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Table 3
Adjusted Manual Rates (per $100 of payroll) 

































































































































































































































SOURCE: Calculated from Martin W. Elson and John F. Burton, Jr., "Workers' Com 
pensation Insurance: Recent Trends in Employer Costs," Monthly Labor Review, March 
1981, table 1.
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1. Daniel N. Price, "Workers' Compensation: Coverage, Benefits, and Costs, 1979," Social Security Bulletin, September 1981, Vol. 44, No. 9, 2
table 2. o'cr
2. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 41-80, Handbook of Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1978, Taxable, p. 1, U.S. OQ* 






































































































Kentucky 45 112.00 219.60 0.51
Louisiana 38 130.00 229.81 0.57
Maine 5 231.72 185.77 1.25
Maryland 12 202.00 224.14 0.90
Massachusetts 35 150.00 224.21 0.67
Michigan 28 171.00 288.96 0.59
Minnesota 14 197.00 226.97 0.87
Mississippi 49 91.00 182.91 0.50
Missouri 44 115.00 226.20 0.51
Montana 17 188.00 201.87 0.93
Nebraska 30 155.00 199.78 0.78
Nevada 10 212.02 227.34 0.93
New Hampshire 20 180.00 196.14 0.92
New Jersey 37 146.00 250.31 0.58
New Mexico 26 172.46 202.37 0.85
New York 21 180.00 259.47 0.69 %
North Carolina 29 168.00 192.30 0.87 g»
North Dakota 22 180.00 200.70 0.90 3
Ohio 8 216.00 255.64 0.84 ^
Oklahoma 42 121.00 219.25 0.55 «•
Oregon 6 224.16 232.45 0.96 |»
Pennsylvania 9 213.00 233.96 0.91 g










































































1. U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Division of State Workers' Compensation Standards, July 1978.
2. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 41-80, Handbook of Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1978, Taxable, p. 1, U.S. 
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.
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Furthermore, since Michigan had experienced no major 
changes in statute while other states had been moving to im 
plement some of the National Commission recommenda 
tions, Michigan's standing relative to those other states was 
steadily deteriorating. In 1972, when the average state com 
pliance score with the 19 essential recommendations of the 
National Commission stood at 6.9, Michigan had complied 
with 11 of the 19, ranking 4th among the states. Table 6 
shows that by 1978 the average compliance score had risen to 
11.7 and Michigan, still with only 11, had fallen to a rank of 
27th. 11
By 1979, even those who might have preferred to do 
nothing rather than moving in the direction of reform along 
the lines of the National Commission recommendations were 
frustrated. There was no shortage of opinions as to what 
reforms were needed to cope with Michigan's problems. 12 
What was missing was a spirit of compromise, or a feeling of 
sufficient urgency to overcome old adversarial attitudes and 
patterns.
When the Governor and the legislative leadership an 
nounced a joint Workers' Compensation Reform Task Force 
in May of 1979, it seemed that the lessons of the past would 
enable the Task Force to effectively negotiate around the 
shoals of previous failures and bring workers' compensation 
reform to reality. Unfortunately it was not to be. Agreement 
was reached on changes in the benefit formula and on max- 
imums and minimums, but progress was ended when it could 
not be established whether the savings from coordination of 
benefits (which employers wanted) would truly offset the 
cost of inflation protection (which organized labor sought 
for employees). There were recriminations over the available 
data and accusations about the fairness of the analysis; more 
fundamentally there was insufficient sentiment for com 
promise, and neither side could impose its will on the other.
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Table 6
Full Compliance Scores Based on the 19 Essential Recommendations 
































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Division 
of State Workers' Compensation Standards, January 1981.
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After meeting intermittently from June through December 
1979, the Workers' Compensation Reform Task Force col 
lapsed as well.
During 1980 there were occasional rumors of progress, 
especially when the Democratic Chairman of the Senate 
Labor Committee announced that a new coalition of small 
business and the AFL-CIO had agreed on a compromise 
package. Hearings were held on this package, and it was 
reported out by the Committee, but the lack of enthusiasm 
from the state's largest employers and its largest union (i.e., 
the auto industry) doomed the effort. Finally, in December 
of 1980, the Governor and the legislative leadership held a 
series of closed-door meetings and hammered out a minimal 
reform package very similar to old S.B. 1285 from 1977. 
When this bill (S.B. 1044) was subsequently passed and sign 
ed into law without major amendment, the long legislative 
log jam in Michigan was finally broken. Round one was at 
last completed.
The goal of the 1979-80 effort had been not simply to 
reform Michigan's workers' compensation system, but to 
make improvements in the system without imposing any 
substantial cost penalty on Michigan's already burdened 
employers. However, the 1980 package when evaluated by 
the actuarial consulting firm of Tillinghast, Nelson & War 
ren, was found to meet these goals only for those employers 
who purchased commercial insurance coverage. Estimates 
were that S.B. 1044 would increase the workers' compensa 
tion costs for this group of employers by just 0.7 percent 
overall. For larger employers who self-insure the increase 
would be in the range of 25 to 35 percent. 13 This uneven im 
pact resulted primarily from past inequities in income 
replacement rates between high-wage and low-wage workers. 
The old benefit formula severely capped weekly benefits for 
high-wage workers while sometimes giving more than 100 
percent wage replacement to low-wage workers. Thus when
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the benefit formula was rationalized, by making the replace 
ment of lost wages at a more consistent rate for many more 
workers, employers who had formerly been paying at the 
relatively low maximums would experience the most signifi 
cant cost increases.
This is demonstrated in table 7, developed from the 
Michigan Closed Case Survey. It shows that 98 percent of 
weekly payment cases from the big three auto producers 
were paid the maximum benefit for their dependency class in 
1978. Over 73 percent of other self-insured cases and 52 per 
cent of carrier-insured cases also received the maximum 
benefit. On the other hand, no big three cases at all received 
the minimum benefit while 9 percent of other self-insured 
and 22 percent of carrier cases qualified for minimum 
payments.
As a result there was a massive outcry from employer 
groups throughout the State of Michigan. Insistent demands 
for workers' compensation cost reductions became an im 
portant part of the political climate in 1981 in many 
legislative districts. The pressure from employer groups, 
together with the general pro-business swing in the nation 
and in the state, resulted in another series of amendments to 
the workers' compensation system at the end of 1981; most 
of these were designed simply to reduce the cost of workers' 
compensation coverage for all employers large and small. 
These changes were enacted over the outraged objections of 
both the UAW and AFL-CIO.
The reform coalition this time consisted of a unanimous 
Republican caucus and a dozen or so "renegade" Democrats 
who risked the wrath of organized labor to secure leadership 
positions in this round of workers' compensation reform. 
The result was that the legislative leadership for the 1981 
reforms was almost totally new; the "old hands" at workers' 
compensation issues were generally excluded from the pro-
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Chi-square (unweighted) = 197.07** with 4 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
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cess. Round two of reform in Michigan thus had a very dif 
ferent flavor.
While these two separate reform packages had very dif 
ferent objectives and mechanisms of attack, it seems ap 
propriate to discuss all the new provisions together to pro 
vide a better feel for the magnitude of change enacted in 
Michigan's workers' compensation system. Most of these 
new provisions went into effect either on January 1 or April 
1, 1982. 14
Benefit Formula
The most significant change in the workers' compensation 
system is clearly the change in the benefit formula. This will 
have a direct impact on claimants and is also the single big 
gest cost item of all the reforms. The old benefit formula 
provided replacement of two-thirds of gross earnings (in 
cluding fringe benefits not continued during disability). The 
new law calls for a basic benefit of 80 percent of after-tax 
earnings (deductions to include federal and state income tax 
and OASDHI taxes). These 1980 changes were amended in 
1981 to provide that fringe benefits are to be included in the 
calculation of the benefit only if the level of the benefit is less 
than the old maximum benefit. 15
Maximum Benefit
The old maximum benefit was two-thirds of the state 
average weekly wage (SAWW), but less if fewer than five 
dependents were claimed. As noted above, this resulted in a 
majority of claimants receiving less than two-thirds replace 
ment of their gross earnings in workers' compensation 
benefits. 16 The new maximum benefit is set at 90 percent of 
the SAWW without regard to dependency. Currently the 
number of dependents influences the benefit level only 
through its effect on deductions, and thus after-tax earnings.
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The net result is that most workers who earn more than the 
SAWW will qualify for higher benefits than they would have 
under the old law.
Minimum Benefit
The old minimum benefits (which were very high due to an 
earlier court decision that indexed them along with the max- 
imums) were eliminated. 17 There is now no minimum benefit 
for general disability cases; low-wage workers simply receive 
80 percent of their after-tax earnings. Exceptions are made 
for fatality claims and specific loss claims, where minimum 
benefit levels are set at 50 percent and 25 percent of the 
SAWW respectively.
Coordination of Benefits
The second most significant area of reform is the coor 
dination of benefits between different income maintenance 
programs paid for, in part or in total, by the disabled 
worker's employer. The basic approach here is to put the 
workers' compensation benefit dollar last in the queue in 
those cases where multiple benefits are received by the claim 
ant. The Michigan approach is very broad; the offset against 
other benefits applies to unemployment insurance, other 
state workers' compensation benefits for the same condition, 
private disability, wage continuation or pension plans, Old 
Age and Survivor's Insurance (OASI), and "other" income 
maintenance plans. It is also provided that, if and when it 
becomes possible again, Michigan's workers' compensation 
benefits will be coordinated with federal Disability Insurance 
payments.
In each case, the workers' compensation benefit under 
Michigan law is reduced by benefits in these other programs 
according to the proportion of the benefit financed by 
employer payments. Thus in the case of OASI, the employer
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is allowed a credit of 50 percent of the monthly OASI benefit 
against the workers' compensation benefit, since the 
employer provided 50 percent of the tax payments to the 
OASI program. These benefit coordination provisions do 
not apply to benefits for specific loss claims, or to payments 
from disability pension plans that were in operation previous 
to the effective date of the statute. However, the statute 
specifically allows that such existing plans may be modified 
to allow coordination if the parties wish. These coordination 
of benefits provisions are expected to lead to significant cost 
savings for Michigan employers, particularly larger 
employers with extensive fringe benefit plans.
Retiree Claims
In addition to the coordination of benefits described 
above, there was another attack on what many had regarded 
as the most flagrant abuse of Michigan's workers' compen 
sation system—claims from retired workers. The 1980 
package introduced a new presumption of no loss of earn 
ings or earning capacity on the part of a claimant who is 
receiving nondisability pension or retirement benefits (in 
cluding OASI). While this presumption can be rebutted by a 
preponderance of the evidence, it should help to reduce 
claims from retired workers, especially when considered in 
conjunction with the offset for other retirement benefits pro 
vided under the coordination of benefits provisions.
Inflation Protection
The 1980 reforms also included the addition of a new 
retrospective inflation protection plan applying to all cases 
with injury dates before January 1, 1980. A state-financed 
Compensation Supplement Fund was established for this 
purpose. A benefit supplement equal to the increase in the 
SAWW (not to exceed 5 percent for any year) is to be paid to 
all continuing claims from these years. The benefit adjust-
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ment payments are made by the insurers directly to 
claimants, with quarterly reimbursements from the Compen 
sation Supplement Fund. This provision is an attempt to 
maintain a major share of the original purchasing power of 
workers' compensation benefits for existing long term 
disability cases. There are no provisions for additional ad 
justments in the future for these or other claimants, but the 
Director of the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation 
is ordered to conduct biannual studies of the general ade 
quacy of benefits, specifically including the impact of infla 
tion.
Statute of Limitations
Both the 1980 and 1981 reform packages addressed the 
statute of limitations under the workers' compensation law. 
The old statute of limitations had been rendered ineffective 
by a requirement that if the employer did not give notice of 
the injury to the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensa 
tion, the time period did not begin to toll. The 1980 reforms 
resurrected by the statute by striking the employer notice re 
quirement and simply providing that the claim must be 
entered within two years of the occurrence of the injury, the 
date the disability manifests itself, or the last day of employ 
ment. The 1981 reforms recomplicated this by adding a new 
requirement that the employee must give notice to the 
employer within 90 days of the injury. If this requirement is 
not met, the employer can contest the case on the grounds 
that the failure by the employee to provide notification of 
the injury prejudiced the employer's defense against the 
claim. 18
Definition of Disability
Both packages also attacked the issue of the definition of 
disability. The 1980 reforms contained language designed to 
tighten up on claims involving mental disabilities, conditions
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resulting from the aging process, and social and recreational 
injuries. The 1981 reform went much deeper into the 
substance of the law. It defined disability in terms of a 
general field of employment, rather than a specific job as in 
the old law. It also separated the issue of disability from that 
of wage loss in an attempt to further tighten eligibility stan 
dards. There is a new provision for disqualification if the 
claimant refuses a bona fide offer of reasonable employ 
ment. A significant complication was introduced concerning 
reemployment and favored work. If an injured employee has 
returned to work for more than 100 weeks and subsequently 
loses that job, only partial disability payments can be paid. 
If fewer than 100 weeks of new work experience are obtain 
ed, full disability eligibility is maintained on the basis of the 
original job.
There is also a requirement for notification to the 
Michigan Employment Security Commission when disabled 
workers are unemployed. That agency is directed to give 
priority treatment to such referrals. The intent was to urge 
partially disabled workers to return to work, but the statute 
is so complex it will take some sorting out by the courts. 
Meanwhile, the entire definition of disability section is slated 
to expire at the end of 1984.
Logging Industry
The 1980 package expanded the Silicosis and Dust Disease 
Fund to the Silicosis, Dust Disease, and Logging Industry 
Compensation Fund (emphasis added). This imposes a 
$12,500 insurer liability limit on each workers' compensation 
claim arising in the logging industry. Any benefits above 
$12,500 per claim will be paid by the Fund rather than the in 
dividual insurer. This has the effect of transferring the 
burden of expensive claims in the logging industry to the 
general employer population, since the Fund is financed by
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proportional assessment on all employers. This special fund 
is due to expire at the end of 1985.
Medical Costs
Another complicating provision is the imposition of a 
medical cost regulation scheme into the workers' compensa 
tion system. The Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensa 
tion is directed to establish fee schedules for medical treat 
ment under the workers' compensation statute. In addition, 
they are to monitor the performance of providers of service 
and establish utilization review procedures for individual 
workers' compensation cases. This reflects the interest of 
one of the major Democratic participants in the 1981 reform 
coalition.
Redemptions
The 1981 reform package also included an outright pro 
hibition of redemptions (compromise and release set 
tlements) for any petitions filed after January 1, 1984. In 
asmuch as 70 percent of all litigated cases are redeemed in 
Michigan (settled with a lump sum), this provision could 
have enormous significance for the way the Michigan 
workers' compensation system really works. 19 No one is yet 
able to predict what this will mean, however.
Rate-making
Last, but by no means least, reform of the workers' com 
pensation insurance procedures should also be reported here. 
Even though this provision was not enacted until 1982, it was 
under discussion with the 1981 reforms, and everyone 
understood it to be a part of the total package. The 
legislature mandated a 20 percent rollback for the 1982 
policy year in the average manual premium rate for workers' 
compensation insurance coverage in the state. They also
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directed that Michigan should move to "open competition" 
in workers' compensation insurance rates effective January 
1, 1983.
Michigan's system provides for a "file and use" procedure 
with a new public body, the Workers' Compensation Data 
Collection Agency, responsible for collecting and 
disseminating the pure premium data to be used by the in 
dividual insurance companies to set their rates. Undoubted 
ly, the way that workers' compensation insurance carriers do 
their business will be altered; it is not clear exactly what im 
pact this change in procedures will have on the system as a 
whole. Those who promoted this reform felt that it would 
lead to lower prices for workers' compensation insurance as 
the competitive pressures of the free market were felt in the 
insurance industry. 20
There are many smaller changes that have been omitted 
from this discussion, some of which may turn out to have 
greater significance than is evident now. The most important 
point to make may be that many of these enactments will de 
pend on court decisions for their specific content. Obviously, 
it will be some years before the true impact of this entire set 
of reforms will be apparent. At the moment, one must be 
content to point out the significant changes that have been 
accomplished: (1) the benefit structure has been rationalized 
considerably; (2) some of the most serious abuses cited by 
employer groups have been addressed; and (3) part of the 
loss imposed on the long term disabled by inflation in the last 
decade has been restored.
Early in 1982, commercial insurance carriers through the 
Workers' Compensation Rating and Inspection Association 
of Michigan (WCRIAM) filed for a rate reduction of 22 per 
cent in the average workers' compensation premium. As was 
discussed earlier, this was not the result of an actuarial 
evaluation, but was WCRIAM's response to a legislatively
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mandated rollback of at least 20 percent in premium levels. 
Thus it is not at all clear that this represents the actual an 
ticipated cost impact of the reforms.
Even if some of the reforms turn out to have been ill- 
advised, any errors were the natural by-product of the 
pressure-cooker legislative environment that was required to 
break the stalemate that had developed in Michigan. It is to 
be hoped that necessary updating will not prove as difficult 
in the future. Taken as a whole, the two rounds of reform 
appear to constitute a significant improvement in Michigan's 
workers' compensation system.
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According to the program, this presentation deals with 
legislative efforts concerning workers' compensation laws in 
the States of Louisiana and New Mexico. Both of these states 
are a long way from Rutgers, and may appear to have little 
relevance to a program the avowed purpose of which is to 
focus on the workers' compensation systems of three north 
eastern states. Relevance may now appear to take more of a 
beating, since it is my intention to also discuss the States of 
Florida, Delaware and Alaska, which are at least as remote, 
in the political if not the physical sense, from the states 
which are to be the subject of our concern as the two 
previously mentioned.
Actually, the topic is better described as "Workers' Com 
pensation Reform and How to Get It." Now, reform is a dif 
ficult subject to discuss, since it is to a great extent in the eye 
of the beholder. It may not even be excessively cynical or 
egotistical to say that reform is what I do, as opposed to 
whatever it is the rest of you do. However, to avoid con 
troversy, for today's purposes, the term "reform" will refer 
to significant changes in a workers' compensation law in-
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tended to provide long term solutions to perceived defects or 
deficiencies in the system—as opposed to what is best 
described as tinkering, which, unfortunately, is the usual 
legislative response to workers' compensation problems.
Given this unilateral change of topic, the relevancy of the 
states previously mentioned becomes apparent. All of these 
states have been involved, or are involved, in workers' com 
pensation reform efforts. The patterns of success versus 
failure, and the events which led to the respective conclu 
sions, are remarkably similar in these states, and as a result 
highly instructive for any state wishing to institute the long 
and difficult process of workers' compensation reform.
As distasteful and/or redundant as it may be to many of 
you, the first portion of our discussion will deal with the no 
longer recent Florida reform effort, which culminated with 
the legislation passed in 1979. Most aspects of the Florida ex 
perience have been talked to death and, fortunately, need 
not even be mentioned. What is of importance is how the 
forces in Florida arrived at what they believed to be a solu 
tion to the state's workers' compensation problems.
Most people in the compensation community are aware of 
the events of the 1979 Florida legislation session, and some 
are aware of the efforts made during the 1978 session, which 
resulted in some temporary patchwork and the famous 
"sunset" provision, which, theoretically, would have 
eliminated Florida's workers' compensation law in 1979 if 
new legislation had not been passed. Very few are aware of 
the years of work which went into preparing the state and the 
legislature to deal with workers' compensation on a mean 
ingful basis. A significant amount of research was perform 
ed by a wide variety of groups and individuals, including Dr. 
John Burton, Associated Industries of Florida, the Florida 
Association of Insurance Agents, and myself. This research 
furnished the bedrock for the reform effort, since it provided
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everyone involved in the process with factual information as 
to what was going on in the system. In addition, the Florida 
Workers' Compensation Advisory Council had spent several 
years looking at the compensation system and discussing the 
problems of all the interests involved, each of which was 
represented on the Council by individuals who were initially 
or took the time and trouble to become knowledgeable in 
workers' compensation matters. The Council itself was 
somewhat remarkable in that its activities were devoid of the 
public posturing and recriminations which often mark 
similar attempts at compromise. As a result, the Council was 
able to deal with substance, rather than illusion, and virtual 
ly all of its recommendations were adopted without internal 
dissent.
Another ingredient in the process was education. Through 
the activities of the trade groups mentioned above and 
others, numerous newspaper articles, including an influen 
tial series by the Miami Herald, a major legislative con 
ference, and many months of study by a legislative joint 
committee, the general public and many members of the 
legislature were made aware of what the compensation 
system was all about and how it was performing or failing to 
perform. Most important, and perhaps by coincidence, one 
member of each house of the legislature became extremely 
well-educated as to the workings of the system, as well as the 
various reform proposals and their probable impact. As a 
result, they were able to provide leadership in legislative 
discussions and to keep the basic reform program together 
during the various committee and floor debates and through 
the critical late-night negotiating sessions.
The final component of the reform process was the 
cooperation between labor and management, which in terms 
of political reality left the legislature and the governor with 
little choice when the agreed upon package came to them for 
approval, despite the opposition of other, usually powerful,
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interests. This coalition may not appear unique, but to the 
extent to which it was based upon the best interests of the 
two groups involved to the exclusion of peripheral interests 
in the compensation system, it is unique. It is interesting to 
note that many of the critics of the new Florida system fault 
the act of cooperation by the AFL-CIO leadership, rather 
than praise it. In reality, organized labor in Florida gained 
far more than it lost in 1979, and certainly benefited from 
the coalition, as compared to what most likely would have 
happened had the bill been structured through normal con 
frontation politics. In fact, if one compares what has hap 
pened to the workers' benefit package as the result of less 
publicized "reform" efforts in other states, the result in 
Florida looks better and better for the injured worker.
By way of comparison, we can look at the State of 
Delaware, which, in spite of significant political effort and 
what I believe to be the best of intentions on the part of most 
of those involved in the reform effort, repeatedly turned 
back a proposal far more financially generous than that 
which was passed in Florida, as well as in other states.
Delaware's reform effort grew out of an official study 
commission, which, near the end of its deliberations, became 
aware of the new Florida law and decided to emulate it. Un 
fortunately, the effort did not include, nor, for reasons of 
time, could it, the research and education portion of the 
Florida experience. In addition, the proponents of the bill 
which was drafted were faced with the knee-jerk reaction of 
some interest groups to any proposal that even looked like 
Florida's, which, as you well know, has been the subject of 
some of the least informed criticism of any workers' com 
pensation law in history. As a result, numerous mistakes 
were made which, in retrospect, virtually guaranteed the 
failure of the reform effort. Certain interest groups were 
made to appear to be the source of all of the system's prob 
lems, which insured their opposition. Because of the lack of
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factual information about the system and its shortcomings, 
broad support for change did not develop. The business 
community split, primarily as the result of internal political 
maneuvering. Organized labor was equally as divided, 
despite early support for the proposal, apparently because of 
outside influences having little to do with the merits of the 
legislative proposal. Finally, there was virtually no workers' 
compensation expertise within the legislature, so that op 
ponents were able to sway votes by actually asserting that the 
only thing wrong with the system was the fact that insurance 
companies were taking in around $50,000,000.00 a year in 
premium, and paying out about $5,000,000.00 in benefits. 
The lack of knowledge on the part of many of those involved 
in the legislative debate was highlighted by Senate floor 
debate, which included fierce opposition to portions of the 
bill which merely recodified existing law, the very law which 
they claimed was virtually fault free. All of these problems 
and mistakes were probably aggravated by a political deci 
sion to go right back to the legislature after the bill's initial 
defeat instead of taking a year or two to do the basic work 
required to make a strong case for reform and for the pro 
posal. Against this background of success and failure we can 
now look at and evaluate the recent developments in Loui 
siana and New Mexico.
Louisiana
From a political standpoint, Louisiana is a very interesting 
state in that virtually all aspects of government are highly 
politicized, with administrative appointments on many levels 
and virtually all legislative action based on interest group 
pressure and power politics. Contrary to popular belief, 
organized labor plays a significant role in this process and 
often can lay claim to "owning" one or the other house of 
the legislature, or both, as well as the governor's office. 
Please understand that the use of the term "own" is in the
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political sense, and not the literal sense. The extent to which 
this state of affairs affects the actions of those involved in 
the political process was brought home to me on one of my 
first trips to the state, for a meeting with a broad spectrum of 
the business community. Several representatives of major, 
national employers expressed reservations about a proposal 
to create an administrative body to run the compensation 
program, on the grounds that at some point the political 
power held by "the other side" would result in a totally 
employee-oriented administration. Although this view was 
eventually rejected, it does illustrate how even major players 
in the political arena can be inhibited in efforts to improve a 
workers' compensation system.
The Louisiana effort, which was successful, parallels 
Florida in many respects. The impetus for reform came from 
the state's major business organization, the Louisiana 
Association of Business and Industry (LABI). Unlike most 
business associations, LABI is headed by an individual with 
a strong background in research. As a result, any legislation 
sponsored by LABI in areas such as workers' compensation 
is based upon well-documented facts, rather than opinion or 
gut-reaction. This was extremely important in two respects. 
First, no public pronouncements were made until the dimen 
sions and cause of the problem were known, and until the ef 
ficacy of proposed solutions had been investigated. Through 
this process, it was found that the perceived source of the 
dual problems of high costs and low benefits was not the 
area of permanent total disability benefits, but rather the 
usual villain—permanent partial disability benefits. In addi 
tion, the viability of an income replacement system as a 
reform measure was confirmed, and the inadequacy of the 
court-administered system, which resulted in virtually no ad 
ministration and an overwhelming reliance on compromise 
and release agreements to keep the system under control, was 
demonstrated.
Politics of Reform 91
Second, when the time for public and legislative debate 
came, the LABI position could be defended on a factual, 
rather than emotional, basis. As will be seen, this factor may 
have been the most critical in the entire process.
Once it was determined that problems truly existed, and 
that there were reasonable solutions available, LABI and the 
business community committed themselves to a true reform 
effort. Although there was legislation introduced rather 
quickly without the long lead time employed in Florida, it 
was with the understanding that it would almost certainly 
take two legislative sessions (in reality it also took a special 
session) in order to achieve the final goal. However, the first 
session could also be used as part of the educational effort, 
and it was. With the strong financial and political support of 
the business community, the entire project was handled on a 
professional basis, with the emphasis on establishing to the 
satisfaction of the voters and the legislature the need for 
change and the validity of the proposed reform. Both were 
accomplished, partly because of research efforts previously 
described, and partly because LABI did not take the all too 
common approach of simply proposing a reduction in 
benefits as a way to reduce costs. Instead LABI arrived at a 
package of benefit and administrative changes geared 
towards reallocating the premium dollar to areas in which it 
was needed, avoiding duplication of benefits and decreasing 
the cost of litigation. The latter was most significant in that, 
unlike Florida, Louisiana was unable to put together a coali 
tion of labor and management. While I cannot even attempt 
to speak for organized labor in Louisiana, there is a widely 
held belief that because of inaccurate comparisons of the 
Louisiana proposal and the then recent Florida reform, as 
well as long-standing ties with the trial bar which did stand to 
lose if the proposals passed, labor could not, from a political 
standpoint, afford to be perceived as having cooperated or 
agreed with any management position. As a result, all at-
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tempts at compromise failed, and unfortunately the benefit 
package eventually enacted into law was smaller than that 
which could have been obtained through negotiation.
As you must have already surmised, the first legislative 
proposal did not pass. As an aside, this "failure" was, in 
retrospect, for the best, since later drafts were, in my opin 
ion, far superior and better suited for local conditions. 
However, the attempt did serve its purpose, since it brought 
the issue of workers' compensation to the forefront and rais 
ed the issues which would have to be faced. During the 10 
months between legislative sessions, additional educational 
efforts were made, with particular emphasis on the members 
of the legislature. These efforts included a special legislative 
conference with speakers from both inside and outside the 
state, as well as special efforts with key legislators and poten 
tial sponsors. As was the case in Florida, several members of 
each house became totally conversant with the problems and 
the proposed solutions, thereby maintaining control of the 
debate process and influencing other, less knowledgeable 
legislators.
The modified package passed the House on its second at 
tempt, in the regular session of 1982, but was amended many 
times in a labor-dominated Senate committee. Interestingly 
enough, virtually all the amendments were stripped by the 
full Senate, which was generally considered to be highly sym 
pathetic to the labor/trial lawyer position. However, the 
operative word was "virtually," since the failure to strip all 
of the amendments meant that the bill had to go to con 
ference committee. There, as a result of a weekend of 
political maneuvering, a compromise was reached without 
the consent of the business community and announced ap 
proximately 15 minutes before the end of the legislative ses 
sion. The compromise included language which had not been 
previously offered, in areas not directly related to the reform 
effort (third-party actions) apparently in the belief that
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LABI and the other backers of the bill would "settle" for 
what was sure to pass. To their credit, the business com 
munity stuck to its program of no action without a complete 
understanding of all implications of the proposal. Since this 
was impossible given the short time involved, the sponsors 
asked the representatives who supported them to kill the bill, 
and this was done. Once again, in retrospect this was the cor 
rect step to take, but the decision was not unanimous, and 
LABI was accused by some legislators and newspapers of be 
ing "greedy." In fact, LABI had already compromised the 
bill to a considerable extent on the basis of what might best 
be described as informed consent. The attempt to add new 
features at the last minute was a mistake from all stand 
points. Last minute changes, if not properly evaluated, tend 
to come back to haunt the authors, and experience in other 
states and in federal programs such as the Longshore Act 
clearly demonstrates the danger in this type of maneuver.
The final act in this drama was played out between July 
1982, the end of the legislative session, and January 1983, 
when a special session was called by the Governor to deal 
with workers' compensation and unemployment compensa 
tion. During that period, pressure on the legislature for 
enactment of the bill became almost overwhelming, and it 
became clear that the LABI proposal, or something very 
similar, was going to pass or some legislators would not be 
returning for a new term. In addition, the research and 
educational efforts which had been undertaken began to pay 
off to an even greater extent, with several key legislators who 
normally might have opposed a management position 
becoming active supporters. This included a Senator whose 
opposition had caused much difficulty in the past and whose 
eventual support did much to influence others, given the fact 
that he was a trial lawyer and well-respected in such matters. 
The bill was passed on January 14, 1983, and signed into law 
a short time later.
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The new Louisiana workers' compensation law is substan 
tially different from the old. For the first time there is an ad 
ministration, with reporting of accidents and benefits 
payments, an enforceable penalty structure, and an informal 
litigation reduction system which in effect requires media 
tion prior to entering the court system. The maximum week 
ly benefit was increased, permanent total disability redefined 
and limited to avoid the payment of such benefits to those 
actually working or able to work, and a restructuring of the 
permanent partial disability system to rely primarily on in 
come replacement benefits, with significant impairment 
benefits payable in the absence of income loss for those with 
schedule injuries in excess of 50 percent loss of use of the 
member, and a meaningful vocational rehabilitation pro 
gram, mandatory for all parties.
New Mexico
New Mexico is perhaps the best example of a state in 
which reform has stalled, despite the best of intentions on 
the part of the participants. Unlike the discussions of the 
other four states in this paper, much of what I will say con 
cerning New Mexico is based upon hearsay, inference and 
after-the-fact talks with those involved from the very begin 
ning of the process, since I was only involved for the final 
two months in early 1983. The effort began with the 
deliberations of an official study commission of several years 
duration. It appears that some of the first problems arose 
during those deliberations and may have sealed the fate of 
the legislation which was eventually introduced. It has been 
stated that there has never been an effective study commis 
sion. I must take issue with that statement, since I served 
with two which led to the enactment of major legislation, but 
I can sympathize with the feelings expressed. New Mexico's 
experience may show why. Please keep in mind that this por 
tion of the evaluation is based in part on the recollections
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and perceptions of some of the parties, some of which are 
totally at odds with others. It appears that representatives of 
the two interest groups directly involved in the workers' 
compensation system—management and labor—were not 
well versed in the operation and structure of the compensa 
tion system. This is not a criticism. In fact it is to be expected 
in most instances since the leaders of business and labor 
organization usually have backgrounds and responsibilities 
which make it extremely unlikely that they will be able to 
come into a study commission with the requisite knowledge 
to make major decisions concerning the system. In the past 
this problem has often been "solved" by each side using 
their lawyers as representatives. Once again without 
necessarily implying criticism, it is a fact that the interests of 
employers and defense lawyers in the compensation system 
are not necessarily the same, nor are the interests of 
employees and their lawyers. Because of this, much of the 
early work of a study group should focus on educating those 
of its members without workers' compensation expertise. 
This was not done in New Mexico, nor does it appear to be 
the case in most other states. As a result, it is my belief that 
the labor representatives were left in the position of having 
to accept either what was being told to them by the other side 
(particularly the insurance industry, where the employer ex 
pertise eventually came from) or what they were told by 
representatives of the claimants' bar. The reasonable in 
security brought about by this situation was probably 
heightened by an interesting phenomenon which occurs dur 
ing the work of most study groups—the impact of 
"observers." Although there is usually an effort made for 
study commissions to be balanced in their representation of 
interest groups, their meetings are often attended by large 
numbers of association representatives from business and 
the insurance industry. This can give, and in New Mexico did 
give, the impression of labor being outnumbered. In addi-
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tion, large numbers of people make it very difficult to have 
frank discussions, and often lead to more public posturing 
than meaningful discussions of real problems.
From the management standpoint, it appears that there 
was somewhat of an educational effort through the in 
surance industry and their attorneys. As an aside I might 
mention, in all fairness, that there did appear to be a 
legitimate effort made by the representatives of the insurance 
industry to be candid and fair in their dealings with manage 
ment, without any of the conflicts of interest of which the in 
dustry is often accused. However, it seems that the real 
educational effort was to a great extent limited to selling a 
rather narrow legislative program, which left management 
locked in to a somewhat inflexible program. Since any major 
change in the proposed bill would have required a time- 
consuming educational effort, it became virtually impossible 
for the employer/insurance representatives to seriously con 
sider proposals made after the legislative session began, even 
though some of them may have been acceptable and might 
have led to passage of a reform package.
Another factor which eventually led to defeat was a 
perhaps inadvertent politicizing of a major issue, the perma 
nent partial disability benefit package. Once again, an in 
come replacement system was being considered. Such pro 
posals are automatically tagged as "Florida wage loss," 
which is a distinct negative to most trial lawyers, and some 
labor leaders, and immediately puts proponents on the 
defensive. Unfortunately, some in the business community 
talked about the proposal in terms which could lead one to 
believe that it was punitive and antilabor, when in fact there 
was no reduction in the total amount of benefits to be paid to 
injured workers, but rather a redistribution. This put the 
leadership of organized labor in an extremely difficult posi 
tion, since accepting an otherwise favorable package could
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lead to charges of having given in to management interests. 
Like politicians, labor leaders are elected and cannot afford 
to be put in such positions if they wish to remain as leaders. 
This result might have been avoided if more of the local 
leadership had been brought into the process at an earlier 
date, had the benefit of a short course in workers' compensa 
tion and the effect of the proposed legislation, and been 
given an opportunity to have any and all questions answered. 
I do not know if this was possible from a political stand 
point, but it would seem that more input from the rank and 
file in all states might give the leadership broader support for 
meaningful change.
As can be seen, the education process, or the lack of it, has 
significance throughout the reform effort. Once again, it ap 
pears that the New Mexico proposal was hampered by lack 
of education on another level—that of the legislature. As I 
mentioned previously, it is my belief that a major legislative 
effort requires the informed backing of several members of 
each house. Not only does this help to sway votes and avoid 
debate over nonissues, it also provides a mechanism for 
resolving conflict, since both sides are often better able to ac 
cept a compromise if it originates, or at least seems to 
originate, from a member of the legislature rather than from 
a spokesman for an interest group. This cannot be ac 
complished unless the legislative advocate knows what he or 
she is talking about. It appears that for a number of reasons, 
the legislation in New Mexico did not have the benefit of this 
type of assistance.
The final missing ingredient was research. It is amazing 
how little is known about the operation of most workers' 
compensation systems, particularly the important items such 
as who is getting the benefits and what it takes from a pro 
cedural standpoint to get them. In the absence of factual in 
formation, what one tends to get from the experts testifying
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at legislative hearings is myth rather than reality. What is 
even more disconcerting is the fact that the same myths are 
heard in every state, which makes for a lot of boredom for 
those of us who do business in more than one state and must 
attend what amounts to the same hearings, with what appear 
to be the same witnesses, in a number of states. When you 
have heard the same misstatements of fact in two different 
states five thousand miles apart in the course of two days, 
you tend to lose faith in the legislative process, or at least in 
those who should know better than to say the things they do. 
Neither side has a monopoly in this area, but in New Mexico 
it was the opponents of the reform proposal who dominated 
the arena, with the usual tales of how the only thing wrong 
with the system was insurance company profits, how it was 
humanly impossible for an administrative structure to han 
dle minor problems more efficiently than the courts, and 
how an income replacement system, no matter how it was 
structured, was not only unworkable but virtually 
guaranteed an 80 percent reduction in benefits paid to in 
jured workers. None of these arguments was new, at least 
not in other states, and with a year of preparation could have 
easily been answered. It is possible that the fight was already 
over by the time these arguments were raised in legislative 
hearings (where the bill was killed), but had that not been the 
case a factual defense would have been extremely helpful.
Conclusion
There should be a point to all this narrative and there is. In 
fact, there may be several. I would like to start with mention 
of the comment made earlier by Alan Tebb, that he would be 
willing to pay in order to have someone from the labor side 
to talk with. I believe that as that statement was in 
tended—as an attempt to change an unfortunate but not 
unexpected reality, rather than a criticism—it is true, but
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does not go far enough. It is good to have someone to talk to 
on the labor side, but it is better to have an educated public, 
business community and legislature, also. It goes without 
saying that this means that the subject of discussion is fact, 
rather than fancy, and that the necessary research is included 
as part of the education, negotiation and compromise pro 
cess. It also assumes a good faith effort by the parties, ex 
cluding, to the greatest extent possible, controversies and 
maneuvering unrelated to the merits of the workers' com 
pensation program. As history now shows us, it is virtually 
impossible to pass decent legislation without most of these 
factors being present, particularly research and education, 
and the more of these elements that come together, the better 
the changes for real success.
This brings us to Alaska. Several years ago I had the good 
fortune to come in second or third, I don't know which, in 
the competition for a contract to investigate the ramifica 
tions of open competition in the workers' compensation in 
surance market. This loss enabled me to enter into a contract 
with the State of Alaska to study and report on all aspects of 
its workers' compensation system, including what happens 
to injured workers after they receive permanent partial 
disability benefits. Alaska is an excellent research subject in 
that it has all the potential for real problems, due to extreme 
ly high benefits (now approximately $1,000.00 for income 
benefits), highly seasonal employment and a relatively tran 
sitory workforce. At the same time, the state has a very small 
population, around 400,000, so that it is possible to look at 
the universe of workers' compensation cases rather than a 
small sample. And it has a compensation community which, 
for the most part, is willing to listen and learn. I am quite 
proud of the resulting report and would like to take a minute 
to quote a small, highly relevant portion of it.
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As can readily be seen, workers* compensation is 
a complex subject and not an easy one for 
employers, labor representatives, and an otherwise 
burdened legislature to deal with in an intelligent 
manner. Typically, matters are made worse by vir 
tue of the fact that no matter how good their inten 
tions, many interest group representatives do not 
have a working knowledge of the compensation 
system, and are familiar primarily with the 'horror 
stories' that can be developed about any system. 
The nature of the political process, in which 
legislative hearings seem to demand highly emo 
tional testimony, results in hearings which offer 
legislators and the public little in the way of educa 
tion, but instead rather extreme and emotional 
arguments having little to do with the normal 
operation of the compensation system, and having 
even less to do with the real problems and issues at 
hand. During the 1982 legislation session, a coali 
tion of employer and labor representatives 
developed a workers' compensation package which 
was in part enacted into law. The package was 
developed not as the result of confrontation politics 
or the exercise of countervailing political forces, 
but rather was the result of many hours of educa 
tion, discussion and debate away from the 
legislative forum. Hopefully this initial success will 
be expanded into a commitment by the members of 
this group to continue their efforts for an extended 
period of time, using the freedom offered by the 
private sector to discuss and investigate what might 
initially be impossible to deal with in the 
legislature, and to continue the education and 
legislative process.
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If the legislature is to maintain its constitutional 
responsibilities with regard to the legislative pro 
cess, it cannot stay involved with the compensation 
system simply through intermittent contact. Ob 
viously, the entire membership of the legislature 
cannot devote its time to learning how the workers' 
compensation system operates and what changes 
may be needed. However, if there is one common 
thread running among the states which have had 
success in controlling their workers' compensation 
systems, it is the existence of a long-term commit 
ment, not only by labor and management, but also 
by a small number of legislators, all of whom have 
taken the trouble to learn enough about the realities 
of the system to make intelligent decisions which 
benefit the system as a whole. While politics cannot 
be totally taken out of a political issue such as 
workers' compensation, the kind of cooperation 
which leads to success minimizes totally partisan 
posturing, and encourages well thought out com 
promise. This is not the type of compromise which 
is often found at the last minute on the floor of the 
Senate or the House, of uncertain outcome. It is 
compromise that recognizes that neither side can 
for long totally dominate the compensation pro 
gram, and that in fact the social and economic im 
pact of the compensation system may make it 
desirable for both parties to accept something less 
than what might be in their short-run financial best 
interests. 1
I am not a particularly naive person, at least not since 1979 
when I quit the practice of law because of the lying, cheating 
and stealing that one sees when involved in trial practice and 
instead moved on to the pristine field of legislative work. I
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know it is naive to assume that in every state we can educate, 
cooperate and get the legislature to look at the real problems 
of the workers' compensation system. In some states this is 
impossible, and power politics will continue to control the 
fate of the compensation system. In the final analysis, it is up 
to legislators and representatives of the business and labor 
communities to learn, perhaps for the first time, what 
workers' compensation is all about. States such as Florida, 
Louisiana and Alaska can be copied, not as to their laws, but 
instead with regard to the ways in which they went about ob 
taining meaningful change. Their similarities can be sum 
marized as follows:
1. Extensive basic research as to how the current system is 
operating and where the benefits are going.
2. Continuous dialogue between labor and management, 
with minimal interference by lawyers, doctors, 
surance carriers and others with only a secondary in 
terest in the system.
3. Education of the public and the legislature, with facts 
rather than opinion and hyperbole.
4. Decisions on philosophy made before legislative draft 
ing begins and before public positions are taken by the 
major parties.
These states are good examples of this process, of how to 
structure a bill and how to get it enacted into law. They are 
examples of how to really reform rather than patch and how 
to handle defeat and pressures for immediate action. 
Workers' compensation is simply too important to be left to 
any other course.
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NOTE
1. John H. Lewis, An Analysis of the Alaska Workers' Compensation 
System. Report to the State of Alaska, Juneau, Alaska, June 1982.

Discussion of Papers 




The papers in this session offer an interesting geographical 
and topical cross section of recent legislative efforts. Even 
this small sample of the 50 states considered most of the ma 
jor areas of reform, from wage loss to rate-making to re 
vamping the exclusive remedy doctrine. However, it seems to 
me that the session's most significant message transcends the 
specifics of any of the proposed changes. I think a crucial 
lesson resides in the collection of legislative stories related, 
that is, in the descriptions of the reform process itself.
One can hardly read the four papers together without im 
agining the legislative halls around the country as so many 
war zones. This impression is not much affected by the 
ultimate outcome—even successful efforts come with a 
struggle. I suppose that is the nature of our democratic pro 
cess. Much as we may wish it were otherwise, it remains true 
that our system of collective rule-making is far from costless. 
But the production of legislation is subject to the same prin 
ciples that apply to production of all goods we value. That 
includes the principle that a variety of recipes exist for pro 
ducing any given final product. For any desired piece of 
legislation there exist a variety of strategies for transforming 
the basic idea to a final statute.
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An economist would view the problem as one of finding 
the path of least resistance, the least-cost way of shepherding 
the proposed bill through the production process in state 
legislatures. Thus, how a bill is sold becomes nearly as im 
portant as what is being sold. The experience of recent years 
suggests that students and proponents of workers' compen 
sation reform have paid too little heed to this proposition. I 
find this all the more curious since workers' compensation 
has been a statutory creature since its inception in the early 
1900s. Participants in this area should be no strangers to 
political haggling and regulatory tinkering. Yet as Alan Tebb 
suggested of California, rather than master the vehicle which 
affects them, the real parties involved—employers and 
employees—"continue to abrogate their responsibility to 
participate in the establishment of public policy in the 
workers' compensation area." The events described in 
Michigan and Minnesota confirm this observation.
How can we minimize the confrontation politics that have 
plagued past efforts? Steve Keefe suggests that the usual 
political warfare over proposed reforms exaggerates the 
perception of an adversarial, employer versus employee rela 
tionship. Too often the image has been that one party gains 
from reform only at the other's expense. Labor interests 
have opposed reforms geared to reduce system costs because 
they expect the price tag will ultimately be a reduction in 
benefits. Of course, "reform" does not have to be a zero- 
sum game which precludes everyone from gaining. The prac 
tical problem in Minnesota (as everywhere else) was one of 
demonstrating that premiums could be lowered without cut 
ting benefits. Certainly, premium reduction requires cost 
reduction, but cost is not synonymous with benefits. A ma 
jor point of Keefe's paper is that proposed legislation was 
supported by studies that demonstrated just that. He sug 
gests that the crucial key to successful reform effort is a 
thorough, objective examination of prior and existing
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systems that illustrate how both business and labor interests 
can get a fair shake from reorganization.
The natural confrontational atmosphere that surrounds 
compensation bills is compounded when only anecdotal 
evidence can be offered in support. I think this session sug 
gests that the prescription for defusing this confrontation in 
any given state is (1) to carefully research the state's existing 
administration to clearly define the problems, and (2) armed 
with these statistics, to educate the political participants. The 
experiences related by the participants reveal that without a 
concerted effort to research and educate, the initial percep 
tions of a zero-sum game are difficult to dispel, with political 
warfare as a result.
A related point deserves mention. The suggestions above 
primarily address a strategy for smoothing the process of 
getting legislation passed. It should go without saying that 
the proposed reform itself should be based on research into 
the state's own experience. Nevertheless, a major trend in 
compensation reform, the wage loss movement, has ex 
hibited a remarkable propensity for generating a bandwagon 
effect. The approach has picked up national support among 
business leaders as the ultimate solution to the problems with 
permanent partial awards. Delaware's recent bout with the 
fever of reform provides an example.
Delaware has a full slate of scheduled awards as well as 
permanent partial awards for percentage loss of use and 
disfigurement. Benefits are paid through an agreement 
system, whereby both employer and employee must agree to 
the offered settlement before payment is made. An employee 
deals with the state's administrative personnel only in the 
event of a contested claim. One problem that has evolved is a 
relatively high incidence of contested cases and an average 
six-to-eight-month delay before initial administrative review. 
Of course, the greater the delay, or threat of delay, the
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greater the incentive for the injured worker to settle for a 
smaller amount.
As seems to be the case everywhere, a special commission 
was appointed in 1979 to bring together labor, business and 
insurance interests in an effort to reach a compromise 
reform package. Its report revealed that labor represen 
tatives were concerned primarily with delays in benefit 
payments, the prolonged hearing process and the agreement 
system of payment. The level of benefits was not a major 
concern. The reform effort of 1982 grew out of the commis 
sion's recommendations. The thrust of the proposed legisla 
tion was to streamline the claim procedure in order to 
(1) speed payment, (2) reduce the potential for disagreement 
over awards and consequently the incentive to contest 
awards and (3) increase the predictability of the size of 
award and when the issue would be resolved. Of course, the 
hope was that in doing so premiums would fall.
I believe it is fair to say that the impetus for reform was 
the concern over the cumbersome administrative process and 
backlog of contested claims (with consequent higher costs). 
Change in the benefit structure was an issue only because of 
the presumption that the type of benefits (not the level) con 
tributed greatly to the probability of contesting a claim. 
Although it is never clearly stated, I suspect the rationale 
behind the proposed solutions was the belief that abolition 
of permanent partial awards was a necessary sacrifice for 
streamlining the system, that effective administrative reform 
was operationally impossible under the existing benefit 
statutes. When framers of the proposed legislation were 
briefed on Florida's new "wage loss" bill, they en 
thusiastically seized the approach as the solution to 
Delaware's problems. Nevertheless, the rationale for the 
tradeoff was not effectively conveyed nor backed with 
statistical evidence from Delaware, or anywhere else. In 
stead, throughout the debate the image was that business was
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extracting a price (in the form of reduced benefits) for 
reform.
Labor representatives had expressed dissatisfaction with 
the old administrative framework, but once the proposed 
legislation started moving toward a vote, this interest in 
streamlining the program took a back seat to the perceived 
benefit reduction. Opponents of the legislation were careful 
to construct numerical examples showing injured workers 
losing thousands of dollars in compensation under the wage 
loss approach. The distrust over the permanent partial 
removal overshadowed other dramatic changes, including a 
proposed increase in the cap on benefits to 125 percent 
SAWW.
The proposed changes failed to pass, due in no small way 
to lack of the research and education effort advocated 
above. But I also wonder if a careful examination of 
Delaware's claim experience would yield the same recom 
mendations that were proposed? Such a study was never 
made. My point is that proponents of the move to wage loss 
in Delaware were easily convinced of the validity of Florida's 
legislation, without statistical support.
It has been suggested to me by several researchers that the 
gain from a shift to a wage loss approach varies depending 
upon prior state statutes, state workforce composition, and 
the accompanying administrative framework. Moreover 
(John Lewis' optimism notwithstanding), the papers in this 
session clearly demonstrate that the political road to a wage 
loss system is fraught with pitfalls and is potentially very 
costly. With the experience of several states unfolding, I 
would like to see a specific discussion of the feasibility of the 
approach relative to less politically volatile alternatives. I 
know of no published discussion at this time. Recognizing 
the constraints imposed by the political process of reform, I 
am wondering when the wage loss approach is the prescrip 
tion for states grappling with their permanent partial 
statutes, and when is it not.
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State-by-state information on the employers' costs of 
workers' compensation insurance has several uses. The in 
terstate variations in costs can be examined to determine if 
the magnitude is sufficient to influence plant location deci 
sions. Also, insurance cost differences among states can be 
compared to differences in benefit levels and other factors to 
isolate the causes of the cost variations. These two topics 
were examined in earlier studies we will identify for conve 
nience as the Dissertation 1 and the Upjohn Study. 2 One con 
clusion of these studies was that the interstate differences in 
workers' compensation costs are unlikely to be a significant 
factor in employer location decisions. Another conclusion 
was that benefit levels are the major determinant of the costs 
of workers' compensation insurance in a jurisdiction.
The method developed in these earlier studies was utilized 
with minor modifications in connection with another use of
ill
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state-specific data on the employers' costs of workers' com 
pensation, namely, as one factor in estimating the cost of 
adopting the recommendations contained in The Report of 
the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensa 
tion Laws. 3 This topic was examined in a paper that will be 
identified as the Supplemental Study. 4
Another use of data on workers' compensation costs in 
various states is to examine the changes through time in the 
costs and to consider the significance of the changes for the 
efforts to reform the program. This topic was examined in 
two studies. The first, Workers' Compensation Costs for 
Employers, provided data through July 1, 1975, and was 
published by the Interdepartmental Workers' Compensation 
Task Force; we will identify this as the Task Force Study. 5 
The second was published in the Monthly Labor Review and 
will be referred to as the MLR article. 6 It provided workers' 
compensation cost information as of July 1, 1978. Both the 
Task Force Study and the MLR article found that the in 
terstate differences in the employers' costs of workers' com 
pensation had widened after 1972, when the Report of the 
National Commission had been submitted. Both studies con 
cluded this provided support for the Commission's case for 
federal minimum standards for workers' compensation.
We recently prepared a report (which will be referred to as 
the Ohio-Pennsylvania Study7) that represents still another 
variation on the use of data on the interstate differences in 
workers' compensation costs. As a result of the increased 
costs of workers' compensation in the last decade, 
employers, legislators, and other interested parties have 
become more interested in the costs of the delivery system 
for the program. 8 In some states this concern has translated 
into changes in the insurance arrangements used to provide 
workers' compensation benefits. In most states, private in 
surance carriers traditionally have paid the bulk of the
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workers' compensation benefits, and have relied on a pricing 
mechanism that limited the amount of price competition 
among carriers. Recently, several states have changed their 
laws or regulations to permit more competition in rates. 9 
Some of these changes are examined in this report because of 
their effect on interstate cost comparisons.
Another manifestation of the concern over costs of the 
delivery system has been the proposal to reduce the role of 
private carriers in favor of greater reliance on state insurance 
funds because of a belief that state funds can deliver benefits 
with lower administrative costs. This belief was a factor in 
the recent establishment of a new competitive state fund in 
Minnesota, which means that for the first time the private 
carriers in the state will have to compete with a state fund. 
The argument that state funds are more efficient also 
underlies the proposal to convert certain competitive state 
funds into exclusive state funds. That is, rather than the state 
fund competing with private carriers, as is now the case in 13 
states including Minnesota, the state fund would be the sole 
carrier providing insurance in the jurisdiction, as is now the 
case in six states. The Ohio-Pennsylvania Study examined 
the possible transmutation of a competitive state fund into 
an exclusive state fund by focusing on a specific case, Penn 
sylvania, where such a proposal is extant. The study chose 
Ohio as a reference point for Pennsylvania because the states 
are contiguous, have similar benefit levels, and Ohio has the 
largest exclusive state fund.
The present study reexamines some of the conclusions 
from these earlier studies. Data are presented on the 
employers' costs of workers' compensation insurance as of 
January 1, 1983, which permits an examination of whether 
the widening of interstate cost differences between 1972 and 
1978 has continued into more recent years. In addition, the 
study examines whether the different rates of increase in
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workers* compensation costs in Connecticut, New Jersey, 
and New York between 1972 and 1983 are related to changes 
in the three states' levels of benefits.
Examination of these topics first requires the development 
of accurate measures of the employers' costs of workers' 
compensation. These costs will be measured at several stages 
of refinement. The first comparison will involve the manual 
rates in effect on January 1, 1983, which are presented in 
table 3 and discussed in section IV. The second level of com 
parison will rely on adjusted manual rates, which are more 
accurate measures of employers' insurance costs than are 
manual rates since the adjusted rates reflect factors such as 
experience rating and premium discounts. The adjusted 
manual rates are provided in tables 10 and 11 and are ex 
amined in section IX. Finally, comparisons will be made us 
ing the employers' net costs of insurance, which represent 
the weekly premiums per worker paid by employers. These 
net costs, presented in tables 13 and 14 and discussed in sec 
tion X, are less convenient measures of employers' costs than 
are the adjusted manual rates since the adjusted manual rates 
can be viewed as the percentage of payroll devoted to 
workers' compensation insurance, and therefore most of the 
emphasis on the costs comparisons will involve the adjusted 
manual rates. Because of the particular focus of this report 
on Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York, section XII will 
extensively examine the cost differences among these 
jurisdictions. The final section then considers the 
significance of the changes since 1972 in the interstate dif 
ferences in workers' compensation costs in all states covered 
by this study.
/. Alternative Methods for Providing
Workers' Compensation Benefits to Employees
For the employer who has elected or has been required to 
provide workers' compensation benefits to his employees,
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three methods are possible. In most states if the employer 
has a sufficient payroll and a satisfactory record of paying 
past claims, it may self-insure the risks of industrial ac 
cidents. Alternatively, in most states the employer may pur 
chase insurance from a private insurance company. In some 
states, the employer may purchase insurance from a fund 
operated by the state.
Costs of self-insurance receive little attention in this study, 
as self-insurers represent a small percentage of benefit 
payments; in 1980, self-insurance benefit payment 
represented 17.5 percent of the total benefit payments. 10 An 
even more compelling reason, however, is the lack of data. 
Except for the figures cited above on aggregate benefit 
payments, only limited data are available on self-insurers 
and these are virtually useless for the present study. 11
Most employers purchase their insurance from private 
companies or from state insurance funds. The determination 
of the insurance costs begins by assigning the employer to 
one or more industrial or occupational categories. In about 
40 states where private insurance is available, these 
categories are prescribed by the classifications published by 
the National Council on Compensation Insurance. 12 Active 
classifications range from 0005 Nursery Employees to 9620 
Funeral Directors. Between these two are several thousand 
other classifications, at least 500 of which are in common 
use. Deviations from the National Council's system range 
from New Jersey, with a few variations, to five states with 
substantially different classification systems. Three of the 
states (California, Delaware, and Pennsylvania) have private 
insurance carriers, while two (Ohio and West Virginia) are 
exclusive fund states.
After each of the employer's operations has been assigned 
to a particular insurance classification, an appropriate initial 
insurance rate, the manual rate, can be located in the state's
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current schedule. Manual rates are stated as a certain 
number of dollars per $100 of weekly earnings for each 
employee. Thus, if an employee earns $200 per week and the 
appropriate manual rate is $3.50, the week's insurance 
premium for this employee is $7.00. Unfortunately, this ex 
ample ignores a number of complications that are relevant 
for this study.
//. Impact of Payroll Limitations 
On Interstate Comparisons
One of the factors that used to be a major obstacle to com 
parisons of workers' compenation costs was that many states 
had different payroll limitations. A payroll limitation is a 
figure that determines the maximum amount of an 
employee's weekly earnings that will be used in the calcula 
tion of insurance premiums. For many years, the normal 
payroll limitation was $100, which meant that the manual 
rate would be multiplied by an employee's weekly earnings 
or $100, whichever was less, to determine the weekly 
premium. Thus, if the manual rate were $3.00, the 
employee's weekly earnings $150, and the payroll limitation 
$100, the employer's weekly insurance premium would be 
$3.00.
Most states affiliated with the National Council on Com 
pensation Insurance converted from a $100 payroll limita 
tion to a $300 limitation around 1957, and to no limit (which 
means the manual rates are charged against the whole 
payroll) during 1974-75. However, four states (Missouri, 
Texas, Florida, and Louisiana) still had weekly payroll 
limitations of $200 or less as of July 1, 1975 and they were 
eliminated from the Task Force Study. By July 1,1978, these 
four states had payroll limitations of $300 or had eliminated 
their payroll limitations, and so the MLR article included 
these states. By January 1, 1983, the comparison date for the 
current study, only Texas had a payroll limitation ($300),
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which means the data on Texas must be used with caution. 
Because the manual rates are only applied to the first $300 of 
payroll, the apparent cost of workers' compensation in 
surance in Texas as shown in this report is artificially high. 13
Table 1 provides a catalog of all states, indicating those in 
cluded in this study because as of January 1, 1983, they have 
appropriate manual rate data available and either a $300 
weekly payroll limit or no limit. The table also provides the 
reasons that four states with exclusive state funds are omit 
ted. Comparable data are available for 46 states and the 
District of Columbia. These 47 jurisdictions are divided into 
three groups in the final column of table 1: two jurisdictions 
with exclusive state funds; 31 jurisdictions in which the Na 
tional Council on Compensation Insurance is the designated 
rating organization; and 14 states with independent local 
rating organizations. As will be detailed later in this report, 
the 47 jurisdictions differ in important aspects that must be 
considered before valid comparisons can be made, including 
differences in classification systems, experience rating, divi 
dend policies, and the degree of competition among private 
carriers that is permitted or encouraged.
///. Inappropriate Methods of Comparing 
Workers' Compensation Costs
One admittedly crude method of comparing employers' 
costs of workers' compensation is to ascertain the ratio of 
earned premium to payroll for each state. Recent figures 
from the National Council on Compensation Insurance 
show a range from 0.99 percent in Indiana to 3.73 percent in 
Arizona, with a national average of 2.46 percent. 14
For the primary purpose of the Dissertation and the Up 
john Study (i.e., the significance of the interstate variations 
in employers' costs of workers' compensation for plant loca 
tion decisions), such information is irrelevant. Employers
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Table 1
Catalog of States Showing Reason for Elimination
of Certain States From Comparison of Manual Rates
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SOURCE: NCCI, Workers' Compensation Rating Laws - A Digest of Changes (1982, with 
August 15, 1983 quarterly update).
Payroll limitation rules are those in effect January 1, 1983.
Code or organization that prepares insurance rates: E is exclusive fund state; I is indepen 
dent local rating organization; N is National Council on Compensation Insurance.
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who move from state to state are going to be concerned with 
their own particular insurance rates, not with those of the 
average employer in each state. Assume that there are only 
two insurance classifications in states A and B—class 1 and 
class 2—and that employer would fall into class 1 in both 
states. Assume that the manual rates for each classification 
are identical in both states; e.g., class 1 is $0.10 in both states 
and class 2 is $1.00. Also, assume that all employers pay 
their employees $300 per week and that there is no payroll 
limit.
Obviously, there is no incentive for an employer to move 
from state A to state B because its insurance costs will be 
unaffected by the move. Yet, if in state A 90 percent of the 
payroll of all employers is in class 2 and 10 percent in class 1, 
while in state B 90 percent is in class 1 and 10 percent in class 
2, the average earned premium as a percentage of payroll will 
vary considerably between the states. Specifically, the 
average earned premium will be 0.91 percent of payroll in 
state A and 0.19 percent in state B, despite the critical fact 
that there is no incentive for an interstate movement of the 
particular employer in question or of any employer, as long 
as its classification does not change as a result of an in 
terstate move.
To a large extent, the National Council data on standard 
earned premium are subject to the same limitations found in 
the hypothetical example. Some industries, such as steel or 
auto production, are important in some states and nonexis 
tent in others. Even for industries found in all states, the pro 
portion of covered payroll accounted for by the classifica 
tion varies widely. Because of the influence of such varying 
payroll distribution on the data, this approach to interstate 
cost comparisons is not considered further here. The Na 
tional Council cautions that conclusions drawn from com 
parisons of such data "have no validity" 15 because of 
payroll distribution variations and other reasons and will no
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longer publish this data in its statistical bulletins due to the 
concerns about validity.
An even more questionable approach to comparing 
workers' compensation costs among jurisdictions by use of 
insurance industry data was utilized in a recent article in 
Best's Insurance Management Reports. 16 Average premiums 
per state were presented for 1981, and showed a range from 
$63.77 per worker in Indiana to $594.98 in Alaska, with a 
national average of $189.57. As noted in the article, no ef 
fort was made to correct for different industry mixes in the 
various jurisdictions. A more serious problem is that the in 
surance premiums are direct premiums written by private 
carriers and state insurance funds, with state information on 
self-insurers omitted because such data are unavailable. The 
data on premiums written "were then divided by the number 
of wage earners in each state." 17 Although the article does 
not identify the source of the employment data, presumably 
the number of wage earners includes workers employed by 
firms that self-insure. The result is that states with a high 
proportion of benefits provided by self-insurers will have 
their cost figures artificially lowered since premiums written 
exclude the experience of self-insurers but the employment 
figures do not. 18
IV. The Appropriate Method of Comparing 
Workers' Compensation Costs
The previous section discussed two methods of comparing 
interstate differences in workers' compensation costs, each 
with a degree of invalidity. Fortunately, a more valid method 
for comparing employers' workers' compensation costs in 
different states is available. To return to the example involv 
ing states A and B presented in the previous section, the 
degree of incentive for employers to move from state A to 
state B can be shown by using the same distribution of 
payroll among classes for both states. For example, the
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distribution of payroll among classes in state A can be used 
with the state B manual rates to generate a new average earn 
ed premium as a percentage of payroll for the state A 
employers on the assumption they move to state B. Obvious 
ly, the state A employers would pay 0.91 percent of their 
payroll as premium in either state, and the lack of incentive 
to move is apparent.
This more valid method of interstate comparison using a 
constant distribution of payroll for all states is the basis for 
analysis in this study. However, the method has to be refin 
ed, and the first step is to increase the number of classifica 
tions used beyond two. There are more than 500 active 
classifications in National Council states, but many of these 
are generally unsubstantial, or are important only in a few 
states. Seventy-one classifications were selected for the cur 
rent study on the basis of their common use, their relative 
importance as measured by the percentage of total payroll 
for which they account, and their representative character in 
three divisions of workers' compensation classifications: 
Manufacturing, Contracting, and All Other. Table 2 in 
cludes a brief description of each of the 71 classifications and 
shows the percentage of total payroll accounted for by each 
classification in the aggregate of the 36 National Council 
states for which payroll information in available. 19
In categorizing data in table 2, the starting point was the 
National Council's Classification Codes used in 42 of the 
states included in this study. 20 States using other classifica 
tion systems were "converted" by selecting the classification 
which appeared most nearly analogous to each of the 71 Na 
tional Council classes. 21 However, since the non-Council 
states often use classifications which are broader than those 
in National Council states, no attempt was made to incor 
porate the payroll distribution among classes of these states 
into the aggregates of table 2.
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Table 2 




covered payroll in 
36 selected states





4304 Newspaper publishing .121
Total 4 manufacturing classes 1.313 
Contracting classes
5022 Masonry N.O.C. .349
5183 Plumbing N.O.C. .879
5190 Electrical wiring-within building .742
5213 Concrete construction N.O.C. .457
5215 Concrete work .049
Total 5 contracting classes 2.476
All other classes
7219 Truckmen N.O.C. 1.278
7380 Chauffeurs, drivers, helpers N.O.C. .910 
7539 Electric light or power companies-N.O.C.-
all operations .158
8017 Retail stores N.O.C. 1.402
8018 Wholesale or combined wholesale-retail N.O.C. .631
8033 Meat, grocery, and provision stores-retail 1.236
8232 Lumber yards .444
8293 Furniture storage warehouses .073
8350 Gasoline or oil dealers .217
8387 Gasoline stations; accessories stations .677
8391 Automobile garages 1.194
8742 Salesmen, collectors, or messengers-outside 6.418
8810 Clerical office employees N.O.C. 25.425
9052 Hotels .468
9079 Restaurant N.O.C. 2.566
Total 15 all other classes 43.097
Total 24 classes 46.886





covered payroll in 
36 selected states
Division B-classes with payroll in all states, 1950-83 
Manufacturing classes
Four classes from division A 1.313
2039 Ice cream .026
2157 Bottling N.O.C. .186
2585 Laundries N.O.C. .122
2586 Cleaning or dyeing .072
2802 Carpentry-shop only .195
3081 Foundries-iron N.O.C. .116
3085 Foundries-nonferrous metals N.O.C. .055
4034 Concrete products .117
Total 12 manufacturing classes 2.202 
Contracting classes
Five classes from division A 2.476
5221 Concrete work: floors, sidewalks, etc. .289
5538 Sheet metal work erection N.O.C. .429
Total 7 contracting classes 3.194 
All other classes
Fifteen classes from division A 43.097
8006 Retail grocery stores-no fresh meats .240
8008 Retail clothing or dry goods stores .790
8044 Wholesale or retail furniture stores .329
8292 General merchandise warehouses N.O.C. .104
8748 Automobile sales or service agencies .534
8833 Hospitals: professional employees 2.765
8868 Colleges or schools: professional employees 6.361
9015 Buildings operation N.O.C. .544
9040 Hospitals: all other employees .565
9101 Colleges or schools: all other employees .901
Total 25 all other classes 56.230
Total 44 classes 61.626
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Table 2 (continued)
Percentage of
Code covered payroll in 
number Classification description 36 selected states
Division C-all classes with manual rates available, 1958-83 
Manufacturing classes
	Twelve classes from divisions A and B 2.202 
2501 Clothing 1.097 
2883 Wood furniture N.O.C. .280 
3066 Sheet metal work-shop .196 
3076 Fireproof equipment .319 
3082 Foundries-steel castings .037 
3113 Tool N.O.C. .282 
3179 Electrical apparatus N.O.C. .460 
3400 Metal goods N.O.C. .228 
3507 Agricultural machinery .394 
3612 Pump and engine N.O.C. .159 
3643 Electrical power equipment .401 
3681 Telephone apparatus .549
Total 24 manufacturing classes 6.604
Contracting classes
Seven classes from divisions A and B 3.194 
Total 7 contracting classes 3.194
All other classes
Twenty-five classes from divisions A and B
Total 25 all other classes 56.230 
Total 56 classes 66.028 
Division D-all classes with manual rates available, 1972-83 
Manufacturing classes
Twenty-four classes from divisions A, B, and C 6.604
2220 Yarn or thread-cotton .395
2361 Hosiery manufacturing .115
2660 Boot or shoe manufacturing N.O.C. .159
3632 Machine shops N.O.C. .981
4484 Plastics-molded products manufacturing N.O.C. .358
Total 29 manufacturing classes 8.612
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Table 2 (continued)
Percentage of
Code covered payroll in 
number Classification description 36 selected states
Contracting classes
	Seven classes from divisions A and B 3.194 
3724 Millwright work N.O.C. .427 
5403 Carpentry N.O.C. .500 
5506 Street or road construction .389 
5606 Contractors-executive supervisors .433 
5645 Carpentry-detached private residences .547 
6217 Excavation N.O.C. .330
Total 13 contracting classes 5.820 
All other classes
Twenty-five classes from divisions A, B, and C 56.230
7720 Policemen .615
8010 Hardware stores-wholesale or retail .515
8039 Retail department stores .710
8829 Convalescent or nursing homes .849
Total 29 all other classes 58.919 
Total 71 classes 73.351
NOTE: N.O.C. means "not otherwise classified."
"Code number and classification description taken from Classification Code of National
Council on Compensation Insurance. The payroll distribution is based on 1978-79,
1979-80, or 1980-81 policy year data for 36 states.
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Even though the 71 classifications were chosen deliberate 
ly to maximize covered payroll, these classes are not of equal 
importance. The classes are grouped into divisions A, B, C, 
and D using criteria that are detailed in the Ohio- 
Pennsylvania Study. 22 Briefly, division A includes 24 classes 
that had sufficient payroll to warrant the use of special ac 
tuarial practices during the rate-making procedures. A sec 
ond measure of importance is whether the manual rates for 
the class have been published in the rate pages of a state. The 
normal criterion for publication is that there must have been 
some payroll exposure for the class in the state within the 
previous five years. As division B of table 4 indicates, there 
were 44 classes that met this requirement or the more strin 
gent requirements of division A for all states included in the 
Upjohn Study. 23
Division C of table 3 includes 56 classifications for which 
manual rates could be obtained in any manner for the 29 
states for 1958-65 and for which data were available for all 
42 jurisdictions included in the Supplemental Study. 24 Final 
ly, division D includes 71 classes in use in most jurisdictions 
in 1983, and was added in the Supplemental Study to provide 
an even broader sample of insurance classification. 
However, some states for which division C data are available 
cannot be shown for division D. 25
The results for the 44 classes in division B are given the 
strongest emphasis in section XI because division B contains 
the largest number of classes for which an historically com 
parable series is available (in the Dissertation, Upjohn 
Study, Supplemental Study, Task Force Report, and MLR 
article) and because some of the classes included in divisions 
C and D have little or no payroll experience in some states, 
which means that the averages for these divisions are less 
reliable than the division B averages.
Table 3
Interstate Variations in Average Costs of Manual Rates for Classes 
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Table 4 
Premium Discount Schedule for Annual Premium
in States Affiliated with the 



















SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance.
Using the national payroll distribution by classifications 
from table 2 and the manual rates from each state, we pre 
sent average manual rates for various combinations of 
classifications in table 3. Column 1 uses the national payroll 
distribution for the classes in division A of table 2 and shows 
the average manual rates for 24 classes. Column 2 presents 
averages using the 44 classes in divisions A and B of table 2. 
Averages for the 24 manufacturing classes in divisions A, B, 
and C are shown in column 3; for all 56 classes in divisions 
A, B, and C in column 4; and for all 71 classes in divisions A 
to D in column 5, where averages for some states are 
unavailable.
The average manual rates shown in table 3 have been ad 
justed for Minnesota and Oregon for reasons related to the 
factors that complicate interstate comparisons when dif 
ferent states use different payroll limitations. 26 In five 
states—Delaware, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Utah, and West 
Virginia—premiums are assessed against the full overtime 
premium, while in the other 42 jurisdictions examined by this 
study, hours of overtime work are considered at the regular 
hourly wage. 27 Since the overtime premium does not appear 
to represent a significant portion of payroll, 28 manual rates
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in the five states were not adjusted to reflect interstate dif 
ferences in payroll bases.
In three states—Kentucky, Michigan, and Oregon—the 
published rates do not include expense loadings and 
therefore the rates used to prepare the average in table 3 were 
calculated for this study. The procedure used to make the 
calculations are explained in section VII in conjunction with 
the discussion of open competition.
V. Modifications of Manual Rates in 
National Council States: Phase 1
The averages of various combinations of manual rates 
provide only a beginning toward accurate comparisons of 
workers' compensation costs. Even assuming that the 
various states are using the same payroll limitations, other 
problems arise because the published manual rates are only a 
starting point for the computation of the employer's in 
surance premiums. The employer does not simply pay as a 
premium the product of the manual rate and his covered 
payroll; its insurance costs are influenced by premium dis 
counts for quantity purchases, dividends received from 
mutual companies and participating stock companies, and 
the modification of the manual rate caused by the 
employer's own compensable accident experience. The ef 
fects of these factors are calculated for the 31 jurisdictions 
that use the National Council on Compensation Insurance as 
the rating organization in this section. In the next section, 
the influence of these factors (premium discounts, dividends, 
and experience rating) in the 14 jurisdictions with indepen 
dent rating organizations is examined. Insurance costs are 
also affected by open competition, deviations, and schedule 
rating, and the impact of these factors in all 45 states with 
private carriers included in this study is discussed in section 
VII. Section VIII then reviews the impact of factors such as 
experience rating in the states with exclusive state funds.
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A. A Catalog of the Modifying Factors on 
Manual Rates in National Council States
The terminology in workers' compensation is not "stan 
dard, descriptive, and orderly." 29 Therefore, the terms as 
defined in the following discussion must be used with cau 
tion since they sometimes are defined differently in other 
publications or exhibits.
If the employer's total payroll falling within the payroll 
limit is multiplied by the appropriate manual rate published 
in the state's rate pages, the result is the manual premium. In 
practice, few employers pay such an amount.
The first modification is caused by experience rating for 
larger companies. In simple terms, experience rating uses the 
employer's own past record of benefit payments to modify 
the published manual rates. If the employer's record is worse 
than the experience of the average employer in its classifica 
tion, then its actual premium for the current policy period is 
larger than its manual premium. Basically, the same ex 
perience rating formula is used in all the National Council 
states and therefore comparisons among these states are not 
complicated by use of this modification. Thus, if an 
employer whose accident experience is 20 percent better than 
its classification in state A has its premium reduced accord 
ingly, it will find the premium similarly modified in state B if 
its own relative accident rate remains the same. 30
Although experience rating does not complicate com 
parisons among National Council states, it is necessary to 
determine the general effects of experience rating in these 
states in order to compare them with other states that have 
their own experience rating plans. The product of the ex 
perience rating factor and the manual premium is termed the 
standard earned premium excluding constants. 31
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The standard earned premium excluding constants also is 
modified for most employers, although there are divergent 
paths depending on the size of the premium. In order to 
cover minimum costs of issuing and servicing a policy, in 
almost all states employers are assessed a flat charge termed 
an expense constant.* 2 In addition, employers in most states 
previously were assessed a flat charge, a loss constant, 
designed to compensate for the generally inferior safety 
record of small businesses. The loss constant program is in 
the process of being eliminated on a state-by-state basis. If 
the expense and loss constants are added to the standard 
earned premium excluding constants, the result is termed the 
standard earned premium including constants.
Employers with annual premiums in excess of $5,000 are 
entitled to reductions in their standard earned premiums 
because of economies of scale. Premium discounts based on 
the schedule in table 4 are compulsory in the National Coun 
cil states, unless both the insurance carriers and the employer 
agree to substitute retrospective rating for the premium dis 
counts. Despite varieties of retrospective rating plans in Na 
tional Council states, basically all are similar in that they 
allow the employer to increase the effect of its own ex 
perience on the published manual rates. The main difference 
between experience rating and retrospective rating is that the 
former uses the employer's experience from previous periods 
to modify the current policy period rate, whereas the 
retrospective plan uses experience from the current policy 
period to determine the current premium, on an ex post facto 
basis. The same expense reductions provided by the premium 
discounts are built into the retrospective rating plans.
The use of premium discounts or retrospective rating 
should not complicate comparisons among the National 
Council states. The same discount schedule and the same
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retrospective plans are available in virtually all these states; 
the few deviations are unsubstantial.
The result of starting with the standard earned premium 
including constants and subtracting any amounts saved by 
employers because of premium discounts or retrospective 
rating is to arrive at net earned premium. 33
There is a further "wedge" in National Council states be 
tween the published manual rates and the rates actually paid 
by employers. A substantial proportion of the workers' com 
pensation insurance is written by mutual companies or stock 
companies with participating policies. While these com 
panies normally use a quantity discount schedule less steeply 
graded than the nonparticipating stock companies, they pay 
dividends which usually cut the net cost to policyholders to 
less than that charged by nonparticipating stock companies, 
especially for large employers.
Participation is not a crucial detriment to comparisons 
among National Council states. Most workers' compensa 
tion insurance is sold by companies operating in more than 
one state; in fact typically the employer with operations in 
more than one state buys its insurance from the same or a 
similar participating company in state A and B is not likely 
to have the relative interstate differences in insurance costs 
altered because of the dividends received; a 10 percent divi 
dend on premiums paid in either state will not influence in 
terstate relativity.
This final modification of subtracting dividends paid by 
mutuals and participating stocks from the net earned 
premium results in the net cost to policyholders. This exer 
cise thus began with manual premium and then, because of a 
series of additions and subtractions, moved to standard 
earned premium excluding constants, then to standard earn 
ed premiums including constants, then to net earned 
premium, and finally arrived at net cost to policyholders.
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The manual premium divided by the appropriate payroll 
equals the manual rate. In this study the net cost to 
policyholders divided by the payroll is defined as the high ad 
justed manual rate. An attempt to quantify these concepts is 
presented below.
B. Estimates of Influence of Modifying Factors 
on Manual Rates in National Council States
There are no data that can be used to calculate directly the 
total differential between manual premium and the net cost 
to policyholders. Instead, it is necessary to determine initial 
ly the difference between manual premium and standard 
earned premium excluding constants, then to measure the 
amount of the constants, and finally to measure the dif 
ference between standard earned premium including con 
stants and the net cost to policyholders. The combining of 
the smaller differentials into the total differential is com 
plicated because data on differences between the manual 
premium and standard earned premium excluding constants 
are available only on a policy year basis, 34 whereas data on 
the differences between standard earned premium and net 
cost to policyholders are available only on a calendar year 
basis.
Table 5 includes information on the differential between 
manual premium and standard earned premium excluding 
constants. The data as provided by the National Council on 
Compensation Insurance actually included the expense and 
loss constant amounts in the premiums and therefore were 
adjusted for this study. 35 This study will assume that 1.000 is 
the relevant ratio of standard earned premium excluding 
constants-to-manual premium for the National Council 
states. Historically, standard earned premium has been 
lower than manual premium, but the recent data show the 
two are essentially identical. 36
Table 5
Ratio of Standard Earned Premium to Manual Premium 
in 38 States with Private Insurance Carriers
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SOURCES: Data in columns 1 and 3 from National Council on Compensation Insurance, based on Unit Statistical Plan dates for 38 states 
(the 31 National Council states enumerated in table 1 plus Hawaii, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin). 
The figures in columns 2 and 4 are estimates prepared by John F. Burton, Jr. based on information provided by the National Council on Com 
pensation Insurance. 
NOTE: Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
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The most recent data on standard earned premium in table 
5 are from policy period 1979-80. Loss constants were of 
miniscule importance as of then, and are even less significant 
now since they are being eliminated on a state-by-state basis. 
For this study the loss constants are therefore assumed to be 
nil. 37 In contrast, expense constants have become more 
significant in recent years as a program has been introduced 
in most states to increase the annual amounts per policy to 
$35, then $60, and currently $75. The National Council on 
Compensation Insurance estimates that the impact of these 
various levels of expense constants is to increase standard 
earned premium by approximately 1.2 percent, 2.0 percent, 
and 2.6 percent respectively. The National Council also pro 
vided information on the amount of the expense constant in 
effect in each state as of January 1,1983 (which is the date of 
rate comparisons for this study). For each state, the dif 
ference between standard earned premium excluding con 
stants and standard earned premium including constants was 
calculated using this information. 38
Table 6, also provided by the National Council, presents 
data on the differential between standard earned premium 
including constants and the net cost to policy holders. 39 The 
figure of .835 as the ratio of net cost to policyholders-to- 
standard earned premium including constants will be used in 
subsequent calculations in this study.
If the ratio of 1.000 between standard earned premium ex 
cluding constants and manual premium is multiplied by the 
state's appropriate ratio between standard earned premium 
including constants and standard earned premium excluding 
constants (which will be 1.012, 1.020, or 1.026 depending on 
the state), and the product in turn is multiplied by 0.835, 
which is the ratio between the net cost to policyholders and 
standard earned premium including constants, then the 
overall ratio between the net cost to policyholders and
Table 6 
Ratio of Net Cost to Policyholders to Standard Earned Premium, Including Constants, All Carriers
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SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, Compilations of Insurance Expense Exhibits, 1977-1981. These figures exclude state 
fund experience and are based on data from the 45 jurisdictions with private insurance carriers.
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manual premium is 0.845, 0.852, or 0.857, depending on the 
state. These figures purport to say that the average employer 
in the states that use the National Council on Compensation 
Insurance as the rating organization does not pay insurance 
premiums equal to the published manual rates times his 
payroll, but pays an amount from 14.3 to 15.5 percent less 
than this because of such factors as premium discounts. In 
order words, including the expense constant adjustment, 
there is a 14.3 to 15.5 percent differential between manual 
rates and high adjusted manual rates as defined above. Ob 
viously, these percentages are only an approximation and 
clearly would vary from employer to employer and from 
state to state for reasons other than different expense con 
stants. Nonetheless, as the best available estimates of the dif 
ference between manual premiums and net costs, they are us 
ed in this study. The average manual rates in table 3 were 
reduced by the appropriate percentage for each of the 31 Na 
tional Council states to produce the high adjusted manual 
rates in table 10.
VI. Modification of Manual Rates in States 
with Independent Rating Organizations: Phase 1
The previous section examined the influence of factors 
such as premium discounts, dividends, and experience rating 
on the employers' costs of workers' compensation insurance 
in the 31 jurisdictions that use the National Council on Com 
pensation Insurance as the rating organization. In this sec 
tion we examine the influence of these factors in the 14 
jurisdictions listed in table 1 that rely on local independent 
rating organizations to help determine workers' compensa 
tion insurance rates.
There are significant differences among these 14 jurisdic 
tions. In six (Hawaii, Indiana, North Carolina, Texas, 
Virginia and Wisconsin) the National Council rate-making,
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rating plans, and classification systems are used, and 
therefore any differences between these states and the 31 Na 
tional Council jurisdictions can be safely ignored. 40 
Michigan and Minnesota also utilize National Council ser 
vices and have a classification system that is closely pattern 
ed after the NCCI classification codes, and for purposes of 
this study will be treated as close enough to the National 
Council states to justify using the figures developed in the 
previous section as applicable to the two states. High ad 
justed manual rates are 14.3 to 15.5 percent less than manual 
rates in these eight states, depending on the size of the ex 
pense constant in effect on January 1, 1983. 41
The remaining six local rating organizations are complete 
ly independent of the National Council on Compensation In 
surance. They are found in California, Delaware, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. 
Three of these jurisdictions (California, Delaware, and 
Pennsylvania) use classification systems that are significantly 
different from the NCCI classification system; the other 
three states use systems patterned on the NCCI codes. 
California does not allow any form of premium discount, 
while New Jersey allows the same discount schedule as in the 
31 NCCI states but limited solely to premiums written in 
New Jersey. The other five states provide for premium dis 
counts based on the interstate premium amount. As to ex 
perience rating, California, Delaware, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania operate intrastate plans in which the ex 
perience from other states is not considered in modifying the 
manual rates in the state, nor is the state's experience includ 
ed in the interstate experience rating calculations. In 
Massachusetts and New York, the experience in the state is 
combined with experience from other states to determine the 
experience rating modifications.
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This review indicates that two of the states with completely 
independent rating bureaus, Massachusetts and New York, 
are very similar to the 31 states that use the National Council 
on Compensation Insurance as the rating organization. In 
both states, the classification system closely parallels the 
NCCI codes, the NCCI premium discount schedule is used in 
conjunction with the entire interstate premium, and the ex 
perience rating formula also considers interstate experience. 
For these two states, the figures developed in the previous 
section that relate net cost to policyholders to manual 
premiums can be used without major qualms.
In contrast, California differs substantially from the Na 
tional Council states in the methods used to modify manual 
premiums in order to arrive at the net cost paid by the 
employer, as it has no premium discount schedule, nor has it 
used the flat loss and expense constant charges in recent 
years. California does use experience rating, retrospective 
rating, and dividend payments; these to some extent prob 
ably reflect the absence of the premium discounts.
The relation between New Jersey and the NCCI jurisdic 
tions is also attenuated compared to the relationship between 
the NCCI jurisdictions and Massachusetts and New York. 
New Jersey only applies the premium discount to intrastate 
business, and the experience rating modification only con 
siders New Jersey experience. 42 It is likely that the retrospec 
tive rating and dividend payment plans in New Jersey to 
some extent compensate for the limited scope of the 
premium discounts and experience rating plans.
These features of California and New Jersey suggest that 
the figures developed in the previous section for the dif 
ference between manual rates and net costs to policyholders 
in NCCI states are only rough approximations of the dif 
ferences in these two states. Unfortunately, these are the on 
ly estimates reasonably available for this study, and thus will
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be used. With this caveat, we proceed as if California, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York were directly 
comparable with the 31 National Council jurisdictions. 
Specifically, we assume that high adjusted manual rates for 
these four jurisdictions are 83.5 percent of manual rates 
(with the percentage modified to reflect each state's expense 
constant as of January 1, 1983), the same relationship 
developed for the NCCI jurisdictions in the last section. 43
The two remaining jurisdictions with independent local 
rating bureaus are Delaware and Pennsylvania, for which 
data were developed in the Ohio-Pennsylvania Study to 
allow manual rates to be adjusted to determine net cost to 
policyholders.
While the ratio of standard earned premium without con 
stants to manual premium is 1.000 in the NCCI jurisdictions 
(see table 5), it is .966 in Delaware, indicating a larger impact 
of experience rating in the state. 44 The expense constant in 
effect in Delaware on January 1, 1983 was $75, which means 
that standard earned premium with constants was estimated 
as 1.026 of standard earned premium without constants. In 
Delaware, the ratio of net cost to policyholders to standard 
earned premium with constants is .848, which is comparable 
to the .835 ratio in table 6 for the NCCI jurisdictions. 45 The 
larger ratio in Delaware indicates a somewhat smaller impact 
of premium discounts and dividends there than in the NCCI 
jurisdictions. In order to develop the overall differences be 
tween manual rates and net cost to policyholders in 
Delaware, the three ratios (.966, 1.026, and .848) were 
multiplied together. The result is a figure of .840, which 
means that the high adjusted manual rates in Delaware are 
84.0 percent of manual rates.
The ratio of standard earned premium without constants 
to manual premium is .947 in Pennsylvania, 46 which is 
smaller than the similar ratio for the NCCI jurisdictions in-
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eluded in table 5. The smaller ratio in Pennsylvania indicates 
that the experience rating plan in the state produces a larger 
reduction than in the NCCI jurisdictions. The Pennsylvania 
expense constant in effect on January 1, 1983 was $60, which 
means that standard earned premium with constants was 
estimated as 1.020 of standard earned premium without con 
stants. The ratio of net cost to policyholders to standard 
earned premium with constants in Pennsylvania is .835, 47 
which by coincidence is the same figure for the NCCI 
jurisdictions found in table 6. In order to develop the overall 
difference between manual rates and net cost to 
policyholders in Pennsylvania, the three ratios (.947, 1.020, 
and .835) were multiplied together. The result is a figure of 
.807, which means that high adjusted manual rates in Penn 
sylvania are 80.7 percent of manual rates.
To recapitulate this section, state-specific data have been 
used to determine the relationship between manual rates and 
high adjusted manual rates for Delaware and Pennsylvania. 
For the other 12 jurisdictions with independent local rating 
organizations, the data from the NCCI jurisdictions have 
been used to make the adjustments. For some of these 
jurisdictions, the use of NCCI data is clearly appropriate 
because the NCCI procedures and rating plans are used in 
the states. For other jurisdictions, most notably California 
and New Jersey, the NCCI data must be viewed as rough ap 
proximations. For each of the 14 states with independent 
rating organizations, the average manual rates in table 3 
were reduced by the appropriate percentage to produce the 
high adjusted manual rates in table 10.
VII. Modifications of Manual Rates in 
All States with Private Carriers: Phase 2
The previous two sections reviewed a number of modifica 
tions that are made to manual rates before the employer's in 
surance premium is determined. There are two important
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characteristics of these modifications. First, they involve 
either (1) formulas that all carriers must adhere to that 
modify the manual rates at the beginning of the policy 
period, such as experience rating, loss constants, and 
premium discounts for quantity purchases, or (2) dividends 
that are paid only after the policy year is over. In short, there 
is virtually no chance for carriers to compete in terms of 
price at the beginning of the policy period with any of these 
types of modifications. Second, these modifications have 
been in use for many years and previously were the only 
modifications necessary to consider in determining the dif 
ference between manual premiums and net costs to 
policyholders. From the Dissertation through to the Task 
Force Study and the MLR article, estimates were made of the 
modifying influence of just these factors. 48 The comparable 
figures produced by this procedure for this study are termed 
high adjusted manual rates.
This report is forced to widen the scope of inquiry for 
modifying factors because of the significant changes in the 
pricing mechanism for workers' compensation insurance 
that have occurred in the past few years. In many jurisdic 
tions it is now possible for private carriers to compete for 
business by varying the insurance rates at the beginning of 
the policy period. The variations in some instances are made 
for groups of employers and sometimes are even made for 
individual employers.
The desirability and causes for this increased ability of car 
riers to compete on an ex ante basis have been widely discuss 
ed and will not be repeated here. 49 Suffice it to say that the 
increased competition means the determination of the in 
terstate differences in the employers' costs of workers' com 
pensation has been considerably complicated. Indeed, 
because the movement towards competition has been so re 
cent, only limited information is available about the extent 
of the competition and the impact of the various competitive
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devices on workers' compensation costs. This section relies 
on the information that is available, which was provided by 
the National Council on Compensation Insurance50 and the 
chapter of this volume by C. Arthur Williams. 51 The data 
pertain to January 1, 1983, in order to be comparable with 
the manual rates used to produce table 3. Since that date, the 
use of the various competitive devices has continued to 
spread. 52
Table 7 provides information on three types of com 
petitive devices that have been adopted in those states with 
private insurance carriers. The most drastic change in the 
pricing mechanism has occurred in those states with open 
competition. In such states, carriers may charge whatever in 
surance rates they feel are appropriate. Carriers are required 
to file their rates with the state insurance department but do 
not require approval before using these rates. There are dif 
ferences among the open competition states, including 
whether a rating bureau (renamed data service organization) 
can publish advisory rates, and, if so, what those rates can 
include. As shown in table 7, there were six states with open 
competition laws in effect as of January 1, 1983, the date of 
comparisons for this report. In Arkansas, Illinois, and 
Rhode Island the advisory rates contain both pure premium 
(covering expected losses) and an expense loading; these 
rates are comparable to manual rates in states without open 
competition and therefore were used without modification in 
table 3.
In Kentucky, the advisory rates contain only pure 
premium, and to place them on a comparable basis to 
manual rates in other states, the expense loading of 36.2 per 
cent formerly used in Kentucky was used to inflate the ad 
visory rates. In Michigan, the advisory rates include loss ad 
justment expenses but exclude other components of the ex 
pense loading and also exclude the trend factor, so a loading 
of 53.9 percent was used to simulate manual premiums com-
Table 7
Ability of Private Carriers to Modify Insurance Rates 










































































































































































SOURCES: Derived from Workers' Compensation Rating Laws - A Digest of Changes, NCCI, 1982, with quarterly updates thru November
1983; C. Arthur Williams, Jr., "Workers' Compensation Insurance Rates: Their Determination and Regulation, A Regional Perspective,"
manuscript presented at the First Annual Conference on Workers' Compensation, Rutgers University, May 9-10, 1983; correspondence from
Barry I. Llewellyn, Assistant Secretary, NCCI, letters, June 24, 1983 and February 7, 1984.
O denotes presence of open competition.
(O) denotes that open competition will be effective in the near future.
X denotes deviations permitted.
NP denotes rate adherence agreements not permitted.
I denotes individual schedule rating.
U denotes uniform schedule rating.
(1) Three additional companies in Alaska write deviations only for selected class codes. The total market share of these companies is 11.9 per 
cent.
(2) The Pennsylvania data were provided in correspondence from Stephen S. Makgill, President, Pennsylvania Compensation Rating Bureau, 
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parable to those in other jurisdictions. Finally, in Oregon, 
the advisory rates only contain pure premium, and were in 
creased by the expense loading of 38.7 percent previously us 
ed in the jurisdiction. 53
These adjustments to the published rates in the states with 
open competition in order to make them comparable to 
manual rates in other jurisdictions seem reasonable, since in 
all jurisdictions the manual rates are only the starting point 
and have to be adjusted before meaningful comparisons can 
be made. The difficult task is to make the adjustments in the 
manual rates in states with open competition in order to ar 
rive at adjusted manual rates comparable to those in other 
jurisdictions. Unfortunately, as of the date of the Ohio- 
Pennsylvania Study (from which the information in the pre 
sent study is derived) there were no data showing the actual 
impact of open competition on the employers' costs of 
workers' compensation. This is not surprising, since the 
earliest open competition law only went into effect in Arkan 
sas in June of 1981, and the other five states with open com 
petition laws in effect as of January 1, 1983—the date for 
comparisons in this study—had laws that had been in effect 
for six months or less as of that date.
If another study of insurance costs is made in four or five 
years, sufficient information may be available to estimate 
with reasonable precision the impact of open competition on 
insurance costs. For this study, two estimates are used. First, 
one view of workers' compensation is that prior to open 
competition, the use of dividends, retrospective rating, etc. 
had squeezed all excess profits out of workers' compensation 
insurance. If this is true, then arguably the only result of 
open competition will be to reduce insurance rates at the 
beginning of the policy period with a corresponding reduc 
tion in dividends at the end of the policy period. This view 
amounts to saying that open competition has no impact on 
the employers' costs of workers' compensation, and
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therefore the procedure that was developed in sections V and 
VI to determine the difference between manual rates and ad 
justed manual rates requires no further adjustment. In other 
words, the "high adjusted manual rates" shown in table 10 
for the six states with open competition correspond to the 
view that open competition does not reduce the costs of 
workers' compensation insurance.
The other view of workers' compensation insurance is that 
prior to open competition and other competitive devices 
discussed in this section, excess profits or unnecessary ad 
ministrative expenses existed in the insurance industry, and 
that open competition eliminates or reduces these expenses, 
thereby reducing the costs of workers' compensation to 
employers. This view is equivalent to saying that the dif 
ference between manual rates and adjusted manual rates is 
greater than the percentages developed in sections V and VI 
indicate. Even if this view is correct, there are no data 
available to permit a precise estimate of the impact of open 
competition as of January 1, 1983. Arbitrarily, a 10 percent 
adjustment factor has been used to produce the "low ad 
justed manual rates" shown in table 11 for the states with 
open competition. That is, for the six states with open com 
petition as of January 1, 1983 (Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Oregon, and Rhode Island), the "low adjusted 
manual rates" shown in table 11 are 10 percent less than the 
"high adjusted manual rates" shown in table 10.
The second type of competitive device included in table 7 
is deviations. (A similar device—a prohibition of rate 
adherence agreements—is also shown in table 7.) In some of 
the states in which rating organizations publish manual 
rates, individual carriers are permitted to deviate from the 
bureau rates after securing the insurance commissioner's ap 
proval. The crucial differences from open competition are 
that prior approval of the deviations is required, while in 
open competition no such approval is required, and the
150 Variations in Employers' Costs
deviations offered by a particular carrier are uniform for all 
policyholders in the state, while in open competition, no 
such uniformity is necessary. As an example of deviations, 
the Zenith Insurance Company offers a 12 percent deviation 
on all policies in Arizona. 54
The information on deviations in table 7 is incomplete 
because most of the data were provided by the National 
Council on Compensation Insurance, and the National 
Council has only limited information of deviations in states 
with independent local rating organizations. There are Na 
tional Council data available for a few of these jurisdictions, 
and additional information derived from the paper by C. Ar 
thur Williams has been added to the table. For 16 states the 
National Council has provided information on the impact of 
deviations on the insurance rates, and these figures are in 
cluded in table 7.
As with open competition, there are two possible views of 
the impact of deviations on the employers' costs of workers' 
compenstion. If there are no excess profits or unnecessary 
administrative expenses in the workers' compensation in 
surance industry, then reductions in premiums due to devia 
tions will result in offsetting reductions in dividends and in 
adjustments through the retrospective rating plans. This 
view is equivalent to saying that deviations have no impact 
on the employers' costs of workers' compensation, and 
therefore for all states with deviations, the "high adjusted 
manual rates" shown in table 10 require no further ad 
justments.
The other view of workers' compensation is that excess 
profits or excessive administrative expenses exist in the in 
surance industry, and therefore deviations reduce the actual 
costs of insurance to employers. The view means that the dif 
ference between manual rates and adjusted manual rates is 
greater than the percentages developed in sections V and VI.
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For the 16 states, the "high adjusted manual rates" in table 
10 were reduced by the percentages shown in the "Impact on 
Rate Level" column of table 7 to produce the "low adjusted 
manual rates" shown in table 11. To the extent that devia 
tions are only partially used to reduce dividends and 
retrospective rating adjustments, the actual costs of workers' 
compensation will fall between the "high adjusted manual 
rates" in table 10 and the "low adjusted manual rates" in 
table 11. In those states with deviations for which the Na 
tional Council was unable to provide information on the im 
pact of the deviations on the rate level, there is no difference 
between the low and high adjusted manual rates shown in 
tables 10 and 11.
The third type of competitive device catalogued in table 7 
is schedule rating. Schedule fating plans have been introduc 
ed in many jurisdictions in recent years. Under these plans, 
insurers can change (usually decrease) the insurance rate the 
employer would otherwise pay through debits or credits bas 
ed on a subjective evaluation of factors such as the 
employer's loss control program. There are two types of 
schedule rating. In states with uniform schedule rating plans, 
the regulators have decided that it is permissible for all car 
riers to use the proposed schedule rating plan. If all carriers 
are not given this permission, then individual carriers can ap 
ply for approval of their schedule rating plans. Unfortunate 
ly, only limited data are available about the overall impact of 
schedule rating plans of the employers' costs of workers' 
compensation, and therefore states with such plans do not 
have their insurance rates further adjusted in this study.
VIII. Modifications of Published Manual Rates 
by Exclusive Fund States
Included in this study are Ohio and West Virginia, which 
have exclusive state funds. These states publish manual rates 
and then modify them to the detriment of easy interstate
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comparisons. Unlike the National Council states, the ex 
clusive fund states do not use premium discounts for quanti 
ty purchasers, nor do they use retrospective rating plans, nor 
do they pay dividends as do the mutual and participating 
stock companies. However, Ohio, and West Virginia use ex 
perience rating plans that are similar to each other and to the 
National Council experience rating plan because they cause 
the rates paid by some employers to be different from the 
published manual rates. We shall see how experience rating 
affects their costs relative to other states.
A. Ohio
The experience rating plan in Ohio is complex and similar 
in sophistication to the method used in National Council 
states. The influence of experience rating can be determined 
with a reasonable degree of precision. Manual rates are pro 
mulgated yearly on July 1. For each calendar year, data are 
available by insurance classification showing payroll and the 
premium actually collected after the application of any ex 
perience rating modification. 55 The main problem is that the 
calendar year includes manual rates promulgated in two 
years. In order to match collected premiums with manual 
rates, the average manual rates in effect during a particular 
calendar year were calculated. Thus for Ohio classification 
2000 (equivalent to NCCI Class 2003) the manual rate effec 
tive July 1, 1980 was $3.68 and the manual rate effective July 
1, 1981 was $3.50; assuming an equal payroll distribution in 
the first and second half of 1981, this means the average 
manual rate in effect in calendar year 1981 was $3.59. The 
1981 total payroll for classification 2000 was $92,967,000 
and with the average manual premium of $3.59 (per $100 of 
payroll), this produces a simulated manual premium of 
$3,338,000. The actual premium collected during 1981, 
however, was $3,487,000, indicating that experience rating 
produced actual premiums 4.5 percent higher than simulated 
manual premiums.
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The effect of experience rating for a sample of 58 Ohio in 
surance classifications that are comparable to the 71 in 
surance classifications used in the National Council states is 
shown in table 8. In both 1980 and 1981, the actual collected 
premiums were less than the simulated manual premiums, in 
dicating that, in general, experience rating reduces the costs 
of workers' compensation in Ohio. For the combined 
1980-81 experience, actual collected premiums were .946 of 
simulated manual premiums, indicating that the influence of 
experience rating for this combination of classifications was 
to reduce manual premium by 5.4 percent. For the remainder 
of this report, it is assumed that the 5.4 percent influence of 
experience rating for 1980-81 is relevant also for the rates in 
effect on January 1, 1983. All subsequent calculations are 
based on adjusted manual rates that are 5.4 percent lower 
than the manual rates shown in table 3.
The Ohio workers' compensation program has separate 
assessments for Administrative Costs and for the Disabled 
Workers' Relief Fund. As of January 1, 1983, the 
assessments for private employers were $0.15 and $0.10 per 
$100 of payroll, for a total assessment of $0.25 per $100 of 
payroll. The handling of these assessments in our study can 
be illustrated with data for Ohio classification 2000. As of 
January 1, 1983, the published manual rate for classification 
2000 was $3.84 per $100 of payroll; with the assessment add 
ed, the total is $4.09 per $100 of payroll. This $4.09 figure 
was one of the rates used to calculate the average manual 
rates for Ohio shown in table 3. The experience rating factor 
does not affect the assessments. Thus, the experience rating 
adjustment of 5.4 percent was used to reduce the published 
manual rate (for classification 2000) from $3.84 to $3.63 per 
$100 of payroll; with the assessment of $0.25 added the total 
is $3.88 per $100 of payroll. This $3.88 is one of the rates us 
ed to calculate the adjusted manual rates for Ohio shown in 
tables 10 and 11.
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Table 8
Ratio of Collected Premiums to Manual Premiums in Ohio 
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SOURCES: Data provided with July 8, 1983 correspondence from Paul C. Whitacre, Jr., 
Director, Actuarial Section, Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation; simulated manual 
premiums calculated by John Burton and Alan Krueger, July 1983.
B. West Virginia
In recent years, West Virginia has used an experience 
rating plan that is similar in sophistication to the plan used in 
National Council states. It is described in detail in two 
publications issued by the West Virginia Workmen's Com 
pensation Fund, 56 and therefore the method will not be 
discussed here, only the quantitative impact is estimated.
The influence of experience rating can be determined with 
precision, using a variation of the method used for Ohio. 57 
Manual rates are promulgated yearly on July 1 and are in ef 
fect until the following June 30. For the same 12-month 
period, data are available by insurance classification show 
ing payroll and the premiums actually collected after the ap 
plication of any experience rating modification. Thus, for 
West Virginia classification D-7, the manual rate effective 
July 1, 1980 was $4.32 per $100 of payroll. Since the payroll 
between July 1980 and June 1981 for this class was 
$9,112,681.90, the simulated manual premium was 
$393,667.85. The gross premium actually collected for the 
corresponding period was $413,693.57, indicating that ex 
perience rating produced actual premiums 5.1 percent higher 
than simulated manual premiums.
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The effect of experience rating for a sample of 24 West 
Virginia classifications that are comparable to the 71 in 
surance classifications used in the National Council states is 
shown in table 9. In both July-June periods for 1979-80 and 
1980-81, the actual collected premiums were greater than the 
simulated manual premiums, indicating that in general ex 
perience rating increases the employers' costs of workers' 
compensation in West Virginia. For the combined 1979-81 
experience, actual collected premiums were 9.3 percent 
greater than simulated manual premiums, indicating that the 
influence of experience rating for this combination of 
classifications increased manual premiums by 9.3 percent. 
For the remainder of this report, it is assumed that the 9.3 
percent influence of experience rating for 1971-81 is also 
relevant for the rates in effect on January 1, 1983 for West 
Virginia. 58 All subsequent calculations are based on adjusted 
manual rates that are 9.3 percent higher than the manual 
rates shown in table 3.
Table 9
Ratio of Collected Premiums to Manual Premiums in West Virginia 






















SOURCES: Data from West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Fund, Annual Report 
and Financial Statement, Year Ending June 30, 1980 and Year Ending June 30, 1981, table 
15; simulated manual premium calculated by Alan Krueger and John Burton, July 1983.
The West Virginia workers' compensation program has 
the assessments for administrative expenses and for the 
catastrophe and second injury accounts included in the base 
or manual rates, and therefore the rates as published were
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used to calculate the average manual rates for West Virginia 
shown in table 3. Likewise, the gross premiums shown in 
table 9 include the charges for these accounts and for ad 
ministrative expenses. Thus the experience rating adjustment 
of 9.3 percent was used with the data in table 3 to calculate 
the adjusted manual rates for West Virginia shown in tables 
10 and 11.
IX. Interstate Variations in Adjusted Manual Rates
The previous three sections have attempted to ascertain 
systematically the influence of experience rating, premium 
discounts, retrospective rating, policyholders' dividends, 
open competition, and deviations on the costs of workers' 
compensation. In table 3, data were presented on the 
averages of published manual rates for various combinations 
of insurance classifications. Table 10 was developed from 
the earlier table by decreasing these averages for manual 
rates by the appropriate percentages for the 31 National 
Council states that were developed in section V, by the ap 
propriate percentages for the 14 states with independent 
rating organizations that were developed in section VI, and 
by the appropriate percentages for Ohio and West Virginia 
developed in section VIII. Table 10 is based on the view that 
open competition, deviations, and schedule rating do not 
have a net impact on workers' compensation costs (once the 
offsetting changes in dividends, etc. are considered), and 
produces what are termed "high adjusted manual rates." 
Table 11 was developed from table 10 by decreasing the high 
adjusted manual rates in those states with open competition 
or with data available on the impact of deviations, using the 
percentage adjustments developed in section VII. Table 11 is 
based on the view that open competition and deviations do 
have a net impact on workers' compensation costs, produc 
ing what are termed "low adjusted manual rates."
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Columns 1 and 2 of tables 10 and 11 present the average 
costs of adjusted manual rates on January 1, 1983 for 24 and 
44 classifications using national payroll distributions. Col 
umn 3 presents the averages for 24 manufacturing classes us 
ing national payroll distribution. Column 4 presents the 
average adjusted manual rates based on the 56 classifications 
in divisions A, B, and C of table 3, and column 5 shows the 
rates based on the 71 classes in divisions A to D.
The results in tables 10 and 11 can be interpreted as the 
percentage of payroll expended on workers' compensation 
insurance by employers in 47 jurisdictions (including the 
District of Columbia) as of January 1, 1983. The results in 
column 2 of tables 10 and 11 are the most reliable and useful 
for reasons explained above. The results indicate, for exam 
ple, that as of January 1, 1983, the 44 types of employers in 
divisions A and B, would, on average, expend 0.905 percent 
of payroll on workers' compensation premiums in Alabama. 
(The "high" and "low" adjusted manual rates for Alabama 
are identical.)
X. Further Adjustment to Interstate Cost
Variations Necessitated by Interstate Variations 
in Employee Earnings
Even the adjustments in the preceding section to published 
manual rates do not complete the modifications necessary 
for comparisons of the interstate differences in the dollar 
costs of workers' compensation premiums per employee. 
Assume that the adjusted manual rates for an employer's 
classification in states A and B were an identical $1.00 of 
payroll, with no payroll limit in each state. Further assume 
that A is northern, industrialized, unionized, etc., and the 
average weekly earnings of employees are $500, while B lacks 
these attributes and the average weekly earnings of 
employees are $250. The result is that equal manual rates in 
A and B lead to dissimilar insurance premiums, since the
Table 10
Interstate Variations in Average Costs of High Adjusted Manual Rates for Classes 
























































































































































































































































































































Interstate Variations in Average Costs of Low Adjusted Manual Rates for Classes 



























































































































































































































































































































162 Variations in Employers' Costs
workers' compensation bill is a product of the manual rate 
and the weekly earnings. In this example the employers' in 
surance cost is $5.00 per employee per week in A and $2.50 
in B.
In reality, interstate variations in employee earnings can 
influence the relative costs of workers' compensation. Un 
fortunately, there is a paucity of weekly earnings differential 
information relevant for this study. 59 Information is needed 
that shows the interstate variations in the weekly earnings of 
workers employed in the same industries, not information 
that reflects interstate differences in the industry mix, which 
is characteristic of most published data. A method developed 
in the Dissertation to derive the appropriate information60 
used earnings data broken down by the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system. The results are presented in 
table 12.
The meaning of the earnings index as used in this study is 
the following: since the index for Michigan is 1.1315, it is 
assumed that, for every industry, workers in Michigan earn 
13.15 percent more per week than the average worker in the 
United States. Because of the varying quantity of informa 
tion available from the states, the index numbers should be 
viewed as approximations. Unfortunately we have no more 
precise measure of interstate earnings variations readily 
available.
The ultimate goal of this study is to quantify the interstate 
variations in the net cost to employers of workers' compen 
sation. This necessitates not only the use of the adjusted 
manual rates from the previous section but also the use of an 
appropriate earnings figure adjusted for the interstate earn 
ings variations. The weekly earnings figure which is used is 
the national average of earnings of workers covered by the 
unemployment insurance program, which for 1980 (the latest 
data available) was $297.09.
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Table 12 































































































SOURCE: Data for most states are from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Supplement to 
Employment and Earnings, States and Areas, Data for 1977-81, Bulletin 1370-16 
(September 1982).
NOTES: Indexes are based on data for individual 2-digit industries except in Alaska, 
Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Utah. In these states, 
because of a paucity of such data, wage data for combined 2-digit SIC industries were used. 
Colorado wage index pertains to 1970 because 1980 data are unavailable.
Finally, we can compute the interstate variations in the net 
cost to policyholders. Table 13 presents the "high" weekly 
net costs per workers, which are the products of the "high" 
adjusted manual rates found in table 10, the interstate earn 
ings index numbers from table 12, and the national average
Table 13
Interstate Variations in Average Costs of High Adjusted Net Costs for Classes 
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weekly earnings figure of $297.09; the product must be 
divided by 100 since the manual rates are per $100 of payroll. 
Table 14 presents the "low" weekly costs per worker which 
are the products of the "low" adjusted manual rates found 
in table 11, the interstate earnings index numbers from table 
12, and the national average weekly earnings figure of 
$297.09, again divided by 100. The results indicate, for ex 
ample, that the 44 types of employers in divisions A and B of 
table 4 would, on average, spent $2.565 per week per worker 
on workers' compensation premiums in Alabama as of 
January 1, 1983. (The "high" and "low" net costs for 
Alabama are identical.)
XL Historical Data
Information on the employers' costs of workers' compen 
sation is available for the 44 types of employers included in 
divisions A and B of table 2 for selected years since 1950. 
(Prior to 1983, these divisions contained 45 classes, as was 
explained in section IV.) Data for 20 states are available for 
nine years between 1950 and 1983; data for eight more states 
are available for seven years between 1958 and 1983; 42 
jurisdictions have data for 1972, 1975, 1978, and 1983; and 
for 1978 and 1983, there are 47 jurisdictions that may be 
compared.
The average adjusted manual rates for the 44-employer 
group are shown in table 15. For example, Illinois employers 
expended, on average, the equivalent of 0.437 percent of 
payroll on workers' compensation premiums in 1950, com 
pared with 1.194 percent (high adjusted rates) or 1.075 per 
cent (low adjusted rates) in 1983. Table 16 presents the ap 
proximate net cost to the same group of policyholders for 
several years between 1950 and 1983. These results show, for 
example, that the employers in Illinois expended a weekly 
average of $0.261 per worker on premiums in 1950, and 
$3.785 (high net costs) or $3.406 (low net costs) in 1983.
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The data in tables 15 and 16 are valuable for tracing 
changes in workers' compensation costs over time in a par 
ticular state, but the volume of information makes it dif 
ficult to comprehend general developments. Tables 17 and 
18 provide a compact summary of these data, permitting 
evaluations of interstate trends.
Table 17, for example, illustrates the changes over time in 
the average adjusted manual rates for the various combina 
tions of states. Columns 1 and 2 pertain to 20 states for 
which data are available from 1950 to 1983; columns 3 and 4 
relate to 28 states for which data are available from 1958 to 
1983; columns 5 and 6 present data for 42 states that are 
available from 1972 to 1983; and columns 7 and 8 present 
data on the 47 states for 1978 and 1983. Panel A relies on 
unweighted observations, while panel B weights each states' 
observation by the size of the state's nonagricultural labor 
force. 61 The text will refer to the weighted data from panel B 
because they are more representative of national experience.
The mean adjusted manual rate in the 20 states was the 
equivalent of 0.470 percent of payroll in 1950, 0.678 percent 
in 1972, and 1.227 percent in 1978. In 1983, the mean for 
high adjusted manual rates was 1.393 and the mean for low 
adjusted manual rates was 1.343. Of particular interest is the 
rapid rise in costs between 1972 and 1978, which was more 
than double the 1950-72 increase. Between 1978 and 1983 the 
employers' costs of workers' compensation insurance con 
tinued to increase for this combination of 20 states, but at a 
less torrid pace than during the earlier portion of the 1970s. 
The data in table 17 also indicate that the average adjusted 
manual rates increased between 1978 and 1983 for the 28 
jurisdictions for which data are available since 1958. 
However, for the averages of adjusted manual rates for the 
42 and 47 jurisdictions, the data indicate that the employers' 
costs of workers' compensation (measured as premiums as a 
percentage of payroll) actually declined between 1978 and
Table 15 
Interstate Variations in Average Costs of Adjusted Manual Rates
for 44 Classes in Divisions A and B of Table 3 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Interstate Variations in Net Costs of Insurance for 44 Classes in Divisions A and B of Table 3
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178 Variations in Employers' Costs
1983. Data for the largest combination of jurisdictions (46 
states plus the District of Columbia) indicate that employers 
on average spent 1.503 percent of payroll on workers' com 
pensation insurance in 1978, and 1.423 percent (high ad 
justed manual rates) or 1.393 percent (low) in 1983.
The average (mean) adjusted manual rate for a particular 
year obviously reflects data from some states that are more 
expensive than the mean and some that are less expensive. 
For example, the average adjusted rate for the 20 states was 
0.470 percent of payroll in 1950 (table 17, panel B, column 
1), but the average employer in Alabama paid only 0.282 
percent while the average employer in Rhode Island paid 
0.829 percent of payroll for workers' compensation in 
surance (table 15, column 1). A statistic that provides a con 
venient summary of the extent of variations among the states 
around the average (mean) cost is the standard deviation. 62 
The larger the standard deviation, the greater is the variation 
among the states in the percentage of payroll expended on 
workers' compensation insurance. The data indicate that 
from 1950 through 1978, there was an increase in the amount 
of variation among the states in the percentages of payroll 
expended on insurance. However, between 1978 and 1983, 
the variations increased for the combinations of 20 and 28 
states, but decreased for the combinations of 42 and 47 
states.
Table 18 presents information on the changes through 
time in the net costs to policyholders for various combina 
tions of states. The layout is similar to table 17, and again 
the text will use the weighted observations data from panel 
B. The net costs are measured as the weekly premiums per 
worker, and in all instances show an increase through time. 
For example, the weighted mean for the 20 jurisdictions 
(table 18, panel B, column 1) indicates that employers paid 
$2.426 weekly in 1978, while in 1983 the cost was $4.040
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(high net costs) or $3.879 (low net costs). Data for the largest 
combination of jurisdictions (47) indicate that in 1978, 
employers on average paid $3.061 weekly on workers' com 
pensation premiums, while in 1983 they paid $4.240 (high net 
costs) or $4.148 (low net costs).
Table 18 also provides information on the extent of varia 
tion among the states around the average (mean) net costs to 
policyholders. In 1950, when the average cost was $.248 per 
worker per week in the 20 states, the standard deviation 
among the states was $.050. The data indicate that through 
time there have been continuing increases in the amount of 
variation among the states in the cost in dollars of workers' 
compensation insurance (table 18, panel B, columns 2, 4, 6, 
and 8).
XII. Comparisons of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York
This section provides a closer examination of Connecticut, 
New Jersey, and New York, the three states of particular in 
terest to the conference for which this paper was prepared. 
We examine the changes in the employers' costs of workers' 
compensation since 1972, the earliest date when data are 
available for all three states. We also attempt to explain these 
cost developments in terms of changes in benefit levels and 
other relevant factors.
Table 19 presents data on the percent of payroll devoted to 
workers' compensation insurance by a sample of employers. 
These data correspond to the adjusted manual rates shown in 
tables 15 and 17. For 1983, only high adjusted manual rates 
are shown since as of January 1983, Connecticut and New 
Jersey did not permit private carriers to modify insurance 
rates on an ex ante basis, and New York had only a very 
limited use of deviations (table 7). The result is that for Con 
necticut and New Jersey, low and high adjusted manual rates 
are identical, while for New York the impact of deviations is
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so slight that the two variants of adjusted manual rates are 
virtually the same.
The data in table 19 present an interesting history of 
workers* compensation costs (measured as a percentage of 
payroll) both nationally and in the three states. From 1972 to 
1978, the 42-jurisdiction average of employers' costs almost 
doubled (from 0.779 percent to 1.454 percent), and then 
from 1978 to 1983 there was a slight decline. In Connecticut, 
the employers' costs of workers' compensation relative to 
the national average (column 3 of table 19) were roughly 
80-90 percent of the national figure from 1972 to 1978. Then 
Connecticut costs increased rapidly so that by 1983 Connec 
ticut employers were paying insurance premiums some 25 
percent above the national average. In New Jersey, the 
employers' costs relative to the national average (as shown in 
column 5) began about 60 percent higher in 1972, dropped to 
about 20 percent above that average in 1975 and 1978, and 
almost exactly matched the national average in 1983. The 
New York record is more erratic, since costs began some 10 
percent above the national average in 1972 (column 7), drop 
ped slightly below the national average in 1975, increased to 
about 20 percent above the national average in 1978, and 
then fell to about 20 percent below the national figure in 
1983.
The patterns just described involving workers' compensa 
tion cost measured as a percent of payroll are paralleled by 
the behavior of costs measured by the weekly insurance 
premium per worker. Table 20 indicates that in 1972 Con 
necticut employers' costs were about 10 percent below the 
national average, while in 1983 the costs were some 20 per 
cent above the national average. In contrast, New Jersey 
employers began with costs almost 65 percent above the na 
tional average, but found their costs almost exactly equal to 
the 42-jurisdiction average in 1983. In New York, costs were
Table 19
Percent of Payroll Devoted to Workers' Compensation Insurance 
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SOURCE: Data in tables 16 and 18 (panel B).
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about 20 percent above the national average from 1972 until 
1978, and then fell to 15 percent below in 1983.
Both measures of workers' compensation costs thus show 
a considerable movement in the relative costs among Con 
necticut, New Jersey, and New York over the last decade. 
Connecticut began as the low cost state and ended as the 
most expensive. New Jersey began as much more expensive 
than the others and ended up in the middle, while New York 
moved from the middle to the least expensive. These rank 
ings are based on comparisons among the employers' costs 
of workers' compensation for a representative sample of 44 
types of employers (or 45 types before 1983). However, the 
rankings are not particularly sensitive to the types of 
employers that are compared. There are, for example, five 
different combinations of employers for whom the adjusted 
manual rates as of January 1, 1983, are presented in table 10. 
For all combinations, New York insurance rates are lowest, 
New Jersey are the next most expensive (ranging from 13 to 
20 percent more expensive than New York rates), and Con 
necticut rates are the most expensive (ranging from 31 to 56 
percent more expensive than New York rates).
A statistical or quantitative explanation of the cost dif 
ferences among the three jurisdictions is not possible, given 
the limited number of observations. 63 What we will therefore 
present is a largely qualitative explanation of the factors that 
appear to explain the cost developments shown in tables 19 
and 20.
An obvious candidate for a variable that explains the costs 
of workers' compensation insurance in a jurisdiction is the 
generosity of benefits provided by the state's workers' com 
pensation program. Table 21 presents information on several 
important aspects of the workers' compensation statutes in 
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York as of January 1, 
1983, the date for the costs of the program as measured in 
this study.
184 Variations in Employers' Costs
Table 21 
Selected Comparisons of Temporary Disability,
Permanent Disability, and Fatal Benefits
in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York
as of January 1,1983
Temporary total disability



















Benefit subject to Social Security offset
Dependency allowance per child
Cost-of-living adjustment
for outstanding cases
Permanent partial disability benefits
Scheduled benefits







Duration varies by impairment, examples:
Total loss of arm
Total loss of leg
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Table 21 (continued)
Total loss of foot 
Amputation cases
Nonscheduled benefits 
Nominal rate of compensation
Percent of preinjury wage
Percent of (preinjury wage-postinjury 
earning capacity)
Percent of wage loss 








Nominal rate of compensation-widow only 
Minimum weekly benefit-widow 
Maximum weekly benefit-widow 
Maximum duration-widow
Widow's benefit reduced by wages
earned after 450 weeks 
Widow's benefit subject to






























































SOURCES: National Council on Compensation Insurance, Legislative Update Service 
(1983 with supplements); data on duration of scheduled benefits from U.S. Department of 
Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Office of State Liaison and Legislative 
Analysis, Division of State Workers' Compensation Programs, State Workers' Compensa 
tion Laws (January 1983), table 8.
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Temporary total disability benefits are the most common 
type of cash benefits in the workers' compensation program. 
The data in table 21 indicate that for most aspects of this 
type of benefit, Connecticut had the most generous provi 
sions. Connecticut had the highest minimum and maximum 
benefits, the shortest waiting period before benefits began, 
and was the only state that provided cost-of-living ad 
justments for outstanding cases. New Jersey had a slightly 
higher nominal rate of compensation that Connecticut, but 
to some extent this advantage was overcome by 
Connecticut's payment of a dependency allowance for 
children.
The benefits for permanent total disability were also 
generally more adequate in Connecticut than in the other 
two jurisdictions. Connecticut had higher minimum and 
maximum benefits, had a dependency allowance, and was 
the only jurisdiction that provided a cost-of-living adjust 
ment for outstanding cases.
Scheduled permanent partial disability benefits are dif 
ficult to compare among jurisdictions because of the com 
plexity of the statutory provisions for such benefits. Those 
aspects summarized in table 21 suggest that Connecticut is 
perhaps somewhat less generous in terms of the number of 
weeks of benefits paid for particular types of injuries (such 
as the loss of a leg), but considerable more generous in terms 
of the weekly benefit. In New Jersey, the maximum weekly 
benefit started at $49 and did not reach $236 until there were 
421 weeks of benefits; in New York, the weekly maximum 
was $105 for all durations; in Connecticut, the maximum for 
all durations as $326.
Statutory provisions for nonscheduled permanent partial 
disability benefits are also difficult to compare because of 
the different approaches used to provide the benefits. New 
Jersey determines the duration by evaluating the extent of
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the worker's impairment and multiplying the rating percent 
age times 600 weeks; the maximum weekly benefit ranges 
from $49 to $236. New York has a maximum weekly benefit 
of $105, which is relatively low, but the payments can con 
tinue for the length of disability, which can be for life. Con 
necticut pays benefits that are related to the percent of wage 
loss, with a maximum duration of 780 weeks and a max 
imum weekly benefit of $326. It is not evident which jurisdic 
tion's provisions for nonscheduled benefits are more 
generous, but Connecticut does not appear to be deficient.
The final type of benefit included in table 21 is fatal 
benefits, where Connecticut generally has the most liberal 
provisions. The nominal percentage of 63 2/3 percent found 
in Connecticut is matched in New York, but in the latter case 
the benefits are subject to an offset provision that reduces 
workers' compensation benefits when social security benefits 
are received by the widow or widower. The minimum weekly 
benefit is lower in Connecticut, but the levels are so low in all 
three jurisdictions that few cases are likely to be affected. 
More significant is the maximum weekly benefit, highest in 
Connecticut, and the cost of living adjustment for outstand 
ing cases, a provision found only in Connecticut.
This qualitative assessment of the workers' compensation 
statutes in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York as of 
January 1, 1983 suggests that Connecticut has the most 
generous provisions for most types of benefits. As between 
New Jersey and New York, the differences are not as pro 
nounced, although for all types of benefits except fatal the 
New Jersey maximum weekly benefits are higher. Thus, at 
least in a rough sense, the ranking of workers' compensation 
costs as of January 1983 as shown in tables 19 and 20 cor 
responds to the ranking of statutory benefit generosity 
shown in table 21.
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The view that employers' costs of workers' compensation 
are affected by statutory provisions is reinforced by informa 
tion on the changes through time in these factors. Tables 19 
and 20 demonstrated the changes between 1972 and 1983 in 
the costs in the three states, with Connecticut moving from 
least to most expensive, while New York costs were declining 
to least expensive. Table 22 presents information on the 
changes between 1972 and 1983 in the extent of compliance 
with the 19 essential recommendations of The National 
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws. 64 
These essential recommendations primarily pertain to 
benefit amounts and durations, the types of provisions for 
which increasing compliance is likely to lead to higher costs. 
It is instructive that the state with the most dramatic change 
in compliance scores between 1972 and 1983 is Connecticut. 
Further, most of the improvements in Connecticut took 
place between 1978 and 1983, which matches the interval 
when the employers' costs of workers' compensation in 
creased sharply in the state.
Table 22 
State Compliance With the 19 Essential Recommendations
of the National Commission 


































SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Office of 
Workers' Compensation Programs, Division of State Workers' Compensation Standards, 
State Compliance with the 19 Essential Recommendations of the National Commission on 
State Workmen's Compensation Laws, 1972-1980 (January 1981), as supplemented by 
January 1, 1983 release from the Division (now the Division of State Workers' Compensa 
tion Programs).
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An even more compelling demonstration of the relation 
ship between changes in statutory provisions and changes in 
workers' compensation costs is provided by comparing the 
cost data in tables 19 and 20 with the data in table 23 show 
ing the levels of the maximum weekly benefits for temporary 
total disability. Both in terms of the dollar amounts of the 
maximums and in terms of the maximum benefit as a per 
centage of the state's average weekly wage, Connecticut had 
the greatest increase between 1972 and 1983, followed by 
New Jersey, and then by New York. Again of interest is that 
most of the improvement in Connecticut's maximum for 
temporary total disability took place after 1978, correspond 
ing to the time when the cost of the program in the state also 
sharply increased.
While this analysis suggests that changes in benefit levels 
are an important determinant of changes in the employers' 
costs of workers' compensation, we do not want to suggest 
that benefits are the only factor that affects costs. In a 
separate study, we are examining the influence on costs of 
variables such as coverage and the type of insurance ar 
rangements (as measured by the importance of state in 
surance funds and of self-insurance). 65 Another factor that 
affects costs is the administration of the law, and in par 
ticular the application of the statutory provisions for perma 
nent total disability and permanent disability benefits. 
Tables 24 to 26 present information on the number and costs 
of these types of benefits in Connecticut, New Jersey, and 
New York.
The data are based on claims that occurred in the policy 
years closest to 1958, 1968, 1973, and 1978. Because of the 
delays between the ends of the policy years and the dates 
when information on the claims from those years are 
available, 1978 is the most recent year for which data are 
available on both the number and costs of permanent
Table 23
Maximum Weekly Benefit for Temporary Total Disability 



















































SOURCE: See table 22.
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disability claims and the employers' costs of workers' com 
pensation insurance.
The shares of all cases with cash benefits accounted for by 
permanent disability cases in the three jurisdictions are ex 
amined in table 24. The most significant finding is the con 
siderably greater importance of permanent disability cases in 
New Jersey than in Connecticut or New York. In particular, 
minor permanent partial disability benefits dominated the 
New Jersey caseload, accounting for almost half of all cases 
in 1978.
The average costs of permanent disability cases are 
presented in table 25. Overall, New Jersey has the lowest 
average, reflecting in large part the predominance of the 
minor permanent partial disability cases. As of 1978, Con 
necticut had the highest average cost per case for each of the 
three types of permanent disability cases as well as for the 
overall average.
The shares of all cash benefits accounted for by permanent 
disability cases are presented in table 26. While Connecticut 
devoted the highest percentage of all cash benefits to major 
permanent partial disability benefits in 1978, New Jersey ex 
pended the largest percentages on permanent total, minor 
permanent partial, and all permanent disability cases. In 
deed, for each of the four years shown between 1958 and 
1978, New Jersey expended the highest percentage of all cash 
benefits on the total of the three types of permanent disabili 
ty benefits.
These data confirm what has been widely discussed 
elsewhere, namely, the unusual emphasis in New Jersey on 
the compensation of relatively minor permanent im 
pairments. 66 This probably is one reason why the employers' 
costs of workers' compensation were relatively high in the 
state, given the level of benefits. For example, in 1978, when
Table 24 ^
Share of All Cases with Cash Benefits Accounted for by Permanent Disability Cases






















































































SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Countrywide Workers' Compensation Experience Including Certain Competitive S- 
State Funds—1st Report Basis," Exhibits dated (no date), March 15, 1972, July 1976, and April 1982.
Table 25
Average Cost of Permanent Disability Cases 
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the maximum weekly benefits for temporary total disability 
in Connecticut and New Jersey were virtually identical (table 
23), the costs of workers' compensation insurance were 
much higher in the latter state.
What the data in tables 24 to 26 cannot reveal because the 
terminal date in 1978 is the impact of the major reform in 
1979 of the permanent partial disability benefits in New 
Jersey. 67 The law was amended to require objective evidence 
of permanent impairments, presumably to preclude payment 
of permanent partial disability benefits for minor injuries. 
Apparently the reform had the intended effect of reducing 
the costs of workers' compensation insurance in New Jersey: 
even though the maximum weekly benefit for temporary 
total disability increased more rapidly than the state's 
average weekly wage between 1978 and 1983 (table 23), in 
surance costs as a percentage of payroll dropped markedly 
during the same interval (table 19).
The data on permanent disability benefits in tables 24 to 
26 have other interesting aspects. In New York, the share of 
cash benefits accounted for by all types of permanent 
disability cases fluctuated in a very narrow band over the 
1958 to 1978 period (from 55 to 57 percent). However, this 
represented a significant decline in importance of minor per 
manent partial cases and an offsetting increase in importance 
of major permanent partial cases. Additional data on perma 
nent partial disability benefits in New York are presented in 
table 27. These data are from records kept by the Workers' 
Compensation Board and pertain to cases closed in a given 
year, regardless of the year of injury, while the data in tables 
24-26, from insurance industry records, pertain to injuries 
that occurred in a given policy year regardless of when the 
cases were closed. Another difference is that the insurance 
industry data divide permanent partial disability cases be 
tween major and minor categories depending on the
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seriousness of the injury (or the amount of benefits paid), 
while the table 27 data distinguish between scheduled and 
nonscheduled permanent partial cases. The latter distinction 
is particularly interesting because New York uses different 
approaches for the two types of benefits: scheduled benefits 
are paid on the basis of the extent of physical impairment 
without regard to the amount of actual wage loss, while the 
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SOURCE: Compensated Cases Closed, Workers' Compensation Board, State of New 
York, for years shown.
The data in table 27 indicate a rapid increase during the 
1970s in the share of cases and cash payments accounted for 
by nonscheduled awards, with a significant decline in the 
amount of compensation going to scheduled awards. Burton 
has examined these patterns in a recent study, 68 and found 
that a major reason why nonscheduled permanent partial 
cases have become more expensive during the last decade is 
the relatively high unemployment rates during the period. In-
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deed, given the magnitude of the increases shown in table 27 
for nonscheduled cases and the high levels of unemployment 
so far in the 1980s, it is surprising that workers' compensa 
tion costs have declined so rapidly in New York since 1978 
(table 19).
This analysis of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York 
thus provides some interesting findings on the behavior of 
workers' compensation costs between 1972 and 1983, and 
some partial explanations of the changes in costs. There were 
significant changes in the relative costs among the three 
jurisdictions, with Connecticut having experienced the most 
rapid increase and New Jersey the largest decline. The ex 
planation of Connecticut's increase appears to be largely due 
to the jurisdiction's significant improvement in benefits 
compared to the other states. In New Jersey, the rapid 
decline in costs compared to the other two jurisdictions be 
tween 1972 and 1983 appears to reflect both a deterioration 
in benefit levels compared to Connecticut and the reduction 
in the prevalence of minor permanent partial disability 
benefits. The New York experience of declining costs be 
tween 1978 and 1983 reflects in part the slippage of benefits 
compared to those in Connecticut during this interval; it is 
not clear why the increasing costs of nonscheduled benefits 
have not limited the costs declines shown in table 19. 
Perhaps the best one sentence summary is that over the 1972 
to 1983 interval, the changing relative costs in workers' com 
pensation insurance in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New 
York can be largely but not entirely explained by changing 
levels of benefits.
XIII. Significance of the Cost Developments Since 1972
The historical data on the employers' costs of workers' 
compensation insurance were presented in tables 17 and 18 
and described in section XI. The essence is that between 1950
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and 1978 there were significant increases both in the percent 
age of payroll devoted to workers' compensation premiums 
and in the weekly insurance premium per worker. Also, the 
variations among the states in these two measures of 
workers' compensation costs significantly increased through 
time. The developments between 1978 and 1983 are more 
complex. For the combinations of states for which the 
historical record is the longest (20 and 28 states), the ad 
justed manual rates showed continuing increases in the 
means and the standard deviations (table 17, columns 1-4). 
However, for the larger combinations of states (42 and 47 
states), there were decreases in the means and standard 
deviations of adjusted manual rates between 1978 and 1983 
(table 17, columns 5-8). The behavior of weekly premiums 
per worker continued the patterns of earlier years in the 1978 
to 1983 interval: for all combinations of states, the means 
and standard deviations increased between these years (table 
18).
Although the patterns of cost changes in the most recent 
five-year interval are somewhat mixed, a clear picture 
emerges if we consider developments over the entire period 
since 1972. That starting point seems appropriate since it is 
the first year for which data are available for all three states 
of primary concern to this study (Connecticut, New Jersey, 
and New York) and because 1972 was the year that the Na 
tional Commission on State Workmen's Compensation 
Laws issued its report and called attention to the issue of in 
terstate cost differences. 69 Between 1972 and 1983, every 
combination of states shown in tables 17 and 18 for which 
data are available has shown increases both in the average 
costs and the differences in costs among states.
The determinants of these cost developments are largely 
beyond the scope of this study. Several findings are relevant, 
however. In an earlier study, Burton found that the level of 
workers' compensation benefits were the most significant
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variable in explaining interstate differences in costs among 
25 states. 70 In a current research project, we have confirmed 
the statistical significance of the level of benefits in explain 
ing workers' compensation cost differences among 31 
jurisdictions. 71 Because of data limitations, neither of these 
studies included New Jersey and New York. However, the 
qualitative analysis in section XII of this study suggests that 
changes in benefit levels between 1972 and 1983 were an im 
portant factor in explaining changes in workers' compensa 
tion costs in these two states relative to the cost changes in 
Connecticut.
We believe this evidence supports the proposition that in 
terstate differences in the levels of workers' compensation 
benefits are a major (though not the only) determinant of in 
terstate differences in the employers' costs of workers' com 
pensation. If this proposition is true, then the developments 
since 1972 in costs are particularly disturbing because they 
suggest the interstate inequities in benefits that were of ma 
jor concern to the National Commission have become worse 
in the last decade. The changes in maximum weekly benefits 
for temporary total disability between 1972 and 1983 in Con 
necticut, New Jersey and New York provide a partial valida 
tion of the disturbing developments. In January 1972, the 
dollar amounts were identical in the three states. In January 
1983, injured workers qualifying for the maximum weekly 
benefit received $100 more per week in Connecticut than in 
New Jersey, while New York workers at the maximum were 
another $21 below the New Jersey figure. 72 To be sure, New 
Jersey and New York employers had lower workers' com 
pensation costs than did Connecticut employers, but since 
the two inexpensive jurisdictions failed to comply with the 
National Commission's recommendations for maximum 
weekly benefits for temporary total, permanent total, and 
death cases, their achievement seems more due to parsimony 
than prudence.
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NOTES
"The present study is based in large part on a study prepared by Burton 
with the assistance of Krueger entitled "Interstate Variations in the 
Employers' Costs of Workers' Compensation, With Particular 
Reference to Ohio and Pennsylvania." The January 1984 study was 
prepared through the auspices of Workers' Disability Income Systems, 
Inc. (202 Blackstone Avenue, Ithaca, NY 14850) with financial support 
from the Workers' Compensation Coalition. The Coalition consists of 
CIGNA, Crum & Forster, Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company, 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and Pennsylvania Manufacturers 
Association Insurance Company. We appreciate the opportunity to use 
the material from the study sponsored by the Workers' Compensation 
Coalition. The views in the present study are not necessarily those of the 
Coalition.
In preparing the present study, refined estimates were prepared for the 
costs of workers' compensation in five jurisdictions. The estimated costs 
were increased significantly for Michigan and decreased slightly for 
Delaware, New York, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.
We appreciate the assistance of Dane Partridge, who prepared several 
of the tables involving comparisons among Connecticut, New Jersey, 
and New York, and Nancy Voorheis, for typing this article. We assume 
responsibility for all views and data, no matter how persuasive and ac 
curate.
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Their Determination and Regulation 
A Regional Perspective
C. Arthur Williams, Jr. 
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One of the most discussed issues of the day is the high cost 
of workers' compensation insurance. As of September 1, 
1982, in the 45 states (including the District of Columbia) 
with private insurers, workers' compensation standard earn 
ed premiums (a term to be defined later) averaged about 
$2.41 per $100 of payroll. The variation among states was 
great, however, ranging from $.74 in Indiana to $4.83 in 
Hawaii. 1 Comparable data are not available for the six states 
with exclusive state funds (Ohio, Nevada, North Dakota, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming). Because this 
session is directed mainly toward regional experience in Con 
necticut, New Jersey, and New York, the relative cost in 
those three states is of special interest. Connecticut ranked 
16th highest with a $2.75 rate, New Jersey 22nd with a $2.48 
rate, and New York 39th with a $1.55 rate.
Many factors account for the variation in these rates, in 
cluding differences in the following: (1) the mix of payrolls 
according to industry and firm size; (2) injury and disease
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frequency and severity rates; (3) statutory benefits including 
eligibility requirements; (4) administrative and court inter 
pretations of these benefits; (5) medical expenses for the 
same treatment; (6) the effectiveness of loss control and 
claims handling services provided by employers, insurers, 
and state agencies; (7) insurer expense and profit loadings; 
and (8) the presence or absence of a competitive state fund.
This paper will concentrate on how the ways in which 
workers' compensation insurance rates are determined and 
regulated vary among the states, with special attention to 
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York.
Workers9 Compensation 
Insurance Rate Determination
Insured employers can be classified according to whether 
they are (1) class-rated, (2) experience rated, (3) schedule- 
rated, or (4) retrospectively-rated. This section will discuss 
first how insurers determine the insured's premium, given a 
set of rates and rating plans. Second, it will describe in 
general terms how insurers determine the class rates printed 
in their rating manuals. In addition to these rating methods 
many insurers return a dividend that reduces the net cost. 
The dividend may vary among firms depending upon their 
size and individual loss experience. Because these methods 
tend to be the same in all jurisdictions, no special attention 
will be paid to regional practices in this section.
Class Premiums
Employers who are class-rated pay a rate per $100 of 
payroll that is based primarily on the industry or industries 
in which they are engaged. Separate rates have been 
developed for over 600 industries. However, the payroll 
assigned to certain employees such as clerical office 
employees, drivers (usually but not always), and outside
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salespersons is assigned the same rate regardless of the 
employer's industry. For example, suppose a small abrasive 
paper manufacturer has a total payroll of $250,000-$200,000 
for plant workers and $50,000 for clerical office employees. 
Further assume that the class rates per $100 of payroll are 
$2.50 for the plant workers and $.25 for the clerical 
employees. The class premium would be 
2,000($2.50)-f 500($.25) or $5,125. 2 Traditionally all 
workers' compensation insurers in the state charged the same 
class rates, but in an increasing number of states some price 
competition exists with respect to class rates.
For employers whose average class premium is under 
$2,500 (still $750 in some states), the class premium is the 
amount charged. Over half the insured employers are class- 
rated, but because they employ few workers, these class- 
rated firms pay less than 10 percent of the premiums received 
by insurers. All other employers are experience rated. An in 
creasing number are both experience rated and schedule- 
rated. Employers whose premiums exceed $5,000 may be 
permitted to be retrospectively-rated in addition to being ex 
perience rated. Insurers, however, usually limit retrospective 
rating to firms paying premiums of at least $100,000. 
Employers whose experience premiums exceed $5,000 (still 
$1,000 in some states) receive a premium discount because 
the insurer's expenses (not loss payments) do not increase 
proportionately with the premium size. Retrospectively- 
rated employers receive this discount through the retrospec 
tive rating formula. Other eligibile employers are rated under 
a separate premium discount plan.
Experience Rating
Under experience rating an employer's class premium is 
modified to reflect two factors. 3 The first factor is how the 
employer's loss experience during a recent three-year period
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compares with the amount the insurer would have expected 
to pay (given current rates except for changes in the workers' 
compensation law since the experience period) if the 
employer had been an average employer in the same industry 
with the same payroll. For example, if the employer's losses 
were half the insurer's expectation, this factor alone would 
suggest cutting the rate in half. If the losses were twice the in 
surer's expectation, this comparison would suggest a dou 
bling of the rate. However, the adjustment also depends on 
how much credibility or confidence the insurer should assign 
to this employer's loss experience. The reasoning behind this 
factor is that chance alone may cause the experience of in 
dividual employers to fluctuate greatly from year to year. 
The smaller the payroll exposure for a given hazard class, the 
more important this chance factor becomes. For example, a 
very small employer may have no losses for 10 years follow 
ed by a substantial loss the next year. As the employer's 
payroll increases, his or her experience becomes more pre 
dictable because the future tends to resemble the past more 
and more closely. Of course, no matter how large the 
employer may be, the future may differ from the past 
because of such factors as law amendments, inflation, or 
changes in the work environment. In practice, insurers assign 
no credibility to the experience of employers with average 
class premiums of less than $2,500. Above that point the 
credibility increases gradually from 1 percent to 100 percent. 
Few employers have enough exposure for their experience to 
be considered 100 percent credible. If an employer had a 
credibility factor of 20 percent and experience period losses 
equal to half the insurer's expectations, instead of cutting the 
class premium in half the insurer would reduce the class 
premium (20 percent) (50 percent) or 10 percent. If the ex 
perience period losses had been twice the insurer's loss expec 
tation, instead of doubling the premium the insurer would 
increase the class premium (20 percent) (100 percent) or 20 
percent.
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The net effect of experience rating is that the employer 
pays a rate that is in effect a weighted average of two rates. 
The first of these two rates is one based on his or her own 
loss experience during the experience period adjusted to 
reflect what these payments would have been under the cur 
rent workers' compensation law. The second is the ap 
propriate class rate. The first rate is weighted by the 
employer's credibility factor, the second by one minus that 
same factor. For example, if the credibility factor is 20 per 
cent, the rate based on the employer's experience is .50, and 
the class rate is 1.00, the experience rate will be (20 percent) 
(.50)+ (80 percent) (1.00) = .90. The higher the credibility 
factor the less the experience rate will depend upon the class 
rate.
Schedule Rating
In many states many insurers have in recent years in 
troduced schedule rating plans. Under these plans insurers 
usually decrease the rate the employer would otherwise pay 
through credits based on a subjective evaluation of such fac 
tors as the employer's loss control program.
Retrospective Rating
Retrospective rating bases the employer's premium on the 
employer's loss experience during the policy period, subject 
to the condition that the premium cannot be less than a 
stated minimum nor higher than a stated maximum. Between 
the minimum and maximum limits the retrospective 
premium is equal to the losses the employer incurs during the 
policy period plus the expenses that are related to the losses 
incurred and a basic premium. The basic premium covers the 
expenses that do not vary with the losses incurred and a net 
insurance charge. The insurer imposes a net insurance charge 
because in the aggregate the insurer loses more dollars
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(because of the maximum premium limitation) than it gains 
from those who pay the minimum premium. Retrospective 
rating permits quasi-self-insurance. In most cases the 
premium depends upon the employer's own loss experience, 
but the insurer administers the program and the premium is 
bounded by the minimum and maximum premiums. Because 
the basic premium is a function of the experience premium, 
it is affected by any change in the class premium in the same 
manner as the experience premium. For the most part, 
however, an employer's retrospective premium does not de 
pend upon its class rates.
A version of retrospective rating that has become popular 
in many states in recent years is paid-loss retro. Instead of 
paying a deposit premium in advance, subject to later ad 
justments as more information on payrolls and losses 
becomes available, the insured pays the retrospective 
premium in annual installments. Each year's installment is 
the benefits and expenses paid that year because of accidents 
that occurred during the policy period. The insured may 
prefer this approach because (1) the insured retains the use 
of the premium dollars longer and (2) the premium paid 
never depends upon the insurer's estimate of future 
payments. However, the insurer may increase its charges 
because it loses some of the investment income it would 
otherwise make. A related practice that affects more in- 
sureds than paid-loss retro plans waives the requirement that 
employers with a premium of at least $2,500 pay in advance 
a full deposit premium.
Dividends
Many workers' compensation insurers return dividends to 
their policyholders. These dividends may vary among firms 
depending upon their size and their individual loss ex 
perience.
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How Insurers Determine Their Class Rates
In order to understand how insurers determine the class 
rates in the rating manual, one must know the elements of a 
class rate. A class rate includes allowances for (1) expected 
losses, (2) the expenses the insurer expects to incur in servic 
ing the insured, and (3) a profit for the insurer or a margin 
for policyholder dividends.
The expected loss allowance is the amount the insurer ex 
pects to pay in benefits per $100 of payroll to all insured 
employees in the same industry during the period the rate is 
in effect. The principal reasons the insurer may change this 
allowance are that it expects changes in (1) the frequency and 
severity of job-related injuries or diseases, (2) the propensity 
of employees to claim benefits for their injuries or diseases, 
(3) the workers' compensation law, or (4) the cost of settling 
claims because of such economic factors as rising or falling 
wage levels or medical costs. The expected loss allowance, 
therefore, is based on expectations for the future that are 
subject to considerable error. In establishing these expecta 
tions, the insurer analyzes its experience in the recent past, 
modified to reflect changes that it expects to occur during the 
future because of law changes and trends in claim frequency 
and severity. Even if the law will remain the same and there 
are no changes in claim frequency or severity, the past ex 
perience may suggest that the current rates be increased or 
decreased. The current rates may be inadequate or excessive 
because the insurers or the regulators either underestimated 
or overestimated the insurer's needs when they established 
those rates, or because the rates have been in effect for some 
time and conditions have changed.
The expense allowance is expressed as a percent of the 
rate. Some of these expenses, such as commissions, are 
budgeted and paid as a percent of the rate. Others, such as 
general administrative expenses, are not budgeted, but on
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the basis of past experience and future trends the insurer can 
determine what proportion of the rate it will use for this pur 
pose.
The prof it or profit and contingency allowance is also ex 
pressed as a percent of the rate. As will be explained later, 
the profit allowance in most states is 2.5 percent. Conse 
quently if the insurer's expected loss and expense allowances 
exactly matched actual losses and expenses, the insurers 
would have earned an underwriting profit equal to 2.5 per 
cent of the class premiums written. Because these expecta 
tions are almost never realized exactly, the actual under 
writing profit rate may be more or less than 2.5 percent. In 
surers argue that this 2.5 percent profit rate plus the invest 
ment income generated by writing workers' compensation 
insurance would produce a reasonable profit on net worth.
If the expense allowance were set at 32.5 percent of the 
rate and the profit allowance at 2.5 percent, the remainder of 
the rate, 65 percent, would be available to pay losses. If the 
dollar amount required to pay losses was determined to be 




Workers' compensation rates are regulated in a variety of 
ways. Except for Texas, where a state board makes the rates, 
states are commonly grouped into two general categories: 
(1) rating bureau—prior approval states and (2) open- 
competition states. In rating bureau—prior approval states, 
the largest category at the present time, rating bureaus are 
permitted to develop and file rates in behalf of their 
members and subscribers. Membership in the rating bureau 
may be compulsory or optional. Agreements to adhere to
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these rates may or may not be permitted; where such 
agreements are permitted, members and subscribers may or 
may not be permitted to deviate from these rates. All of these 
states require the insurance commissioner to approve 
workers' compensation rates before they can be used.
Open-competition states may or may not permit rating 
bureaus, renamed data service organizations, to publish ad 
visory rates. All, however, make membership in the 
organization optional, and prohibit agreements to adhere to 
these rates. All require insurers to file their rates with the 
state insurance department, but none have a prior approval 
requirement. Insurers, however, may be unable to use filed 
rates until after they have been on file for a designated 
period of time. The six open-competition states at present 
are Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Oregon, and 
Rhode Island. Georgia and Minnesota have also enacted 
open-competition laws that soon will become effective.
As this discussion indicates, a two-way classification of 
states (other than Texas) oversimplifies the situation. Within 
each of these two categories some significant differences ex 
ist. Table 1 shows for each of the 45 states in which private 
insurers operate (1) the role that rating bureaus are permit 
ted to play in rate determinations and (2) whether the state 
insurance commissioner must approve proposed bureau or 
individual insurer rates before they go into effect.
Role of Rating Bureaus
As of early 1983, every state except Kentucky, Michigan, 
Oregon, and Texas permits rating bureaus either to develop 
advisory rates or make rate filings in behalf of their 
members. Kentucky, Michigan and Oregon permit rating 
bureaus to develop only advisory "pure" premiums 
(premiums without expense or profit loadings). In Texas the 
State Board of Insurance makes the rates. Only 10 of these
Table 1 
Types of Workers' Compensation Insurance Rate Regulation, by State, Early 1983
Rating bureaus
Bureau rate filings 





































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: Derived from information supplied by the American Insurance Association and the National Council on Compensation Insurance. 8
C/3
a. Unless above rates approved by the commissioner. *£.
b. Effective January 1, 1984 Georgia will substitute an open competition rating law for its present approach. Bureaus will be permitted to §
publish advisory rates. *&
c. Effective July 1, 1983 Minnesota will enter a transition period that will lead to full open competition by January 1, 1986. After that date the S-
bureau will not even be permitted to publish advisory pure premiums. It will be able to publish aggregated loss data, trend factors, and loss °° 
development factors. Prior approval will continue with respect to upward deviations from these pure premiums until July 1, 1986 when it will
cease completely. (In late May 1983 Minnesota advanced the beginning of complete open competition to January 1, 1984.) ^
d. Advisory pure premiums only. so
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43 jurisdictions (Arizona, California, Idaho, Indiana,Min- 
nesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Penn 
sylvania, and Wisconsin) require all workers' compensation 
insurers to belong to a rating organization, but the practice 
in most other states is for most, if not all, insurers to become 
bureau members. Although bureau membership is not re 
quired in most states, all but 14 of the 43 states that permit 
bureau rate filings (Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Rhode 
Island, and Virginia) permit bureaus to require adherence to 
the bureau rates. In these states that prohibit such adherence 
agreements, however, most insurers have until recently 
elected to use the bureau rates. Among the 29 states that per 
mit agreements to adhere to bureau rates all but seven states 
(California, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) permit insurers 
either (1) to deviate from the bureau rates after securing the 
insurance commissioner's approval or (2) a much less com 
mon option, to charge lower rates without securing any prior 
approval. Such deviations seldom occurred in the past except 
for specialized classes for which some insurers may have 
developed some special expertise or associations. They have 
become more common in recent years through the filing of 
deviations from class rates or of scheduled rating plans. Only 
five states require all insurers to belong to a rating bureau, 
permit agreements to adhere to the bureau rates, and pro 
hibit deviations from these rates.
In most states the National Council on Compensation In 
surance is the rating organization. The exceptions are as 
follows:
Workers' Compensation Insurance Rating Bureau
of California 
Delaware Compensation Rating Bureau
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Hawaii Insurance Rating Bureau
Indiana Compensation Rating Bureau (administered
by the National Council on Compensation Insurance) 
Workers' Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau
of Massachusetts 
Workers' Compensation Rating and Inspection
Association of Michigan 
Workers' Compensation Insurers' Rating Association
of Minnesota 
New Jersey Compensation Rating and Inspection
Bureau
New York Compensation Insurance Rating Board 
North Carolina Rate Bureau 
Pennsylvania Compensation Rating Bureau 
Virginia Compensation Rating Bureau 
Wisconsin Compensation Rating Bureau
The National Council provides many of these independent 
rating bureaus with statistical services.
All states with independent rating bureaus except Indiana, 
Minnesota, and Virginia permit these bureaus to require 
adherence to their rates. Of the seven states that prohibit 
deviations from agreements to adhere to bureau rates, all but 
Missouri are states with independent rating bureaus.
Georgia and Minnesota will soon become open- 
competition states. In Georgia insurers will be permitted to 
develop advisory rates. In Minnesota rating bureaus will at 
first be permitted to develop advisory pure premiums, but 
starting in 1986 (changed to 1984 in late May 1983) they can 
publish only actual loss costs plus loss development and 
trend information.
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York are all rating 
bureau-prior approval states. However, Connecticut does 
not require insurers to belong to the bureau and forbids
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agreements to adhere to the bureau rates. New Jersey re 
quires insurers to belong to its independent bureau, permits 
agreements to adhere to the bureau rates, and prohibits 
deviations from those rates. New York does not require in 
surers to belong to its independent bureau, but it permits 
agreements to adhere to bureau rates. However, deviations 
from the bureau rates are permitted. Connecticut and New 
Jersey, but not New York, permit insurers to waive the ad 
vance payment of a full deposit premium.
Prior Approval Requirements
As table 1 shows, all states, except the six open- 
competition states, require insurers to file their proposed 
rates and wait until the state insurance commissioner ap 
proves them. Usually the commissioner must act within a 
stated period after the rates are filed. If he or she fails to act 
within that period, the insurer can use the rates.
In two open-competition states (Arkansas and Oregon) an 
insurer cannot use rates until they have been on file for a 
designated period. In the other states, insurers are permitted 
either to use the rates and then file them or to file their rates 
and use them immediately.
Georgia and Minnesota will soon become open- 
competition states. Georgia will not require prior approval; 
Minnesota will require approval only of upward deviations 
from the bureau advisory pure premiums until 1986 (chang 
ed to 1984 in late May 1983) after which time insurers will be 
able to use their rates immediately and file them later. Con 
necticut, New Jersey, and New York are all prior approval 
states.
Important Regulatory Issues
Three regulatory issues that have been the subject of in 
tense debate in recent years are (1) open competition versus
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the rating bureau-prior approval approach, (2) the effect of 
insurers' investment income on the profit loading in their 
rates, and (3) the excess profits approach as a supplement to 
either open competition or prior approval.
Open Competition Versus Rating 
Bureau-Prior Approval Approach
Traditionally workers' compensation insurance rates have 
been more restrictively regulated than other property and 
liability insurance rates. Although a few states have erased or 
reduced these differences, workers' compensation rates con 
tinue in most states to be more rigidly controlled. For exam 
ple, 21 states are generally considered to be open- 
competition states with respect to property and liability in 
surance. Only six states (soon to be eight states) have open- 
competition workers' compensation laws. However, several 
other states have considered such legislation in recent years. 
The arguments advanced in the legislative debates on this 
issue are summarized in the next two sections.
Arguments Favoring Open-Competition Laws
Those who favor open-competition laws argue that the 
rating bureau-prior approval approach stifles or discourages 
price and service competition. In the early days of workers' 
compensation, this approach made sense because only a few 
states had insolvency funds that would protect employers 
and injured workers against insurers who became insolvent 
because of competitive pricing pressures or undercapitaliza 
tion. Furthermore, few insurers had developed enough ex 
perience or expertise to establish their own prices. Today 
such guarantee funds exist in every state; insurers are now 
more highly capitalized and better managed, and many in 
surers, with the aid of data advisory organizations, can 
establish their own rates with confidence.
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A prior approval requirement, in their opinion, is a 
misguided, inefficient use of regulatory resources. Insurers 
are subjected to costly delays, decisions that are influenced 
too often by political pressures instead of objective evalua 
tions, and in some states expensive hearings. Regulators are 
required to make decisions that would frustrate Solomon 
and are better left to the marketplace. Consumers lose 
because insurance availability problems arise when insurers 
believe the approved rate structure is inadequate, and 
because for some insureds the approved price exceeds the 
competitive price.
Rating bureaus by definition set an average price that is 
too high for some insurers, too low for others. The expense 
allowances included in the rates are typically based on the 
average expense experience of nondividend paying stock in 
surers, which tend to have higher expenses than the other 
groups of insurers. Without rating bureaus or prior approval 
requirements, they argue, insurers will compete more 
vigorously for business. Both price competition and service 
competition will intensify, producing better services and 
lower prices. Much of the service competition will consist of 
improved loss control advice and assistance and more effec 
tive claims management, both of which will reduce claims 
costs. Price competition will cause the premiums to be lower 
on average and more responsive to the loss experience of 
groups of insureds with similar exposures and of individual 
insureds. Groups of similar insureds and individual insureds 
will in turn have more incentive to better their own perfor 
mances in controlling losses and managing claims. Admit 
tedly, some intense price and service competition does exist 
under the rating bureau-prior approval approach, but ac 
cording to open-competition supporters, this competition 
benefits almost exclusively larger employers who might 
otherwise self-insure.
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Open-competition laws will also force insurers to make 
more independent decisions regarding workers' compensa 
tion insurance instead of delegating so much of this decision- 
making to the rating organization. Currently, insurers tend 
to assign their most able employees to other lines involving 
more decisions. Open-competition laws will cause more of 
these employees to become concerned about workers' com 
pensation problems; the result will be some innovative ap 
proaches.
Finally, open-competition advocates argue, in those states 
where open competition has been tried price competion has 
been intense, no serious insolvency problems have 
developed, insurer services have not suffered, and insurance 
has become more readily available through standard chan 
nels.
Arguments Against Open-Competition Laws
The opponents of open-competition laws argue with equal 
intensity that it would be a serious mistake for most states 
with rating bureau-prior approval laws to move to open 
competition. Workers' compensation insurance, they argue, 
is different. Workers' compensation insurance is social in 
surance. With a few exceptions, workers' compensation is 
the exclusive recourse of the employee against the employer. 
The benefits, prescribed by statute, are to be paid on a no- 
fault basis. Unless employers secure permission to self-insure 
their financial obligations under this statute, they must pur 
chase workers' compensation insurance. Consequently, the 
public is much more concerned about the solvency of 
workers' compensation insurers and how they establish their 
prices than in the solvency and pricing practices of other in 
surers. Consequently the public is best served by (1) a pricing 
mechanism that permits a rating bureau to apply its expertise 
to the pooled experience of many insurers and promotes rate
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stability and (2) prior approval which involves the regulator 
more actively in the pricing process.
These opponents deny that permitting rating bureaus to 
exist and requiring prior approval stifles price and service 
competition as much as the open-competition advocates 
claim. In the typical prior approval state, competition takes 
many forms. Insurers need not belong to the rating bureau; 
they may develop their own rates. The bureau is permitted to 
require members to adhere to its rates, but the members may 
secure insurance department approval to deviate from these 
rates. Schedule rating plans that permit such deviations on 
the basis of subjective evaluations have become much more 
commonplace. Dividends provide another avenue for price 
competition. Prior approval, they agree, could be a problem 
if rigidly and unfairly administered, but they believe this is 
not the case in most states. The trend is toward more flex 
ibility and reliance on market forces. Furthermore, price 
competition is not the only kind of competition that is possi 
ble. Under prior approval, insurers have even more incentive 
to compete on the basis of services rendered.
The second line of thought pursued by the opponents of 
open competition is that this approach will itself produce 
some adverse effects. For many insureds, especially small 
employers, prices will rise in the short run and probably the 
long run. Price competition may become so intense that the 
solvency of many insurers and the viability of guarantee 
funds may be threatened. Small insurers especially will be 
adversely affected by the inability of the rating bureau to 
develop rates to which they can simply agree to adhere. 
Because smaller insurers may be less able to compete effec 
tively under open competition, the market may soon be con 
trolled by a few large insurers; this growing concentration 
would weaken the degree of effective competition. The pro 
ponents of open competition, they assert, have greatly
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underestimated the quality of the insurer and rating 
organization personnel who are currently involved in 
workers' compensation insurance. The rating practices, loss 
control services, and claims management services match in 
quality those associated with any other line of insurance.
Probably the most serious concern of open-competition 
opponents is that the data base used to calculate workers' 
compensation rates will be less reliable. Unless all insurers 
use the same rate classes, or subclasses that can be combined 
into a uniform set of rate classes, their experience cannot be 
pooled to establish a credible yardstick for measuring the 
fairness of the class rates. Open-competition laws are likely 
to generate heterogeneous classifications that will substan 
tially reduce the volume of experience that can be mean 
ingfully pooled.
In any event, these opponents say, it is too early to 
evaluate experience under the open-competition laws in 
force. None of these laws has been in effect for more than a 
few years. Even if one leans toward the concept of open 
competition it is better to liberalize the administration of a 
prior approval state and to "wait and see."
Some opponents of open-competition laws simply deny 
that price competition in workers' compensation insurance is 
effective enough to justify such heavy reliance on the 
marketplace. These opponents are much more opposed to 
removal of the prior approval requirement than to pro 
hibiting rating bureaus.
A Brief History: 1980-83
The trend toward open-competition workers' compensa 
tion laws was stimulated by the adoption in December 1980 
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners of 
a model open-competition rating law. This model bill, which 
was considered to be a regulatory alternative for those states
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favoring the open-competition approach to rate regulation, 
dealt with most types of property and liability insurance, but 
one of its most controversial parts was the section on 
workers' compensation insurance rates. For two years rating 
organizations could publish advisory rates, but insurers 
would not be required to join the organization and would be 
prohibited from agreeing to adhere to the advisory rates. In 
surers would have to file new rates before they used them, 
but these rates would not be subject to prior approval. After 
two years workers' compensation insurance rates would be 
treated like most other property and liability insurance rates. 
Rating organizations could develop only advisory pure 
premiums. Insurers could use new rates before filing them.
In December 1982, in response to some objections to the 
December 1980 model bill treatment of workers' compensa 
tion insurance rates, the NAIC adopted a separate and dif 
ferent model open-competition workers' compensation act. 
Under this bill, data service organizations can develop only 
advisory pure premium rates. A major provision requires in 
surers to report their loss experience under a uniform 
statistical plan approved by the state insurance commis 
sioner.
During 1982 at least eight states debated vigorously but 
did not act on open-competition workers' compensation 
statutes. Fewer states have thus far seriously considered this 
possibility. This slowing down has been attributed primarily 
to the development of, and more liberal regulatory response 
to, scheduled rating plans and other deviations from bureau 
rates, but some observers believe the real cause is a "wait 
and see" attitude. 4
Investment Income and Insurance Rates
Employers and others have expressed intense interest in re 
cent years in whether workers' compensation insurers have
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adequately recognized in their pricing the investment income 
they generate from writing workers' compensation in 
surance. This section will describe (1) why insurers generate 
investment income from writing workers' compensation in 
surance and (2) how this investment income is recognized in 
the profit loading in class rates.
How Insurers Generate Investment Income 
From Insurance Writings
Insurers generate some investment income from their 
writings in all lines of insurance because some time elapses 
between the dates when the insurer collects its premiums and 
the dates when it pays some of its expenses and most of its 
claims. For some lines of insurance, such as fire insurance 
and automobile physical damage insurance, the time lag is 
short and the investment income generated during this 
period on the monies held by the insurer is relatively small. 
For other lines of insurance such as automobile liability in 
surance and workers' compensation insurance, the time that 
elapses is long and the investment income generated by the 
insurer relatively large. For example, according to the most 
recent rate filing by the Workers' Compensation Insurers 
Rating Association of Minnesota, on the average only 22.5 
percent of the total dollar claims is paid by the time the in- 
sured's policy expires, 58.5 percent five years after the policy 
period starts, 77.8 percent ten years later, and 92.9 percent 
20 years later. 5
The Profit Loading in Manual Rates
Insurers have for many years recognized investment in 
come in their pricing of workers' compensation insurance. 
Whether they have adequately recognized such income and 
whether they should do so explicitly is the real issue. In most 
states insurers include a 2.5 percent profit loading in their 
class rates which, if their predictions are correct, will pro 
duce an underwriting profit equal to 2.5 percent of the
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premiums earned. If an insurer's workers' compensation 
premiums are three times the net worth the insurer allocates 
toward writing workers' compensation insurance, the 2.5 
percent profit loading will produce a 7.5 percent under 
writing profit on net worth. 6 Therefore, the insurer's total 
return on net worth because of its workers' compensation 
writings would be 7.5 percent plus its investment income ex 
pressed as a percent of net worth.
The underwriting profit loading has not always been 2.5 
percent. In 1915 the national underwriting profit loading was 
0 percent. The loading was raised to 1.5 percent in 1917 but 
dropped again to 0 percent in 1920. Despite underwriting 
losses insurers did not try to increase this 0 percent profit 
loading again until 1934. According to C. A. Kulp, insurers 
did not seek a higher profit loading during this period 
because (1) workers' compensation insurance was a favorite 
wedge or business-getter for more profitable lines and 
(2) workers' compensation time lags provided substantial 
funds for investments. 7 Other considerations were the threat 
of state funds and the social insurance characteristics of 
workers' compensation. In the early thirties, however, in 
vestment income disappeared or turned into losses and 
underwriting experience worsened. In 1934 the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners approved a profit 
loading of 0 percent to 5 percent, depending upon how the 
insurers' cumulative losses in the state since 1933 compared 
with the portion of the premiums collected since 1933 that 
was supposed to cover these losses. If the cumulative loss 
payments equaled the cumulative loss allowances in the 
rates, the approved profit loading was to be 2.5 percent. If 
the cumulative payments exceeded the cumulative loss 
allowances, the profit loading could be more than 2.5 per 
cent but not more than 5 percent. If the payments were less 
than the allowance, the loading could be less than 2.5 percent 
but not less than 0 percent. Because underwriting experience
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improved markedly during the next few years, during the 
forties the loading under this rule soon became 0 percent for 
all but a few states.
In 1949 the National Council on Compensation Insurance 
included a 2.5 percent profit loading in its rates, which by 
1957 had been approved in most states. One argument in 
favor of including a 2.5 percent profit loading in workers' 
compensation insurance rates was that in all other property 
and liability insurance lines the profit loading was at least 2.5 
percent. In 1951, however, a subcommittee of the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners had recommended 
that the loading be only 1.5 percent. The subcommittee 
argued that a 1.5 percent profit loading plus investment pro 
fits should provide a reasonable rate of return on net worth. 
The NAIC, however, approved a 2.5 percent profit loading.
In recent years a few states have required insurers to in 
clude a smaller profit loading than 2.5 percent because of the 
presence of investment income. For example, on April 21, 
1981 then Minnesota Commissioner of Insurance Michael 
Markman issued an order disapproving the request of the 
Workers' Compensation Insurers Rating Association of 
Minnesota for an average 28.6 percent increase in workers' 
compensation rates. Instead he granted an average increase 
of 11.8 percent effective June 1, 1981. 8 The principal reason 
why the Commissioner recommended a much lower increase 
than requested was because he disagreed with WCIRAM's 
2.5 percent profit loading in the proposed rates. He argued 
that if rates were increased 28.6 percent, the combined 
underwriting and investment profits of insurers would ex 
ceed 30 percent, which would be excessive. He based this 
finding on several assumptions, including a 14-year payment 
period for losses incurred during the policy year, net worth 
during those 14 years equal to one-third of the loss reserve 
established at the end of each year, and a 7 percent after-tax
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investment return on assets corresponding in amount to the 
loss reserves and associated net worth. Commissioner 
Markman argued that the reasonable rate of return was 18 
percent and that, under the assumptions noted above, in 
surers could attain this objective with a -10 percent profit 
loading in their rates. Depending on the assumptions used 
this approach may produce a profit loading above, below, or 
equal to 2.5 percent.
Only three other states have reduced the 2.5 percent profit 
loading to reflect investment income—Georgia to 2 percent, 
Massachusetts9 to -12 percent, and Oklahoma to 0 percent. 
The effect of investment income on total insurer profits has 
been cited in two or three other states as one of the reasons 
for reducing recently requested rate increases, but the profit 
loading was not explicitly reduced. In Connecticut, New 
Jersey, and New York the profit loading is 2.5 percent.
Excess Profits Statutes
Another approach to rate regulation that may supplement 
either a prior approval or an open-competition law is an ex 
cess profits statute. Six states (Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Minnesota, New York, and South Carolina) have excess pro 
fits statutes applicable to automobile insurance. 10 Only one 
state, Florida, has such a statute applicable to workers' com 
pensation insurance.
Excess profits statutes require insurers to return to their 
policyholders profits in excess of a specified threshold. In 
theory the threshold is the long-run reasonable rate of return 
from all sources plus an allowance for short-run fluctuations 
around that reasonable rate of return.
The Florida statute requires workers' compensation in 
surers to return to their policyholders any underwriting pro 
fit that exceeds the profit loading in the rate by 5 percent.
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Currently, therefore, the threshold is 2.5 percent plus 5 per 
cent or 7.5 percent. Instead of applying the test to each 
year's operations, however, the statute orders the state in 
surance department to test the average underwriting profit 
over the past three years. Investment income does not affect 
the allowance for short-run fluctuations, but the department 
is supposed to consider investment income in approving the 
basic profit loading.
Excess profits statutes first appeared on the scene during 
the early seventies when several states passed automobile no- 
fault statutes and a gasoline shortage existed. Both of these 
events were expected to reduce insurance costs, but opinions 
differed widely on the extent of those reductions. Excess pro 
fits statutes were passed to protect consumers against large 
insurer windfall profits. Florida's workers' compensation 
statute had a similar stimulus—the conversion of permanent 
partial disability benefits to a wage loss benefit. Insurance 
costs were expected to decrease because of this change with 
the possibility of large windfall profits for insurers.
Excess profits may make open-competition statutes more 
acceptable because insureds have some protection against ex 
cess insurer profits. For the same reasons regulators might be 
able to also administer prior approval statutes more flexibly. 
On the other hand, excess profits will occasionally require in 
surers to return profits to their policyholders even if their 
long-run rate of return is equal to or even less than the 
reasonable rate of return. Furthermore, determining the ex 
cess profit threshold is a difficult process involving several 
highly subjective assumptions. 11
None of the three regional states has an excess profits 
statute applicable to workers' compensation insurance. New 
York, however, is one of only two states, the other being 
Florida, that has implemented such a statute applicable to 
automobile insurance.
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Concluding Remarks
Workers' compensation insurance rate determination and 
regulation vary widely among the states. A trend exists 
toward more reliance on competition through the passage of 
open-competition laws or, more commonly, through more 
flexible administration of rules permitting class rate devia 
tions and schedule rating. A few prior approval states have 
reduced the 2.5 percent profit loading in the rates to reflect 
insurers' investment income. Open-competition states expect 
competition to reduce insurers' total profits. One state has 
an excess profits statute.
The three states represented here illustrate this diversity. 
All are rating bureau-prior approval states. All authorize a 
2.5 percent underwriting profit loading. In Connecticut 
membership in the rating bureau is optional and rate 
adherence agreements are prohibited. New Jersey, on the 
other hand, forbids deviations from the rates developed by 
its rating bureau to which all insurers must belong. New 
York is much closer to Connecticut than to New Jersey in its 
rate regulation, but is somewhat less flexible. Both Connec 
ticut and New York have seriously considered open- 
competition laws. New Jersey has not. New York is one of 
two states in the nation to implement an excess profits law 
applicable to automobile insurance.
Strong arguments exist pro and con for each of these ap 
proaches. The opportunity to experiment is supposed to be 
one of the advantages of state regulation as opposed to 
federal regulation. The laboratories testing ways of deter 
mining and regulating workers' compensation insurance 
rates have probably never been more active.
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NOTES
1. The National Council on Compensation Insurance periodically 
publishes a listing of state standard premium rates.
2. Employers whose class premium would otherwise be under some small 
amount, such as $500, have to pay an extra charge called an expense con 
stant because the expense allowance in the rate does not produce enough 
dollars to cover the expenses incurred in servicing these very small in- 
sureds.
3. The rating formula used in practice is more complicated than the one 
described here. The results, however, are close to those described above.
4. "Drive for Open Competition Rating Starting to Slow Officials," 
Business Insurance, February 21, 1983, pp. 2, 74. "Trend to Open Com 
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Too often comprehensive studies of workers' compensa 
tion programs conclude (as will this paper) with the recom 
mendation that workers' compensation programs should be 
better administered. Certainly no one will quarrel with that, 
but just as certainly it is a relatively weak recommendation. I 
am as guilty as anyone, and in a study comparing programs 
in 10 states I came up with the remarkable conclusion that 
some states are better administered than others. 1 Yet there is 
hardly any way to account for the superior performance of 
the Wisconsin program other than to say that its program 
has been administered in an active or aggressive manner.
The National Commission on State Workmen's Compen 
sation Laws has had a modicum of success in persuading 
states to increase benefits and broaden coverage. However, 
in areas where it is difficult to devise quantitative standards, 
its success has been less well documented. This is not surpris 
ing. In so many aspects of workers' compensation, I have the 
feeling that the problem is not the law, but the way the law is 
administered. Unfortunately, we do not have much of a clue 
as to what an appropriate and proper system of administra-
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tion of the law ought to be, or any objective way in which to 
judge whether one law is better administered than another.
At the outset, I might point out that the problem is 
relatively simple in some states when there does not seem to 
be any administrative mechanism whatsoever. I am not 
thinking only of a state such as Louisiana which until recent 
ly had no administrative agency of any sort, or states such as 
Alabama or New Mexico where courts play a major role in 
the administration of the workers* compensation act. I am 
thinking of other states which have administrative agencies 
whose sole concern seems to be the adjudication of disputes.
In most jurisdictions, administration of the act is en 
trusted to a workers' compensation board or commission. 
The idea of the disinterested public-spirited commission to 
administer these laws was a popular idea in the progressive 
era when workers' compensation acts first were passed. 
Some 21 jurisdictions have a single administrator, sometimes 
in conjunction with an appeal board, sometimes housed 
within a Department of Labor and Industry or some other 
department within the state government.
I do not believe that the organizational structure of the 
workers' compensation program is the crucial item to be 
looked at when analyzing problems of administration. It is 
the functions which are discharged and the manner in which 
they are carried out.
The National Commission's Recommendations
Everyone who has looked at this problem agrees that ad 
ministration is a crucial variable in judging the program. The 
National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation 
Laws stated that the basic objectives of the system, i.e., 
broad coverage, substantial protection against interruption 
of income, provision for sufficient medical care and
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rehabilitation services, and the encouragement of safety, are 
dependent on an equally important fifth objective: "An ef 
fective system for the delivery of the benefits and services." 2 
The National Commission recognized that in the beginning 
the system was thought to be self-administering. It was ex 
pected that with the elimination of the fault concept and the 
prescription of benefits by statute, employees would be able 
to protect their interests without external assistance. We now 
know that hope for self-administration was overly op 
timistic. Few would argue with the National Commission's 
view that litigation might have been less frequent had state 
agencies provided enough positive assistance to workers who 
are unable by themselves to deal with the complexities of the 
law and that the void has been filled by an active plaintiffs' 
bar.
The Commission viewed the state agencies as having six 
primary administrative obligations:
1. The agency must take the initiative in administering the 
law.
2. It must continually review the performance of the pro 
gram and request state legislatures amend the law to 
meet the changing needs of the program.
3. An agency must advise workers of their rights and 
obligations under the law and assure that they receive 
the benefits to which they are entitled.
4. Agencies should apprise employers and carriers of 
their obligations and rights under the law. Other par 
ties in the delivery system, including physicians and at 
torneys, should also be informed of their obligations 
and privileges.
5. The agencies should assist in a voluntary and informal 
resolution of issues.
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6. The agency must adjudicate claims which cannot be 
resolved voluntarily.
In the eyes of the Commission, the key to an effective 
delivery system is the agency's active pursuit of these ad 
ministrative obligations. "The thrust of the system should be 
to create an ambience of protection and mediation rather 
than adjudication." 3 The Commission delved into the pro 
cessing of workers' compensation claims, making recom 
mendations on reports, organizational structure, attorneys' 
fees, methods of closing cases, supervision of medical care, 
and security arrangements, among other aspects. I do not 
wish to dwell on administrative organization or structure or 
even the processing of cases. I believe that the crucial 
variable is the business of creating the ambience and per 
suading the agency to pursue an active role.
The Historical Neglect of Administration
It is confusing to discuss administration because of the 
lack of information, and frustrating because nothing seems 
to change in spite of continual detailed inquiries about the 
nature and quality of administration.
As an example, let me excerpt from a fine inquiry into the 
problem of administration. It was noted that of three recent 
investigations, all agreed that the system ought to have ad 
ministrative hearings with informal procedures, and judicial 
review upon issues of law only. Two investigations urged 
control of attorneys' fees and that compensation boards be 
equipped with a competent medical staff to aid in the ad 
judication of compensation claims. One recommended im 
partial testimony with respect to the extent of disability. All 
made recommendations for a more adequate standardization 
of the disability schedules. The study concluded that there is 
substantial agreement as to many of the fundamental prob 
lems of workers' compensation. What is frustrating is that 
this excellent study by Walter Dodd was made in 1936. 4
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These same kinds of recommendations have been cited in 
conferences, investigating reports, and academic discussions 
since then. But if things do not change in a half century, it 
may be that the present system meets the needs of the wider 
community that supports the system. We must be very hum 
ble about making any recommendations for changes in 
workers' compensation administration.
Yet when we look at the essence of the administrative 
problem and try to state it in the simplest possible way, it is 
that workers' compensation is fundamentally a social in 
surance program with compulsory coverage. Neither 
workers nor employers have choices in these matters. 
Although it may not be self-administering in the sense that 
the earliest proponents of the law believed, nonetheless, the 
principal rationale for the program is that it would minimize 
conflict. The concept of liability without fault was to 
substitute a swift, certain and assured remedy for litigation 
endemic to tort liability. To assure that objective requires 
some administrative functions.
The Workers' Compensation Agency 
Does Not Pay Claims
What are the essential functions that a workers' compen 
sation administration ought to perform? Before we can 
answer that question it is well to recognize that the ad 
ministrative agency usually is not responsible for the pay 
ment of claims. Common to all systems of cash disability 
transfers, be they tort cases, workers' compensation cases, 
or social security disability insurance cases, is the payment of 
claims. What is different in workers' compensation is that 
the administration of the claims management function is the 
responsibility of the insurer, whether it is a private insurance 
company, an exclusive state fund, a competitive state fund, 
or the firm itself if it is self-insured. Unlike the Social Securi 
ty Administration, the workers' compensation agency does
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not issue any benefit checks, does not pay any benefits, nor 
does it pay treating physicians or any other provider of ser 
vices. Yet there comes a time, at different stages of the 
claims process, depending on the jurisdiction, when the 
workers' compensation agency is charged with responsibility 
for administering the claims procedure. At these times the 
agency's responsibilities are substantial.
The Public Interest in Administration
It is probably important to pin down why this is so. The 
patient suing his physician in a malpractice suit can settle for 
any amount that is agreeable to him, his doctor, and the in 
surance carrier. If dissatisfied with a proffered settlement, he 
can pursue his remedies through the court system. No state 
agency will interfere with a voluntary settlement on the 
grounds that it is not sufficient. At the opposite end of the 
administrative spectrum, a person seeking social security 
disability insurance benefits will receive a benefit amount 
determined in accordance with his wages as specified in the 
statute. Valid workers' compensation claims are paid by the 
insurance carrier in accordance with the statutes, but the ex 
act amounts to be paid, especially in the case of permanent 
disabilities, is not certain. There is wide discretion in the 
system which impedes the objective of certainty, and unlike 
the tort settlement, the amount should not be left to the par 
ties alone. The whole theory of workers' compensation 
argues that there is a direct public interest in the amount of 
compensation and the manner and method in which it is paid 
to those injured at work. It is the administrative obligation 
of the agency to provide guidance as to the type and amount 
of such payments, the conditions under which they are to be 
made, and the medical and rehabilitation services to be pro 
vided. It is the very nature of a compulsory social insurance 
program that such matters are not left to the parties.
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The Basic Administrative Functions
Once we allocate the claims management function to the 
insurer, the functions performed by the agency in processing 
the workers' compensation cases can be grouped under four 





The recordkeeping function is present in all agencies. Each 
workers' compensation case begins with a report of an injury 
or disease to the employer, a copy of which is sent to the car 
rier and eventually to the agency. Each state requires some 
subsequent reporting about the individual case and its even 
tual disposition. States will vary greatly as to the kinds of 
case records the agencies maintain and the diligence with 
which administrators will follow up requests for reports that 
do not come to them in the normal course of events. 
However logical it may be to proclaim a public interest in ad 
ministrative matters, the total extent of some agencies' in 
volvement may be in recording and filing what the parties 
themselves have done voluntarily.
Some, and possibly most, states go further and are con 
cerned with the monitoring function. The state agency is 
concerned with the equity and adequacy of the payments 
made voluntarily by the insurance carrier. The agency may 
also be concerned with the worker's rehabilitation in cases 
where his return to work is delayed. The agency may police 
the carrier's activities designed to maximize the probability 
of the worker's return to his job. The monitoring function 
may involve procedures for checking on the carrier's 
promptness of payment, or adequacy of general perfor 
mance, advising or penalizing carriers if their performance 
falls short.
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A third group of procedures has to do with what may be 
termed evaluation of the workers' permanent disability. 
Some agencies have prescribed procedures to evaluate, or to 
aid the parties in evaluating, the extent of the claimant's 
disability. In some states, the agency itself will take on the 
responsibility of determining the extent of disability. In 
other states, the agencies will do almost nothing in this area; 
the parties reach some agreement, and if they fail to do so, 
they resort to the contested procedures.
The fourth function is the adjudication function which is 
universally undertaken by the state agencies. Each agency 
has procedures to adjudicate disputes between the parties.
Diversity Among the Three States
What has remained a hallmark in workers' compensation 
has been the diversity among the various jurisdictions in how 
they go about any one of their tasks. Nowhere is this better 
illustrated than in the case of the administration of workers' 
compensation in the neighboring states of New Jersey, New 
York, and Connecticut.
As far as structure is concerned, in New Jersey we have no 
workers' compensation board or commission. A supervising 
judge has chief administrative responsibility for the ad 
ministration of the law. The agency employs few, if any, 
professionals, other than the judges of compensation and 
persons who participate in one capacity or another in the ad 
judication process. There is no board of appeals within the 
state. Appeals from compensation judges' decisions are to 
the state courts. In contrast, the administration in New York 
is in the hands of a workers' compensation board whose 
chairman bears responsibility for administrative functions. 
In Connecticut, regionalism seems to be the key.
As noted in the Connecticut annual report, the workers' 
compensation law is administered by a nine-member com-
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mission with exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes 
under that law. The chairman of the commission has 
statewide jurisdiction. Each of the seven district commis 
sioners has responsibility over disputes in an area of the 
state, and the remaining commissioner-at-large is assigned 
by the chairman to act in any district where needed.
When it comes to recordkeeping functions, it is safe to say 
that no one of the states does a complete job. In all states, 
the case begins with a report of injury to the employer. A 
copy is sent to the carrier, and eventually to the agency. Each 
state does require subsequent reporting on the case. In New 
Jersey, however, very little is done with these records, other 
than to report annually on case activity. Almost nothing is 
done now in analyzing the first reports of injury. Few ad 
ministrative statistics are kept on the agency activities. New 
York produces a rather complete set of information about 
closed cases and some analysis of the first reports of injury. 
In Connecticut, records as to the number of voluntary 
agreements, informal hearings, formal hearings and appeals 
processed by the Compensation Review Division are kept. 
No analysis of these case statistics is done.
The monitoring function also differs in each of these 
states. In New Jersey, from time to time, there has been 
some review of the so-called direct settlements where the 
worker and the employer reach voluntary agreement as to 
the amounts of compensation to be paid. If, however, some 
discrepancy was found in that type of settlement, the pro 
cedure was to advise the worker of his rights and have him 
file a formal complaint. In these instances, the matter 
becomes a contested case. In sharp contrast, New York, at 
least on a formal basis, has a hearing system in which all 
cases have the opportunity to have a hearing before the mat 
ter is closed out. In Connecticut, lack of administrative per 
sonnel prevents any significant monitoring activity. The in 
formation for recordkeeping and monitoring purposes may
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be available in the future. Public Law 81-407 established a 
Statistical Division effective February 1, 1982, but only in 
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1983 were start-up funds pro 
vided to implement that legislation. Funds were also 
available beginning July 1, 1983 to implement provisions of 
the law creating a Division of Workers' Education. 
Presumably that division would undertake some monitoring 
functions.
As far as evaluation procedures are concerned, none of 
these states has prescribed procedures to evaluate, or to aid 
the parties in evaluating the extent of their obligations for 
payment for permanent disabilities. This can possibly best be 
seen in the area of permanent partial disability. As pointed 
out above, in some states the agency takes on the respon 
sibility for determining the extent of the permanent partial 
disabilities. That is not the case in New Jersey. Nothing in 
the uncontested procedures aids the parties in determining 
the amounts that are due. Consequently, very few permanent 
partial disability cases are closed out in New Jersey, except at 
the formal level or at steps immediately preceding the formal 
level. In New York, hearings are held in most permanent 
partial cases whether scheduled or nonscheduled. Connec 
ticut follows the New Jersey pattern with extensive use of in 
formal and formal hearings to dispose of these matters.
All three states devote major portions of their ad 
ministrative energies to the adjudication function. Each of 
these states has a type of substitute court system where 
workers may have their cases heard and decided with the ac 
tive participation of the plaintiffs' and defense bar.
Are the systems as they exist in these three states optimal? 
Are they the most efficient and equitable systems that could 
be devised? Do those clients who seek out representation 
from the plaintiffs' bar do better than they would otherwise? 
Is the fact that the normal procedure is to resort to an at-
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torney in the event of permanent partial or permanent total 
disability the wisest use of scarce resources?
Using the Tri-State Conference 
to Improve Administration
This is the first of what I hope will be a series of annual 
conferences in which interested persons in these three states 
convene to discuss workers' compensation problems to their 
mutual benefit. I am a realist. I do not expect quick results. I 
know that these administrative problems have existed since 
the inception of the program, and I do not expect that im 
provements will be made overnight.
One possible purpose of these meetings is to initiate 
dialogue and to begin discussions about matters of common 
concern. Perhaps this first conference might be thought of as 
a consciousness-raising session. I would raise the question of 
whether it makes any sense for each of these states to begin 
to think of improving their recordkeeping, monitoring, and 
evaluation functions. If I were to plead for improvements in 
the administrative area, I would first plead for im 
provements in the data and information systems. I believe 
data systems are useful. As an example, I would like to be 
able to compare the litigiousness of New York, Connecticut 
and New Jersey on some valid basis. Yet I find myself 
defeated by the fact that the data systems are not complete in 
any of the states, and they are certainly not comparable.
Take another example: states are presumed to be 
laboratories of experiment. In these states we have three dif 
ferent ways of administering different laws. Which is more 
efficacious in the prevention of accidents and diseases at the 
workplace? I submit that the data systems currently in place 
do not come close to providing an answer.
But something more than data systems is involved. We 
need better evaluation and monitoring to decrease the pro-
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portion of contested cases. Nothing I have said, nor anything 
I wish to say, is meant to denigrate the contributions of the 
plaintiffs' bar. In the same vein as saying "Some of my best 
friends are members of a particular religion/' I say that were 
I injured at work today, I would find myself a good lawyer 
before I would move one inch in the State of New Jersey. But 
as I say it, I resent the fact that it is necessary to resort to 
representation. In the majority of cases where compensabili- 
ty is admitted, why cannot the state devise an evaluation 
system such that a claimant would know in a particular case 
what the obligations of the carrier were? Several states have 
done this, other states are doing it, and although I cannot 
point to the exemplary state lest my recommendations be 
misconstrued, I can say that some states do better than New 
Jersey, New York, or Connecticut.
Although it is difficult to change the administration of 
state workers' compensation systems, why not start in this 
part of the country, in these three states which have a high 
proportion of the workers' compensation cases? Why cannot 
the responsible administrative and political officials col 
laborate to seek ways and means of improving their systems? 
These three states have the unique opportunity of utilizing 
the services of three universities, each of which has personnel 
and units vitally interested in the area of workers' compensa 
tion.
Administrative reforms might well begin with the matter 
of data systems, since it is the least controversial and least 
threatening to the parties involved. It would be equally possi 
ble to begin to think about monitoring and evaluation func 
tions, and about doing simple checks of what workers have 
received in voluntary settlements, and of devising ways and 
means by which adequate settlements might be forthcoming 
without litigation.
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In similar fashion, it should be possible to think about sets 
of evaluation standards which could be widely promulgated, 
or at least to ask the question of whether it is possible to deal 
with this issue. I raise only one caution. It is necessary for 
each of the jurisdictions to accept the fact that ad 
ministrative personnel are necessary if administrative tasks 
are to be accomplished. I do not think that these matters can 
be left solely to chairmen, supervising judges or commission 
members. It should be possible for these responsible officials 
to get together to think about these matters and perhaps to 
go further and devise ways and means whereby desirable ob 
jectives can be met.
On July 4, 1983, we celebrated the 72nd birthday of the 
oldest of these three compensation statutes. But in workers' 
compensation programs, there is no compulsory retirement 
age. There may be life left in this program which may not yet 
be ready for the geriatric scrap heap. Survival depends on 
evidence of change and vitality, and nowhere can that better 
be shown than in administrative reform. It is the most dif 
ficult of areas to change, but even small improvements can 
yield great social benefits.
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The Berkowitz, Burton, and Williams papers ask whether 
costs, prices, or profits in the workers' compensation in 
surance market differ across "regulated states." The market 
is regulated in most states, including those they consider in 
depth: Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. A central 
question they ask is what role the state (or its regulatory arm) 
plays in the process that generates costs, prices, and profits.
Professor Williams gives an excellent summary and 
description of rate regulation and price determination in 
both the national and regional workers' compensation in 
surance markets. He describes how manual rates are deter 
mined, as well as the adjustments to manual rates that affect 
the price actually paid. He describes the environment in both 
open-competition and prior approval states. He examines 
the underwriting profit and contingency factor, investment 
income and insurance profitability. Professor Williams is 
not judgmental. He is simply scholarly. He reports the pro 
and con arguments for open competition.
I think that given a state workers' compensation law and 
its basic administration, what Professor Berkowitz
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categorized as recordkeeping, monitoring, evaluation, and 
adjudication, the state and its regulatory arm will play little 
role in the price of workers' compensation insurance or the 
profitability of the business. I consider one family of excep 
tions later. First, I present the rationale for my judgment 
that the state plays a limited role.
For over half a century, workers' compensation insurance 
was a stable line. The actuarial estimates of program costs 
were generally on target and the combined ratios predictable. 
But in the early 1970s at least two major events eliminated 
this predictability. One was the impact of inflation. The 
other was structural change in the program, including in 
creased benefits, brought about in part by the National 
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws 
chaired by Professor Burton. These events made the accurate 
forecasting of losses a more difficult art. Medical costs 
escalated rapidly, as did indemnity claim frequency, and 
perhaps the durations of disability, as both real and nominal 
benefits rose.
As Professor Williams pointed out, writing workers' com 
pensation insurance is a leveraged business. Over the 1970s 
the leverage, the ratio of either net premiums written or 
reserves to statutory capital and surplus or to net worth, also 
increased. Obviously, nominal rates of interest rose with in 
flation, and the nominal investment income earned by in 
surance companies increased with the rise in interest rates 
and leverage. The nominal rate of return required by all in 
dustries to attract and retain capital also rose. As regulators 
and others saw insurers earning increasingly larger amounts 
of nominal investment income, there was increasing pressure 
to have open competition or to include investment income in 
the calculation of manual rates in prior approval states.
The workers' compensation insurance market is 
characterized by intense price and nonprice comptition. The
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market has relatively easy entry (and exit) requirements. The 
capitalization requirements are low in many states and insur 
mountable in none. There are many sellers in the market 
and, although some are large in absolute size, the concentra 
tion ratio (combined market share) of the top four or top 
eight firms is low. Firms actively in the market must compete 
with one another, contend with the threat of firms self- 
insuring and the potential entry of insurers licensed in the 
state but not active in the market. There are many buyers in 
the market, and these buyers are businesses with good 
prepurchase information. The basic coverage sold in the 
market is mandated by law, and although insurers compete 
vigorously on claims handling and safety services, the in 
surance coverage offered by insurance company A is a good 
substitute for that offered by insurance company B.
Insurers compete vigorously on price. They do so at the 
beginning of a policy period, at the end of the period, or 
both. Professor Williams has listed some of the methods in 
surers use to compete. Insurers offer firms cost-plus in 
surance, sliding scale dividend plans (rebate of part of the 
premium based on the safety record of their insured), and 
they alter the time flow of the premium that their insured 
must pay. In virtually all states, the deposit premium rule has 
been waived. This means that an insured and an insurer can 
enter into an agreement to lengthen the time over which the 
insured can pay a fixed nominal insurance premium. For ex 
ample, assume the nominal price of mandated coverage is 
$100. The insurer and insured can agree that this amount will 
be paid in a lump sum today, or in installments over N 
periods. The latter case could include some initial periods of 
zero payment. In effect, there is price flexibility downward. 
Prices will vary with the inflationary and real return expecta 
tions of the parties to the contract. It is difficult to imagine 
excessive profits being earned in markets such as the one 
described above.
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Professor Williams pointed out that some critics argue 
that competition in the workers' compensation insurance 
markets "benefits almost exclusively the larger employers 
who might otherwise self-insure." The argument posed by 
these critics is extremely weak. Firms risk their capital in ex 
pectation that they will receive a market return, which in 
cludes a risk premium. Firms are not prohibited from writing 
insurance business for small risks. Many insurers do so. If 
there is not great downward pressure on prices for the 
business of smaller firms, it is because insurers do not 
evaluate the risk involved in writing this business to be com 
mensurate with the rewards for writing the business. Infor 
mation is available on the loss records of smaller risks (both 
individually and collectively). If insurers thought they would 
earn greater than a market rate of return writing this 
business, they would. Some risks end up in assigned risk 
pools. These firms do not end up in assigned risk pools 
because insurers expect to make too much money writing this 
business. They do not end up in assigned risk pools because 
insurers are charities. They end up in assigned risk pools 
because insurers do not expect to earn a reasonable profit 
writing these risks. Why? Because most states have man 
dated that the nominal price of insurance cannot exceed a 
preset limit. Although there is downward price flexibility, 
prices are not flexible upward. This is one of the exceptions 
that I mentioned earlier regarding the impact of regulation 
on workers' compensation prices.
The state can affect prices and profits by arbitrarily setting 
the price of insurance too low at the beginning of an 
operating period and not allowing upward price ad 
justments. States may also delay the implementation of new 
manual rates. Or regulators may shift interest rate risk to the 
beginning of an operating period, in effect lowering the 
manual rates and hence the ceiling price, and forcing more 
risks from the competitive market. Finally, the state may
Costs, Prices, Profits 255
constrain the taste for risk bearing on the part of some in 
surers by requiring them to write business at lower leverage 
than the insurers would desire, or the market would dictate.
Why do workers compensation insurance prices and costs 
vary across states? In large part because of differences in the 
state: law, labor market, industrial composition, cost of liv 
ing and a host of related factors. The benefits paid may dif 
fer over states as a result of variations in state workers' com 
pensation laws and state wage distributions. Workers in a 
state may be willing to bear more risk or to report more in 
juries and file more workers' compensation claims given 
higher insurance benefits. Given different benefit structures 
across states, workers with the same tastes for risk bearing 
may have different accident and claim filing rates. In addi 
tion, with the same level of benefits across states, workers in 
different states, and in particular in different industries and 
occupations, may have different tastes for risk bearing. The 
number of occupational injuries and diseases will be a func 
tion of the industrial composition of a state. If more risky in 
dustries are concentrated in a state, the total cost of workers' 
compensation insurance in that state will be higher. Similar 
ly, if the costs of accident prevention are higher in one state 
than another, all else constant, more injuries will take place 
in the high prevention cost state.
Professor Burton and Mr. Krueger examine the dif 
ferences in costs to employers across states. In their research, 
they control for heterogeneity in the state industrial com 
position. Their paper gives us insight into how much of the 
variation in the costs to employers is due to residual factors, 
including regulation, market conditions, and administration. 
They carefully document the link between the benefits and 
costs of a social insurance system. Although they do not 
stress the point in their paper, their methodology also pro 
vides one way to compare the cost of public versus private
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provision of a social insurance. They close their paper with 
the value judgment, "... New Jersey and New York 
employers had lower workers' compensation costs than did 
Connecticut employers, . . . their achievement seems more 
due to parsimony than prudence." It may be that what Bur 
ton and Krueger chose to call parsimony is simply political 
markets working well.
Monroe Berkowitz poses the basic question, why do some 
states "administer" their programs by letting litigation take 
place, and others by aggressive and interventionist strategies. 
I believe political markets work. New Jersey had high perma 
nent partial claim frequency because it was the political con 
sensus to have it. Property rights and their administration at 
any point in time are reflections of the will of the people (or 
their power block coalitions).
The political market is the mechanism through which 
groups attempt to shift the cost burden of disability. Witness 
the existence of state insurance funds. This same political 
market has given us state systems for compensating perma 
nent partial disability, and all of the headaches that go with 
administering such a system. The market has not yet given us 
a full federal system for compensating for permanent partial 
disability under the social security system. Much of the 
claimed "administrative efficiency" of that federal pro 
gram, and inefficiency of state programs, is actually the 
market at work. And much of the role that I have ascribed to 
the state, including the setting of ceiling prices and leverage 








Attending a seminar and discussing the future of occupa 
tional disease legislation and compensation systems 
sometimes becomes an exercise in riding merry-go-round. It 
is not exactly clear to me why we have suddenly decided to 
ride the horse again, but I welcome the opportunity. I par 
ticularly welcome the fact that there is renewed public 
scrutiny of this serious social issue.
My purpose today is two-fold: first, to review the 
background of congressional consultation of this issue; sec 
ond, to review and comment on some of the major policy 
issues involved in this particular legislative activity.
I believe we have finally reached a point in our policy 
development where we can safely say that most of the rele 
vant issues have surfaced, been examined and explored, and 
been given reasonable public consideration. That is not to 
say that there is any agreement on where we go and how we 
get there.
By way of contrast, when the question of occupational ill 
ness was first broached during consideration of the Occupa-
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tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, there was perceived to 
be an almost complete lack of information on this subject. 
The number of organizations paying attention to the issue 
was miniscule. The focus, if any, was on the question of 
respiratory diseases, principally pneumoconiosis (Black 
Lung).
The National Commission on State Workmen's Compen 
sation Laws actually commissioned some interesting work on 
occupational disease. Those studies recognized that there 
were coverage and other questions which needed to be con 
sidered in the reform process. Nonetheless, the focus of that 
Commission's report was not on the emerging problems of 
occupational illness and compensation thereof.
Following the Commission's report, the emphasis shifted 
to concerns about state workers' compensation systems and 
the process of legislative reform. Very little time was actually 
spent on how occupational illness would fit into this com 
pensation system, except along the lines of an adjunct to the 
underlying need to have a uniform system for injury as well 
as illness. Thus, even though occupational disease has always 
been a significant element in the policy and political con 
siderations surrounding such legislation, it has not been 
recognized as such until recently.
Why, one might ask, did this situation exist? It may be at 
tributed in part to the complacency of the state workers' 
compensation system administrators and the insurance in 
dustry, who saw few occupational disease claims, and 
assumed that the problem in actuality was far less than ex 
periences reflected. Moreover, awareness of toxic 
substances, carcinogens, and their impact on individuals has 
only emerged to its true dimensions in recent years. Again, 
that is not to say that such things were not known, but the 
focus tended to be on identifiable situations such as Black 
Lung and not on the whole host of other occupational ill-
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nesses for which the existing state laws are generally quite 
restrictive.
The next plateau in our consideration rests with the work 
of the Department of Labor's Interdepartmental Task 
Force, which spent several years and a fair amount of public 
funds in exploring a number of workers' compensation 
issues including problems of occupational disease, product 
liability and third party issues.
Unfortunately, the problems of commissioning an inquiry 
and ultimately bringing it to fruition can become quite un 
manageable. In this case much of the work of that group 
commissioned in 1975 and 1976 was not completed until 
1978 or 1979 and was not published until 1981. I know not 
how these documents become lost in the Government Prin 
ting Office. However, each of these studies has provided in 
valuable information about the nature of the problem.
One may cut through all of the complexities and come to 
the realization that this very serious problem of disability 
compensation can readily be solved if only it could fit within 
the existing system.
After all, if in this day and age we have reached a state of 
public acceptance that those who are made ill by toxic 
substances should be duly compensated and properly cared 
for, there is no great public consensus to be built on the 
underlying issue.
We know that the ideal law should cover any and all oc 
cupational illnesses arising out of and in the course of 
employment. We know that the ideal system should deliver 
prompt, reasonable benefits for permanent and partial 
disability and should provide full medical treatment, oppor 
tunity for rehabilitation and all of the other facets of a 
"good" workers' compensation program. Unfortunately, 
we have a few odds and ends of matters about which we have
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not quite reached agreement—for example, should this be 
done on the state or national level, should it cover all ill 
nesses and diseases, or should the legislation be disease- 
specific; what is a "reasonable" level of benefits and who 
should pay for them; how should benefits be financed; and, 
who should administer the program?
I do not come here today with any great conceptual 
framework about which we can gather to create this new ho 
ly writ of a disability compensation law. Most of you are 
aware that there have been several legislative proposals pend 
ing in Congress that represent what might reasonably be con 
sidered a fresh start to the process. 1
There are a number of basic elements that any proposed 
bill should have in order to make a disability compensation 
system effective. They include the federal role, coverage, 
benefit levels, claim processing and funding. A review of 
these elements might suggest that the major issue is over 
what diseases should be covered by any compensation 
scheme. However, in my judgment the major issue is really 
whether an improved occupational disease compensation 
program should be created as a new system or be part of the 
existing state compensation systems.
Federal Role
Some 10 years ago, I was the advocate for a workers' com 
pensation system that would have provided fully for a 
federal program administered through the state agencies, in 
cluding a full occupational disease component. At that time 
Congress, the Executive Branch, and many scholars on the 
subject suggested that the federal government's takeover of 
the state workers' compensation systems, if not unconstitu 
tional, was certainly unconscionable. If one learns nothing 
else over a period of time in our nation's capitol, it is that 
you cannot climb the same greased pole twice. Accordingly,
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I believe that we are now talking about a compensation 
system that does not impact on the state agency's operations. 
Indeed, we are looking at a proposal that was too revolu 
tionary for 1973, that is, preempting the state law with 
respect to occupational disease claims and administration 
totally at the federal level. The strongest argument for 
federal preemption is in the interests of uniformity. 
Judgments about the effects of toxic substances and the 
causal relation to the workplace are difficult enough for one 
agency to develop. Spread to more than 50 jurisdictions, the 
problem becomes quite unmanageable. Moreover, the 
political interests of many state agencies do not appear to 
lend themselves to comprehensive treatment of occupational 
disease and appropriate benefit levels.
Coverage
What is covered under this new scheme is indeed the sec 
ond most serious question. It arises because the onset and 
causality of an occupational disease are simply not as simple 
as in straight cases of injury. There are, as we know, long 
latency periods, complications arising from the combination 
of on and off the job exposure and numerous other scientific 
and medical problems to solve before one can reasonably 
suggest that a particular disease did arise out of and in the 
course of employment. Nonetheless, much is known about 
many diseases, both in the U.S. experience and elsewhere in 
the western world. The fact is that to deal with the occupa 
tional disease issue in a fair manner, we are going to have to 
adopt something called "presumptions." Now if there was 
any single issue which caused more confusion and difficulty 
than the Black Lung program, it was the question of 
presumptions.
Somehow we have established in some quarters a view that 
presumptions are either a) unscientific, b) unfair, or c) load-
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ed against the employer. In the context of the Black Lung 
program, Congress confused the issue by legislating different 
kinds of presumptions without fully explaining the particular 
political purpose for each one. For example, with respect to 
the presumptions regarding time worked in the mines and in 
dications of Black Lung, one can argue that there was some 
medical evidence relating to the development of 
pneumoconiosis after long exposure to coal mining. On the 
other hand, creating a set of presumptions relating to 
pneumoconiosis based on affidavits, nonmedical evidence 
and other criteria in order to provide compensation to 
widows of Black Lung victims does not rise to the level of 
scientific support. There is nothing wrong with providing 
such a political presumption if indeed it is not characterized 
as medical criteria. My own view is that Congress, in enac 
ting the Black Lung Law, created a hybrid mechanism of 
some parts medical, some parts compensation and large 
parts combat pay. The difficulty, aside from the ad 
ministrative problems of handling that law, is that it was un 
fortunately characterized as a workers' compensation pro 
gram, although it had many of the elements of a pension 
program or a social security compensation system and an in 
sufficient number of the elements of a true disability com 
pensation program. The worthiness of it should not be in 
dispute, merely the nomenclature under which it was 
presented through Congress to the public.
In viewing presumptions for occupational disease, the 
underlying need is to eliminate the concept that in each in 
dividual case an entire system of proof need be offered to 
establish both the illness and its causal relationship to 
employment. There is no reason to create a system that 
would thrive on having expert medical testimony repeat and 
repeat and repeat the same well-known and established fact 
that certain exposure to certain types of chemicals and toxic 
substances in the workplace can and will, over a reasonable
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period of time, lead to the development of certain occupa 
tional illnesses.
The mechanism of developing such presumptions is not 
easy to achieve. It will require some form of impartial han 
dling, and it will involve judgment calls by some form of 
neutral or independent agency to promulgate the presump 
tions against which diseases will be compensated. The fact 
that it may be a difficult mechanism does not make it the 
wrong way. In point of fact, there are a number of models 
from the European experience that could be utilized in the 
way in which the scientific and medical criteria are developed 
for purposes of creating such a presumption. 2 Indeed, 
creating a series of properly medically based presumptions or 
"good" presumptions is the only way in which a comprehen 
sive occupational disease compensation system can function.
Benefit Levels
The next area that should be addressed in our model com 
pensation system is one involving the appropriate benefit 
levels. Once again, we are confronted with a serious dilemma 
in the way in which we approach workplace disability and 
occupational disease compensation. If we are talking about 
an income replacement, or so-called wage loss concepts, we 
approach perhaps half the problem. Indeed, it is not so dif 
ferent from the disagreements which have been raging in 
other areas of occupational injury for some years. Perhaps a 
major difference is that the partially disabled worker with 
occupational disease has a more than reasonable chance of 
that disease eventually pushing that worker into total 
disability and death. Unlike most injuries, occupational ill 
ness is not necessarily a discrete result.
Consequently, we're looking at an entirely new compensa 
tion system. One should not be narrow-minded in looking at 
benefit levels and levels of compensation. In particular,
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should there be some provision that goes beyond income 
replacement or wage loss, and provides some form of com 
pensation for the pain and suffering as a result of the 
disease? I think the answer is yes. One result of toxic ex 
posure is harm to an organ which does not interfere with 
work ability. So the equivalent of a "scheduled" award is 
worth examining. Should benefit levels be higher for occupa 
tional disease than for injury? My response would be prob 
ably not. But in developing any new law, we should not ac 
cept current levels of compensation as the norm, because by 
and large they are far below reasonable economic protection.
Moreover, we may be procedurally faced with a situation 
where there is a family trauma and not just an individual 
situation, because family members may also be affected by 
the results of the exposure to a toxic substance. Likewise, the 
question of a maximum level of compensation in order to 
provide an incentive to return to work may be a somewhat 
specious criterion when one is confronted with an occupa 
tional disease problem where the result is often permanent 
disability or death, or progressive deterioration.
Claims Processing
One of the more difficult problems in dealing with an oc 
cupational disease compensation system is the question of 
claims management and claims handling. Always we are con 
fronted with the question of providing appropriate due pro 
cess and appropriate procedures for handling administrative 
and judicial review in a fair and reasonable fashion. The 
question becomes, to some degree, due process for whom? 
In a preemption situation, we are clearly looking at a 
uniform federal system in an area where the federal govern 
ment has not always been known for its clarity of claims 
handling.
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I suggest that the system, whatever it be, become simple, 
that it be designed to keep adjudication to a minimum and to 
focus on eliminating controversy and the adversary mentali 
ty. Insofar as the medical side of the claims handling is con 
cerned, this area lends itself to the creation of some form of 
impartial medical evaluation. It may be advisable to create 
one group of physicians who will determine causality and a 
different group of physicians who will be the panel to review 
degree of impairment or disability caused by such exposure.
A major concern about the due process mechanism of any 
claims proceeding is the determination of who will pay. If 
some form of a group requirement or group responsibility is 
created, it then is very important to create a mechanism that 
does not provide a "super employer" to challenge each and 
every claim. The concept of super employer is currently em 
bodied in the "pool" arrangement of HR 3175. In that pro 
posal, the pool represents all of the employers and has the 
right to challenge claims pending before the Department of 
Labor. If that be the case, it might be better to keep pushing 
at the states to adopt improved systems of handling occupa 
tional disease claims matters, rather than subject individual 
claimants to the potential of opposition by a single entity 
representing all employers.
Funding
In each of these scenarios, one must determine both who 
should pay and how they should pay it. There are a number 
of different criteria which have been suggested for a funding 
mechanism, ranging from assessments to direct taxes to in 
surance pooling arrangements and a whole spectrum in be 
tween. I suspect that as this process continues over the next 
several years, someone will even invent a voucher system for 
handling the cost of the compensation program.
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On the other hand, in administering such a super-fund 
program, we may well have reached the point where it would 
be useful to examine not just the public or the private sector, 
but also whether we need to create some quasi-public or 
private agency to handle the paperwork and financial trans 
actions this sort of a fund would entail. Even though the 
political process of enacting a pool arrangement based on a 
tax is formidable, I believe it may be the only viable 
mechanism. The concept of an insurance pool is interesting, 
but the ability to administer such a process may be beyond 
our current capabilities.
While I have used up a great deal of verbiage in describing 
these various components of a disability system, there are at 
least two more considerations that I would suggest in think 
ing about the necessary mechanisms for dealing with this 
problem. First, we have put the cart before the horse 
somewhat in dealing with these compensation legislation 
recommendations because we have not emphasized enough 
the preventive and risk assessment screening programs that 
are urgently required to protect the workforce against these 
new and emerging occupational maladies. This is peculiarly 
an area where investment in prevention, investment in risk 
assessment and investment in screening will not only pay vast 
dividends to workers who will be given opportunities for 
treatment or cure at early stages of their disease, but can also 
result in enormous cost savings to employers.
Second, having described the basic elements required of 
any system, I am not at all sure that they constitute the ideal 
system. 3 1 would say to you that while we need to implement 
this process and have a legislative solution as soon as possi 
ble, we ought also consider the longer-range implications of 
workplace disability, particularly in the occupational disease 
area.
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Because we are confronted with difficulties in causal rela 
tionships in occupational illness, there is reason to consider 
the possibility of an integrated benefit system. It may be time 
to consider the notion that if one is afflicted with an occupa 
tional illness or disease, the question of whether it happened 
on or off the job is perhaps less relevant than in other com 
pensation systems. One could legitimately view an occupa 
tional disease compensation system as the beginning of an in 
tegrated approach to disability compensation. 4
There is an area that I have thus far deliberately not men 
tioned in this paper. That is the question of whether a pro 
gram such as I have outlined here should be provided only if 
it is the exclusive remedy for exposure to occupational 
hazards in a workplace situation. Under its other name, it is 
called exclusive liability or elimination of third party 
liabilities. It may even be one of the criteria for enactment of 
a product liability statute.
I am not sure that I can add to the many statements made 
on both sides of this issue. 5 Suffice it to say that it seems to 
me it is not the relevant consideration for looking at a com 
pensation system that hurdles a problem relating to the 
employer and employee. In point of fact, the so-called 
manufacturer is indeed a third party. I would say that the 
employment contract runs from the worker to the employer. 
The tort system has traditionally provided a remedy, as be 
tween the employer and the manufacturer, or as is now so 
frequently, between the individual and the manufacturer 
under various product liability standards. It is indeed strange 
to see the U.S. Congress, in this area of liability, being forc 
ed into denying workers' rights they have yet to receive. I 
think it is the wrong bargain and the wrong form.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not occupa 
tional disease legislation can be enacted. No one ever knows
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the direction in which the political process will move on a 
given issue. It is safe to say that there is more interest now in 
occupational disease than ever in history. There is more in 
terest now in providing a disability compensation system 
than in any time in recent years. There is also a greater 
understanding of the scope of certain federal or federally- 
administered compensation programs such as Black Lung 
and FECA. These programs have been widely criticized as 
costly and inefficient. The fact that they were poorly ad 
ministered and never provided proper funding or manage 
ment until recently does not mean that they are not fun 
damentally sound from a public policy and worker protec 
tion point of view.
Is all the above feasible? Who knows. But if I can review 
from the beginning, there is nothing new or novel. There is 
no lightning rod to come down upon us. The studies have 
been done. We must recognize that only 3 percent of occupa 
tional disease cases are filed through the existing workers' 
compensation system in the face of vastly more numbers be 
ing afflicted. This is the time to be considering such matters. 
There is an interest now, thanks to the Environmental Pro 
tection Agency. 6 There is an interest now, thanks to Johns- 
Manville and asbestos, asbestos, asbestos.
We do not need any more study commissions or any more 
large groups to evaluate public policy. We now need to 
design and implement the program.
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NOTES
1. See, for example, the bills introduced by Congressman Miller and 
Senator Hart in the 97th Congress (HR 5735 and S 1643). Also note HR 
3175 Occupational Disease Compensation Act of 1983, introduced May 
26, 1983.
2. E.g., Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, U.K. In most of these 
statutes the descriptions have taken the form of a list of diseases. Once 
the exposure to a listed disease through a period of employment is 
established, causation is no longer an issue.
3. Appendix A is a copy of recent testimony of the AFL-CIO that lays 
out in brief form the way in which these elements could be put togther 
for a reasonably successful, if not ideal, system.
4. The European systems noted above are examples of integrated benefit 
programs. Some are all government run and some have strong elements 
of the private sector. Some, such as in the Netherlands, pay the same 
benefits regardless of on or off the job illness. Most have some differen 
tials, but none as disparate as those found in the U.S.
5. See generally, DOL Task Force Report, Volume 4.
6. Recent criticism that the Administrator of EPA was not properly en 
forcing the environmental laws led to a congressional investigation.
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Testimony in Behalf of the 
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations,
The AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department and 
The AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades Department
Before the Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the
House Education and Labor Committee on H.R. 3175, to Provide
a Program of Compensation for Occupational Disease Victims
June 13, 1983
For the AFL-CIO: Kenneth Young, Executive Assistant to the
President of the AFL-CIO 
For the Industrial Union Department: William H. Bywater, President,
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers 
For the Building and Construction Trades Department: Robert
Georgine, President
Statement of Mr. Kenneth Young, Executive Assistant
to the President of the 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
June 13, 1983
The AFL-CIO, the Industrial Union Department and the Building and 
Construction Trades Department are appearing today jointly to present 
views on H.R. 3175, which would establish a system for compensating 
workers and survivors in cases of disability or death caused by occupa 
tional exposure to asbestos and other toxic substances.
We thank the committee for this opportunity to appear and we com 
mend you, Mr. Chairman, for your attention and diligent efforts in seek 
ing a solution to a serious deficiency in the workers' compensation 
system and to relieve the suffering of tens of thousands of victims of 
these diseases.
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This legislation, introduced by the chairman and co-sponsored by 
other members of this subcommittee, offers the Congress, organized 
labor, the insurance carriers, the manufacturers and processors and 
other interested parties an opportunity to come forward to discuss this 
proposal in serious pursuit of solutions to the pressing social, economic, 
legal and political problems that occupational diseases cause our society. 
The moral and ethical issues are so serious that common sense tells us 
that it is time to resolve this problem for the welfare of the stricken 
workers and their families and for the good of our nation.
We believe that we can agree on several basic concerns:
1. The need for a federal program. State workers' compensation laws 
governing occupational disease and disability do not provide prompt, 
adequate and equitable compensation to workers exposed to toxic and 
hazardous substances. Reform of this inadequate system is long overdue.
2. The need is evident for a system that adequately meets the economic 
and medical needs of workers stricken by occupational diseases, and for 
their families.
3. The need is evident for a system that provides swift and certain 
remedies without delay.
4. The need is evident for a system that provides for expansion of 
coverage of diseases in an ever-widening world of risk factors and in 
cidences.
5. The need is evident for a system that is adequately financed and 
properly administered.
6. The need is evident for a system with mechanisms for protecting 
workers from exposure in the workplace.
Mr. Chairman, none of us is an expert in this field, though we are 
familiar with the problems and the need for solutions from our direct ex 
perience in the labor movement.
While workers' compensation laws in all states cover disability that 
results from occupational disease, this coverage most often is in name 
only. There is no uniformity of procedures to determine occupational 
disease compensability. Many states have in their laws restrictive eligibili 
ty provisions or arbitrary compensation standards. Claims procedures 
are generally too costly and time-consuming. Many occupational 
diseases are not adequately covered by the workers' compensation 
system. Thus, millions of workers who suffer the disabling effects of ex 
posure to hazardous agents in the workplace receive no benefits.
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The occupational disease effects of new and changing technology are 
increasingly being borne by workers themselves rather than the system 
designed to compensate them. Thousands of workers die each year from 
the effects of asbestos, radiation, cotton dust, vinyl chloride, benzene 
and hundreds of other hazardous agents to which they were exposed, 
sometimes many years ago. Millions of workers are at risk of irreversible 
diseases of the heart, nerves, muscles, bones and lungs. Many of the tox 
ic agents that cause these diseases have found their way into workers' 
homes and communities, claiming as victims an unknown number of 
family bystanders as well. Many of these victims are uninformed about 
the fact that they are at risk as well as about what must be done to reduce 
the risk.
The AFL-CIO, and our Industrial Union and Building Trades Depart 
ments, therefore, have called for the establishment of a federal program 
to compensate workers and their families for death or disabiity resulting 
from occupational diseases. Attached to our testimony is the February 
28, 1983 statement by the AFL-CIO Executive Council, and the compan 
ion Resolution of the Industrial Union Department urging Congress to 
enact legislation that will establish a comprehensive occupational disease 
compensation program as well as a program to identify, notify and 
diagnose workers who are at high risk as a result of occupational health 
hazards.
There are provisions in H.R. 3175 that we support. However, there are 
elements of the bill about which we have concerns: specifically, the level 
of disability benefits, the death benefit, the wage loss provision as well as 
the procedure for filing and determining claims. While we will not ad 
dress in our testimony, today, all of these features, we look forward to 
working with the Committee to resolve the problems of concern and to 
strengthen this legislation.
At this time I wish to address one problem: the matter of exclusive 
remedy.
The AFL-CIO has long endorsed the traditional concepts of exclusivi 
ty with respect to workers' compensation as between the employer and 
his employees. The certainty of the compensation payment weighed 
against the uncertainty of traditional common law actions and defenses 
has been the cornerstone of the workers' compensation system for more 
than 70 years in this country.
H.R. 3175 continues this approach by including within the exclusive 
remedy limitations the employer, insurance carriers, collective bargain 
ing agents and fellow employees.
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There is much to argue for this approach. Experience has shown that 
where workers have had to seek redress in the courts, the time consumed 
has been extensive, the outcome uncertain and the awards when they 
come often net the worker very little after lawyer fees and costs.
Also, uncertainty on the employer's part transfers to the worker: If a 
company does not know its liability, then its workers can have no sense 
of protection.
There are two points, however, which we would like to make regarding 
the notion of exclusive remedy. First, in the area of occupational illnesses 
related to toxic substances, we believe that the exclusive remedy protec 
tion granted to employers should not extend to those actions of willful or 
intentional misconduct which cause harm to employees.
We have seen too many examples of employers with knowledge of the 
dangerous substances or the dangerous conditions, willfully exposing 
their workers to these dangers.
Second, we do not believe that the exclusive remedies should be ex 
tended to extinguish the traditional third-party rights of actions that 
employees would have against manufacturers. We believe that these 
workers should be entitled to their full rights against such manufacturers 
for additional damages including pain, suffering, loss of consortium and 
punitive damages as appropriate.
Limiting the manufacturing liability to that of an employer reduces the 
incentives on that manufacturer to operate with a high standard of 
testing and production as well as comprehensive warning requirements.
Statement of Mr. William H. Bywater, Vice President and Member
of the Exeuctive Council of the Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO,
and President, International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. On behalf of the In 
dustrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, we are very pleased to be here to 
testify in support of occupational disease compensation legislation.
As stated in the companion testimony of the AFL-CIO, occupational 
disease is a many-faceted workplace problem. The focus of public atten 
tion has been on cancer and asbestos because of the enormous, well- 
publicized impact it has had on thousands of workers exposed to that 
substance. Nonetheless, rubber workers who develop leukemia from
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benzene, plastics workers who develop liver cancer because they must 
breathe vinyl chloride, miners who die of lung cancer because of ionizing 
radiation, electroplaters in my own industry who breathe cadmium 
fumes and die of prostate cancer—all sicken and die just as easily as men 
and women exposed to asbestos.
Their suffering and the suffering inflicted upon their families should 
not be less because their tragedy draws less attention in the media.
Cancer is not our only occupational disease. Cotton dust disease, 
nerves destroyed by lead, mercury and solvents; all are worthy of our 
concern.
We hope that the Committee recognizes that the effects of other toxic 
processes and substances should be covered in the compensation scheme. 
We believe a mechanism for doing so is essential with respect to some of 
the requisite elements contained in this Bill.
The provisions contained in Section 16 of the Bill provide a framework 
for coverage of additional diseases and populations. Fleshing out of 
these provisions is necessary if this section is to be successfully im 
plemented, and diseased workers compensated. Experience with stan 
dard setting for toxic substances and processes under other statutes and 
legislative history, has shown that absent specific Congressional direc 
tion in the statute promulgation of effective standards is seriously 
hindered.
We are concerned that the legislative directions make clear the 
Secretary of Labor's responsibility to promulgate a suitable regulation in 
a specific time frame. It is important that workers not become caught in 
the cross-fire of inter-agency disputes, and suffer long delays in obtain 
ing relief. For those occupational diseases and populations at risk 
already recognized and well documented such as byssinosis among cot 
ton textile workers, the Congress should set a maximum time limit for 
coverage of these diseases and workers under this legislation.
The Bill at a minimum should direct the Secretary of Labor to set stan 
dards for additional discrete diseases, populations at risk, and substances 
or processes which consider exposure criteria, diseases and disease sites 
to be covered, and diagnostic criteria.
The Bill should also make clear that the criteria transmitted to the 
Secretary of Labor should contain to the extent feasible specific 
presumptions relating to causality so as to eliminate the challenges to the
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eligibility where medical evidence is sufficient to warrant the finding of a 
connection between the occupation and the disease.
H.R. 3175 already contains such presumptions for asbestos-related 
diseases. The Bill correctly makes irrebuttable the presumption that 
asbestosis is caused by breathing asbestos because the scarring of the 
lung and calcification observed by the physician is typically found among 
exposed workers. The chance is very small that the same conditions can 
be found in the absence of asbestos exposure.
The proposal makes a similar presumption for mesothelioma.
In this complex struggle with problems of causation and in under 
standing what happens to populations and groups of workers, we must 
deal with scientific information as it emerges and relate this knowledge to 
the legal formulations in order to accomplish our compensation scheme. 
The traditional requirement of compensating diseases "arising out of 
and in the course of employment" can and must be reconciled through 
appropriate redefinitions and qualifications to reflect the state of 
knowledge about disease causation. The acceptance of presumptions as a 
basis for clarifying causation and thereby determining compensation is 
essential.
Presumptions are a method of recognizing the advancement as well as 
the limits of science; they are valuable only when used fairly and con 
sistently.
We believe that it will not be difficult for NIOSH to make the same 
determinations for workers exposed to other toxic substances and pro 
cesses that reflect the increased burden of risk. Those who have borne 
this risk and developed cancer or other diseases because they are coke- 
oven workers, welders, textile workers, uranium miners, painters or oil 
refinery workers are no less entitled than asbestos workers to compensa 
tion.
Consideration should also be given to including a "general 
protection" provision which would allow claimants to seek compensa 
tion for work-related disease even though the specific effects have not 
been explicitly listed as compensable.
All of those provisions requiring consultation with the insurance pool 
insofar as it would permit a veto of additional coverage should be 
eliminated from this legislation. In our judgment the question of addi 
tional coverage should be limited to assessment of risk or disease and not
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confused with a criterion of whether there is an insurance mechanism for 
funding a particular compensation program. We also believe that there is 
no need for Congressional review of each new disease regulation.
Mr. Chairman, this is not wishful thinking about problems down the 
road. As is amply shown in my colleagues' testimony this morning, the 
need for additional coverage for occupational illness is urgent. There are 
afflicted workers and their families who need help now. There are a 
number of groups of workers in high-risk populations which should be 
covered within a short period of time after passage of this statute. The 
Secretary's timeframe should be far shorter than one year for promulga 
tion of such additional regulations.
We support the approach taken for the medical considerations in H.R. 
3175 because we believe that there is an understanding that this complexi 
ty of occupational diseases is not explainable in terms of simple single 
causes and simple single effects. The language of the proposed statute 
implies recognition of the concepts of risk factors and thinking in terms 
of populations which need to be the focus of the process of assessment 
that delineates work-related illness.
Finally, we would like to make clear that our interest is not just in 
compensation alone. The basic process of risk assessment useful in a 
compensation scheme is also important and has application in the reduc 
tion of suffering and death.
One of the most important realities repeatedly established for en 
vironmentally induced chronic disease is the long period of clinical laten 
cy between the onset of effective exposure and the first evidence of the 
disease. This "silent period" between initial exposure and the discovery 
of disease is of more than theoretical interest. It offers an opportunity, a 
possibility that intervention during this time might be successful in 
breaking the chain of events between exposure to an agent and the onset 
of uncontrollable disease. For cancer alone, the American Cancer Soci 
ety estimates that nearly a third of the expected deaths could be 
prevented by existing clinical methods of early detection and treatment. 
There is even some evidence of reversing the development of disease 
before it is found when the exposure has been stopped. Consequently, an 
integrated program of early detection is an urgent need including the 
identification and notification of high-risk groups, resources for the 
diagnosis and verification of disease effects, community and family 
resources for continuous and lifetime surveillance, and referral and 
counseling.
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We believe that these elements are essential to an effective program of 
occupational disease prevention. We can not focus totally on compensa 
tion without bringing to bear an understanding of this need as well.
Mr. Chairman, the Industrial Union Department joins with the AFL- 
CIO and the Building Trades Department in underscoring the impor 
tance of this legislative effort. We are pleased that you lead the Congres 
sional effort to enact legislation and we intend to spare no effort to help 
achieve a law that is so needed by our membership.
We are attaching to our statement additional remarks which we ask be 
included in the record of this hearing.
Statement of Mr. Robert Georgine, President, 
Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO
I am very pleased to join with my colleagues from the AFL-CIO and 
the Industrial Union Department to speak to this committee today on 
behalf of the Building and Construction Trades Department.
My belief is that now is the time for all of the groups concerned over 
the problems created by hazardous materials to accept the responsibility 
for the solution to the ultimate problem—how to make whole, and fully 
and fairly compensate, the diseased workers, and to eliminate the 
dangerous work practices causing these diseases. No facet of our society 
can be complacent because they have solved their individual piece of the 
problem. This legislation certainly addresses the issue of society's 
restoration of, and financial restitution to, diseased workers and their 
families.
This is not a matter of abstract concern to the trade union movement. 
The effort to design and evaluate a comprehensive approach to the oc 
cupation disease problem is urgently needed. I also recognize that as the 
solutions begin to evolve, the potential for conflict will arise. This is so, 
because there are so many interested parties—labor, producers and 
manufacturers of asbestos itself, mining, quarrying, packaging, and the 
processing of the products using asbestos, plus the builders, the con 
sumers, the insurance companies who underwrite risks, the people who 
are exposed, and the health and welfare services who must tend the vic 
tims, plus governments and courts who must administer, interpret and 
enforce laws.
Occupational Disease Legislation 279
All of us in construction remember the decade between 1960-69 when 
more than 40,000 tons of fireproofing material were sprayed annually in 
highrise buildings. The estimate today is that more than one million tons 
of asbestos material remain in place aboard ships, in buildings, and in 
process industries. We know that asbestos dust fills the air when it is 
damaged or has to be replaced. Fortunately, through our apprenticeship 
and training programs we have promoted the use of better work prac 
tices, means of isolation, and engineering controls to minimize the ex 
posure during removal or repair of in-place asbestos that is easily crushed 
and releases fibers readily into the job-site atmosphere. Laborers, 
Asbestos Workers, Painters, are exposed in rip-out work; I could name 
every International Union in the Building Trades, and I'm sure that they 
could provide additional situations of exposure.
Boilermakers, similar to many other craft unions, also have lodges or 
locals that represent workers in an Industrial setting; but they have work 
ed on construction sites where it has been estimated that 10,000 to 20,000 
tons of asbestos were applied annually to pipes, boilers, and other high- 
temperature equipment in factories, refineries and power plants.
We have tried to control the exposure of construction workers to in- 
place asbestos during rip-out work by encouraging the development of 
specialty contractors to do this work, and discouraging the use of con 
tractors without experience and knowledge.
Researchers at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine have estimated 
that 7.5 million construction workers are at some degree of risk of 
developing an asbestos-associated disease. Within the next 20 years an 
nual excess deaths from asbestos-related lung cancer among construction 
workers are estimated to range from 1,405 persons to 1,893. When other 
cancer deaths are projected, it adds an additional 1,000 to 1,500 deaths.
There are other toxic substances which I will talk about for a few 
minutes. An Ironworker told me recently,
"We used to bring bottles or cartons of milk with us to do the 
job when we were welding. We would drink this milk thinking 
that it would reduce the upchucking when we were welding 
galvanized steel, or over the surface of steel that had been 
painted with lead in it."
Of course, we all know that it didn't work very well, but I use this as an 
illustration of the immediate and violent reaction of a respiratory system 
that is being overloaded with welding fumes. Apply this to confined
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spaces, and add Plumbers and Pipefitters and the toxic atmosphere prob 
lem is magnified. NIOSH has listed deaths due to respiratory disabilities 
as the number one cause of death among the occupational diseases.
Painters are exposed to the fumes of paints and solvents in the con 
struction trades. Roofers are exposed to coal and asphalt tar pitch fumes, 
Tile Setters, Plasterers, Cement Masons, Carpenters, Bricklayers are also 
exposed to mixtures and epoxies from which toxic fumes can be present. 
Laborers handle bags, barrels, boxes, cans, drums, cylinders, and other 
containers which may contain hazardous substances, and all crafts on a 
construction site are exposed to many kinds of dusts and vapors. Iron 
workers, Pipefitters and Plumbers handle materials, cut, shape and weld 
coverings with paint and anti-corrosive materials that are too numerous 
to mention. Carpenters, Operating Engineers, Electricians—pick any 
craft, and you will find a potential group of construction workers for ex 
posure to asbestos and other toxic substances.
It is against this background of danger that a special Building and 
Construction Trades Department Committee was appointed to study and 
coordinate efforts with other AFL-CIO departments concerning all oc 
cupational disease compensation programs. That Committee developed 
several basic questions about such a compensation system. They are:
(1) How will our members, who are potential risks to exposure, 
gain entry to any system devised to meet their health, 
economic and social needs? Not only for themselves but their 
families when they are deceased, or worse yet, suffering a 
"living death"?
(2) What will be the mechanisms to identify and to label, as well 
as to define, the very best procedures and equipment needed 
to protect those who are presently exposed at their workplace, 
or may face work assignments in the future that will expose 
them?
(3) How can we insure that the delivery system will not be out 
moded, and constantly require upgrading in the future to 
serve the people dependent upon it?
(4) How can we insure that such a program will be adequately 
financed?
(5) How can we insure that it will be properly administered?
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(6) How can such a program be designed so that it will become 
the catchment basin for all such future problems as may arise, 
and not be done on a piecemeal basis as we have done in the 
past, and then only after there has been great suffering by our 
working people?
Our Committee report to me indicates that their impression of this Bill 
now pending before the Subcommittee is that it does not answer all of 
these questions as specifically as is necessary but it does offer an oppor 
tunity for substantial improvement over the present situation, and a 
great deal of opportunity for real progress towards the day that our 
country will achieve a comprehensive compensation program for work 
ing people who are disabled or die as a result of an unsafe or harmful 
health environment. Our comments are offered in this spirit.
The testimony of the AFL-CIO has outlined in detail the reason why 
this legislative effort to provide occupational disease compensation is so 
critical to American workers.
I would like to comment more specifically on the funding mechanics.
This aspect of the proposed legislation is of particular importance to 
both construction workers and their employers. Construction is an oc 
cupation with a high degree of mobility. Most of our members work for 
many different employers during their normal career. Our industry long 
ago set up multi-employer health and pension funds to accommodate this 
mobility.
With the long latency periods and multi-exposure problems of occupa 
tional diseases, we believe that it is essential to have a financing system 
that will fairly compensate our workers made ill and not place the entire 
cost on the "last employer," whose involvement may be minimal.
We believe that the responsibility for compensating the workers and 
their families made ill through asbestos exposure and other toxic 
substances should be placed squarely on those who are responsible for 
the harm. Any mechanism for paying compensation should place the 
burden of payment on the employers or manufacturers of the toxic 
substance; because of latency and multiple exposure factors it is ap 
propriate that a compensation fund be created that will have an industry- 
by-industry orientation.
We do not believe that the American public should pay for the 
workplace disability caused by exposure to toxic substances.
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We recognize that there are many possibilities for funding 
mechanisms, one of which is the insurance pool arrangement embodied 
in H.R. 3175. This is a complex issue and we would be willing to work 
closely with the subcommittee to develop a mechanism that will provide 
certainty of payment, reasonable financing, and fairness of process to 
the injured workers and their families.
We have serious reservations about the insurance pool arrangement 
from at least two aspects as it is now constituted in H.R. 3175. First, the 
pool arrangement gives substantial rights to the pool to challenge in 
dividual claims coming before the Secretary of Labor. The claims con 
sideration and adjudication process should be simple as we have stated 
and principally rest with adjudications by the Secretary of Labor. We do 
not believe it is appropriate to create a process whereby the pool becomes 
a "super employer" able to challenge claims. Under the pool arrange 
ment, as currently set forth in H.R. 3175, the various provisions of the 
pool and claims-handling permitting constant challenge to the claim will 
create a mechanism that will be litigation-prone and will be an injustice 
to the workers' interest.
Second, we do not believe that the pool should have any say in whether 
or not additional diseases will be recognized as eligible for compensation 
under the statute. The pool arrangement appears to give the insurance in 
dustry a veto over whether or not additional diseases will be the subject 
of compensation. This is not an acceptable process for the workers' in 
terest.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, this is a very serious 
effort you have started. It means a great deal to our membership in the 
Construction Industry. As we have stated, it is not an abstract proposi 
tion for us. It is an urgent need and we hope the Congress will be respon 
sive to this urgency.
Statement by the AFL-CIO Executive Council
on 
Occupational Disease Compensation and Prevention
February 28, 1983 
Bal Harbour, Fla.
About 100,000 workers die each year from the accumulated effects of 
exposure to carcinogens and other chemical hazards. Another one 
million workers become disabled each year from the same cause.
Occupational Disease Legislation 283
When occupational disease episodes are publicized, attention is drawn 
to the tragic situation of the victims of radiation, asbestos, cotton dust, 
kepone, vinyl chloride, benzidine, and hundreds of other hazardous 
agents. The vast majority of those who have been harmed are not afford 
ed assistance; often they do not even know that they are at risk. And only 
a very small percentage of the most severely disabled workers receive 
benefits from state workers' compensation systems, which are designed 
to deal primarily with traumatic injury, not disease.
A federal program is needed to compensate workers and their families 
for death or disability from occupational disease. The AFL-CIO is en 
couraged in this respect by current legislative initiatives. Both Rep. 
George Miller (D-Calif.) and Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) have 
announced an intention to introduce legislation that would establish a 
comprehensive federal program to provide adequate and equitable com 
pensation.
Any such legislation: should include generous time limits for filing 
claims that take account of the long latency periods for occupational 
diseases; should include eligibility requirements that give workers a fair 
opportunity to prove that their disabling disease is caused by exposure to 
a toxic substance; and should cover known occupational health hazards 
and provide for coverage through administrative action of additional 
hazards as they become known.
While a comprehensive compensation program is essential, it is not 
sufficient in itself. A program to identify, notify and diagnose workers 
who are at high risk as a result of an occupational health hazard is also 
necessary. Legislation should be developed to authorize the National In 
stitute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to carry out medical 
research to isolate occupational diseases and to assist populations at risk.
We strongly object to the denial to workers on grounds of alleged 
bankruptcy of compensation to which they are entitled for job-related in 
jury and disease. Legislation should be enacted to correct this injustice.
Working men and women need and deserve a nationwide effort by the 
federal government to prevent occupational disease and to assist those 
who are paying the price in pain, in suffering and in the lost ability to 
provide for themselves and their families for years of inaction by 
employers and by the states.
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Industrial Union Department Resolution
on 
Occupational Disease Prevention and Compensation
About 100,000 workers die and one million become disabled every 
year because of past and continuing exposure to toxic agents in their 
workplaces. Millions of workers are at risk of irreversible diseases of the 
heart, nerves, muscles, bones, and lungs. Many of the toxic agents that 
cause these diseases have found their way into workers' homes and com 
munities, claiming as victims an unknown number of family bystanders 
as well.
When occupational disease episodes are publicized by the media, at 
tention is drawn to the tragedy and pain suffered by victims of radiation, 
asbestos, cotton dust, kepone, vinyl chloride, benzidine, and hundreds 
of other hazardous agents. But when the television cameras are turned 
off, the vast majority of victims remain completely unassisted. They are 
uninformed about the fact that they are at risk as well as about what 
must be done to reduce the risk, and only a very small percentage—10 
percent in 1978—of even the most severely disabled workers receive 
benefits from state workers' compensation systems, which are designed 
to deal with traumatic injury, not disease.
Past legislative efforts have focused solely on the compensation issue, 
in recent months focused on asbestos victims. Workers and their families 
need help to prevent disease, those who do develop work-related diseases 
need assistance, and legislation cannot be restricted to the effects of one 
or two agents. There must be a mechanism for helping all workers made 
sick by conditions at work.
A comprehensive program to identify, notify, screen, diagnose, aid, 
and compensate populations of both workers and their families who are 
at high risk of dying or becoming disabled as a result of an 
occupationally-attributable disease is critical if we are to end this 
chronic, massive national epidemic based on ignorance, apathy and inac 
tion.
A two-fold national program is needed. This first part would be ad 
ministered by NIOSH, which would conduct medical research to identify 
and assist populations at risk and administer a Risk Assessment Board. 
Coverage for known populations at risk would be based on an 
epidemiologic trigger. Additional workers would be included as new in 
formation is collected through research.
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The second part would be administered by an independent federal 
agency that would compensate disabled workers and their families 
through industry trust funds gathered from employers, adjudicate 
claims, and initiate a national recordkeeping system. Compensation 
would be virtually automatic where occupation is a factor in causing a 
worker's disease or disability, on a no-fault basis. Workers and the agen 
cy would have the right to sue both corporation and individual corporate 
officers in cases of criminal and gross negligence, and workers would be 
protected from exclusion from coverage under existing health insurance.
The Executive Council and Conventions of the Industrial Union 
Department have adopted resolutions on this issue in the past. These 
have been confirmed as policy statements of the labor movement by ac 
tion of the Executive Council and Conventions of the AFL-CIO.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED:
That the Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, mount a campaign 
to implement these policies, that the Department call on all affiliates and 
Departments of the AFL-CIO to join us in a national campaign to cor 
rect the injustices of the past.

12
Issues in Asbestos 
Disease Compensation
Donald L. Spatz
Director of Occupational Safety and Health
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers,
Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths,
Forgers and Helpers
The Asbestos Legacy
The relationship between occupational exposure to 
asbestos and the development of human disease has been ex 
tensively studied, both clinically and epidemiologically. Scat 
tered reports of lung scarring among workers in asbestos fac 
tories occurred throughout the industrial world in the first 
two decades of this century. In 1918, one of the first in 
dustrial hygiene reports issued by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics referred to the adverse health experience of 
asbestos workers. 1 Population studies among asbestos textile 
workers in the 1930s showed that these workers experienced 
a high frequency of lung abnormalities. 2 3
These first clinical and epidemiological reports focused ex 
clusively on the development of asbestosis. In 1935, the first 
case reports of the cancer-causing potential of asbestos were 
published. 4 5 In 1946, the annual report of the chief inspec 
tor of factories in Great Britain noted an extremely high rate 
of lung cancer among workers who had died from
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asbestosis. 6 Population-based studies confirmed the excess 
risk of lung cancer among asbestos factory workers in both 
Great Britain and in the United States. 7 8 In 1964, Dr. Irving 
Selikoff and others published findings of an enormously in 
creased rate of death from cancer and asbestosis among 
users, rather than producers of asbestos products. 9
Since the mid-1960s, scientists have found similar results 
among other groups of workers occupationally exposed to 
asbestos in either production or use of asbestos-containing 
products. Pleural and peritoneal mesothelioma, a rare and 
striking disease, began to be diagnosed among groups of 
workers only casually exposed to the "magic mineral." 10 It 
could indeed be argued that without the finding of 
mesothelioma among persons with such varied occupational 
and environmental exposure, that the tragic potential of 
asbestos to cause human disease might have been thought to 
be limited to only those persons with direct and substantial 
contact.
As mesothelioma was found among shipyard workers, 
railroad workers, construction workers, those servicing 
automobile and truck brakes, and among family members 
who cleaned workers' dust-laden clothes, it brought new 
awareness of the potentially broad impacts of toxic 
substances. While black lung was restricted to those who 
chose to mine coal for a living, and silicosis was confined to 
a handful of occupations, the effects of asbestos spread 
across occupational groups and, somewhat, across social 
classes. 11
While it appears self-serving for a major insurance com 
pany with extensive liabilities at stake to call asbestos disease 
a "social problem," 12 it is undoubtedly true that the 
widespread use of asbestos products has caused enormous 
suffering and personal loss among workers whose jobs 
brought them into contact with the substance.
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Recently, the most detailed estimates of the number of 
workers occupationally exposed to asbestos and an assess 
ment of those who, because they were significantly exposed, 
are at risk of developing an asbestos-associated disease, have 
been published. 13 There are presently more than 21 million 
American workers who, in the past 40 years, were 
significantly exposed to asbestos. 14 From this legacy, it is 
estimated that 8,200 to 9,700 annual deaths from asbestos- 
associated cancer plus additional deaths from asbestosis will 
occur for each of the next 20 years. 15
Of some importance in understanding the implications of 
the asbestos problem is the fact that less than one in 17 of 
these workers was involved in the primary or secondary pro 
duction of asbestos products. The remainder were involved 
in using, maintaining, or removing products containing 
asbestos—primarily asbestos insulation materials. Addi 
tionally, initial evidence reveals that workers who had no 
direct contact but were exposed to fugitive asbestos dust may 
be at risk. 16
With this toll of current and future victims of asbestos- 
associated disease as a backdrop, how well have victims and 
their survivors fared under our statutory social insurance 
programs—state and federal workers' compensation—and 
under common law remedies against manufacturers? While 
data are not available for members of most groups of 
workers who have been disabled or killed from prior 
asbestos exposure, this paper presents information on two 
groups of asbestos factory workers and asbestos insulation 
workers in the State of New Jersey.
Artificial Barriers to Workers' Compensation
The statutory barriers to occupational disease claims in 
state workers' compensation laws have been well- 
documented, beginning with the report of the National Com-
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mission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws in 1972, 17 
continuing with the Inter-Departmental Workers' Compen 
sation Task Force in 1976, 18 and most recently by the 
Department of Labor in its Interim Report to Congress on 
Occupational Diseases. 19 Perhaps the best summary of the 
situation was provided by Larson, who wrote, "a close 
review of the current statutes can only lead one to 
believe . . . that their real objective is to deliberately limit 
the number of cases, especially of the chronic long term (and 
probably costly) variety, which are admitted into this 
system. 20
Recency of employment rules, strict statutes of limita 
tions, and definitions of occupational disease that require 
peculiarity to a particular trade or exclude ordinary diseases 
of life, are the three types of artificial barriers which restrict 
the entry of legitimate claims. 21 Recency of employment or 
exposure rules are patently unfair in cases of disability or 
death from an asbestos-associated disease. The progressive 
nature of asbestosis, in which impairment may progress to 
disability in the absence of additional exposure, and the 
latency period for the development of an asbestos-associated 
cancer, have been documented by Selikoff and others. 22 23 
The negative presumption of work-relatedness created by 
these rules is not necessary because each state still requires 
the claimant to carry the burden of proving that the condi 
tion arose out of and in the course of employment.
Statutes of limitation have been modified by legislative ac 
tion and judicial interpretation in many states since the 
report of the National Commission was released. The liberal 
discovery rules have mollified the effect of statutes of limita 
tion, but unjustifiable exclusion of claims may still occur.
State laws that continue to require that a compensable 
disease be peculiar to an occupation or trade make little 
sense for asbestos-associated diseases. 24 How could a brake
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mechanic show that mesothelioma is peculiar to the trade? It 
is a disease peculiar to exposure to asbestos, regardless of 
trade. Exclusion of ordinary diseases may also act as a bar to 
asbestos-exposed workers who develop lung cancer or 
cancers of other sites. 25 When the disease is clinically in 
distinguishable as to specific cause, the asbestos-exposed 
worker can only point to the higher statistical incidence of 
the disease in his trade in seeking compensation.
Experience in a State Without Artificial Barriers
If the worker is fortunate enough to live or work in a 
state26 without artificial barriers to seeking workers' com 
pensation, the claimant still faces the formidable problem of 
proving causality. Even with expert legal and medical advice, 
the outcome is less than certain and rarely speedy. Evidence 
of the difficulties that workers and their survivors have 
faced, even in a state without artificial barriers, is available 
from a study of three groups of workers in New Jersey who 
died of an asbestos-associated disease over a decade, from 
1967 to 1976. 27
The New Jersey workers' compensation statute has a fairly 
broad definition of compensable occupational diseases and, 
since 1974, has applied a liberal discovery rule with no other 
artificial barriers. 28 During the decade from 1967 to 1976, 
205 deaths from lung cancer, mesothelioma, asbestosis or 
another asbestos-associated cancer occurred among the three 
groups. Other than having suffered from the same occupa 
tional diseases, the three groups of workers shared few oc 
cupational characteristics. One group consisted of asbestos 
insulation workers who were members of one of the three 
New Jersey locals of the Union. These were a subgroup of 
the 17,800 asbestos insulators enrolled in a nationwide mor 
tality study in 1967. 29 Of these New Jersey locals, 44 men 
died of an asbestos-associated disease during the next 
decade.
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The second group was composed of 87 persons who died 
from asbestos-associated disease who had worked at a Pater- 
son, New Jersey asbestos insulation factory that had closed 
in 1954. These workers came under prospective surveillance 
by the Mount Sinai School of Medicine in 1961. This is a 
classic case of short term exposure producing an elevated in 
cidence of asbestos-associated diseases. Detailed informa 
tion on the mortality experience of this group of workers and 
its relationship to asbestos exposure has been reported. 30 31 
The fact that the factory closed in 1954 permitted examina 
tion of the effect that a break in the employment relationship 
had on the likelihood that these workers or their survivors 
sought compensation.
The third group included in the comparative analysis con 
sisted of workers employed in production and maintenance 
classifications in the Manville, New Jersey plant, the largest 
asbestos products manufacturing company in North 
America. From a cohort of workers under prospective obser 
vation since January 1, 1959, 74 deaths from asbestos- 
associated disease occurred between January 1, 1967, and 
the end of 1975. 32
Long term mortality studies of each of these groups of 
workers showed a significantly increased incidence of 
diseases caused by previous asbestos exposure. Lung cancer 
was the predominant cause of death among all groups, but 
many of the workers died of mesothelioma and asbestosis. 
Cancers of the gastrointestinal tract, the kidney, and other 
sites accounted for the remaining asbestos-associated 
diseases. 33
The occupational histories of each group of workers were 
considerably different. The insulation workers primarily ap 
plied and removed asbestos insulation products, working for 
a variety of different contractors in the construction industry 
over their careers. Exposure to asbestos was usually con-
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tinuous during their employment in the trade. The Manville 
workers were likewise exposed to asbestos over their working 
lives at the factory. Employment with this company was 
stable and, for these workers, usually continuous until retire 
ment, disability or death. The workers at the Paterson firm 
were different. During the war years, labor turnover at the 
factory was high, and upon its closing in 1954, the remaining 
workers dispersed to a wide range of other industries and oc 
cupations. With the long latency period of asbestosis, 
however, short term exposure in this plant three decades 
previous produced a pattern of disease similar to that seen 
among the insulation and Manville workers, even though the 
workers had gone on to various types of other blue-collar 
and white-collar employment.
Initiation of Workers' Compensation Claims
There were considerable variations among the three 
groups in the initiation of workers' compensation death 
claims. Claims for benefits were filed by only nine survivors 
of the 87 workers from the Paterson factory. In contrast, 
among the insulation workers claims for benefits were in 
itiated by survivors in 26 of the 44 deaths. A similar propor 
tion of claims (40 of 74) were filed by survivors of the Man 
ville factory workers. 34
Among the insulators who remained in the same trade, 
albeit with different employers, and among the Manville 
workers exposed continuously at one production facility, the 
association between asbestos exposure and the resultant 
diseases was much better recognized. In turn, the knowledge 
to seek workers' compensation was displayed more con 
sistently by these workers and their survivors than among the 
Paterson victims. The dissemination of information con 
cerning asbestos hazards and advocacy for compensation 
were aided by the presence of union representation among
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the insulators and Manville workers. The Paterson workers 
and their survivors, because of the closing of the plant, no 
longer shared an occupational bond or association through 
which information and assistance could be transmitted.
While the proportion of workers' compensation claims fil 
ed by survivors of insulators and Manville workers was 
rather constant over the decade, reflecting early and con 
tinuous recognition of the occupational nature of these 
deaths, the few claims by survivors of the Paterson workers 
came only in more recent years. The increase in the number 
of Paterson survivors filing workers' compensation claims 
could not be directly attributed to any one factor. Greater 
public knowledge of the effects of asbestos exposure, 
awareness through participation in a medical surveillance 
program, and the elimination of the recency of exposure 
limitation from the state law in 1974, could all be considered 
contributing factors. Based on interviews with survivors of 
Paterson workers who did not file claims, it appeared that 
lack of recognition of the association between asbestos and 
disease was not as limiting a factor as was the lack of 
knowledge that the survivors were potentially eligible for 
benefits.
The specific cause of death, as well as the accuracy of the 
diagnosis recorded on the death certificate, had an impact 
upon whether compensation was sought. The influence of 
these factors, however, was not consistent across all three oc 
cupational groups. Among the insulators and Manville 
workers, claims for death benefits were filed by survivors in 
a high proportion of deaths from mesothelioma, yet only 
one in 13 deaths from mesothelioma among the Paterson 
workers resulted in a survivor's claim. Somewhat surprising 
ly, claims for compensation benefits were less often initiated 
by survivors of those who died of asbestosis. To a large 
degree, this was found to be related to the worker's age at
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death and the description of the cause of death on the death 
certificate. Only among the survivors of the insulators were 
claims for compensation benefits filed from deaths of less 
well known asbestos-associated cancers, such as 
gastrointestinal cancer.
Among all three occupational groups, the age of the 
worker at death was a consistent factor in whether compen 
sation claims were initiated. In part, the decline in the pro 
portion of claims filed as age at death increases reflected the 
lesser likelihood of there being dependents to advance 
claims. Yet the same decline in the initiation of claims was 
seen among those deaths in which there was still a surviving 
spouse. Although there were no restrictions on the availabili 
ty of workers' compensation to survivors of those who died 
after retirement and whose major source of income was no 
longer wage earnings, the worker's retirement status at the 
time of death appeared to be a considerable factor in 
whether compensation was sought by a survivor. Three 
reasons might be considered to explain this: workers and sur 
vivors have less access to information after the connection to 
the employment network is severed by retirement; eligibility 
for retirement benefits reduces the financial need to file a 
claim; and lack of pursuit of potential claimants by legal ad 
vocates when a worker's death occurs at an older age.
Outcomes of Workers' Compensation Claims
Detailed information on the processing and outcomes of 
the workers' compensation claims was available from the 
New Jersey Division of Workers' Compensation for the 26 
claims filed by survivors of insulators and the nine filed by 
survivors of Paterson workers. Less detailed data were 
available on 40 claims and seven direct settlements among 
the survivors of the Manville workers. Despite the lack of ar 
tificial barriers, only 11 of the 26 survivors of the insulators
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were awarded full dependency benefits. Eleven claims were 
resolved through the payment of partial benefits, three 
through compromise agreement by the parties, and eight 
others by formal decision of the judge in which dependency 
was dismissed and posthumous disability awards were 
entered. 35
Particularly disturbing was the manner in which claims by 
six survivors of insulators who died of mesothelioma were 
resolved. In only one case was the widow awarded full 
dependency benefits. In other words, in only one of six 
claims could the survivor meet the required burden of proof 
that the disease and death arose out of and in the course of 
employment. In neither the one award, nor the approving 
settlements signed by the judges, was mesothelioma 
specifically indicated as the cause of death. Despite the fact 
that asbestos exposure encountered while on the job was the 
only plausible cause of these workers' deaths from 
mesothelioma, this medical reality was not reflected by the 
decisions and practices under the New Jersey workers' com 
pensation system. The handling of claims resulting from 
deaths due to lung cancer shows a similar lack of consistency 
with documented scientific evidence. Half of the lung cancer 
claims were either dismissed or compromised.
Claims resolved through compromise agreements or in 
which the judge dismissed the dependency claim and award 
ed posthumous disability benefits provided considerably less 
in compensation than if judgments for full dependency had 
been awarded. New Jersey law provided income benefits for 
surviving dependents of 50 percent of wages at the time of in 
jury since 1970. Claims paid through compromise 
agreements in a fixed amount were less than $30,000 in all 
cases and most likely were less than what a survivor would 
have received had full dependency been awarded. Yet in an 
individual case facing long litigation, compromise may have
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been the only way for the survivors to receive benefits during 
the immediate time of need.
Among the survivors of insulators the median period be 
tween filing a claim petition and its resolution was 19 
months. One in three claims took two years or more to 
resolve. Over the decade under study, there was no indica 
tion that the period of controversy was reduced as evidence 
of asbestos-associated occupational disease became more 
available and seemingly less subject to dispute.
Among the survivors of the Paterson workers, with the ex 
tended period of time between the last exposure to asbestos 
and manifestation of disease, the lack of recognition of the 
occupational nature of their husbands' diseases and inade 
quate knowledge of their possible eligibility for workers' 
compensation were primary impediments. For that reason 
only 9 of 87 potential claims were filed. The resolution of 
these nine claims indicates that the New Jersey system was 
even less capable of acting in concert with medical 
knowledge of the etiology of asbestos-associated diseases 
than it had been with the insulators. Prior to 1974, claims of 
these survivors were effectively barred because of the recency 
of exposure limitation in the state law.
Although the Paterson asbestos insulation firm was nam 
ed as a responsible employer in eight of the nine claim peti 
tions, it was ultimately found liable for payment of sur 
vivors' benefits in only two (both deaths from lung cancer). 
One successful claim had been appealed by the company for 
seven years before final resolution. The widow was finally 
awarded lifetime benefits of $34 per week, based on her hus 
band's last earnings with the firm in 1954. The other claim in 
which the firm paid benefits was a $14,000 settlement reach 
ed four and a half years after the worker's death. The only 
claim arising from a death from mesothelioma was dismissed 
in 1978 for "failure to sustain the burden of proof."
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Despite the scientific evidence of the association between 
these workers' employment at the Paterson factory and their 
deaths from asbestosis, mesothelioma and lung cancer, the 
experience of their survivors, when claims were no longer 
statutorily barred, indicates that the compensation system 
was unable to handle the medical fact of latency. These 
workers, who suffered a pattern of disability and death 
similar to that of the asbestos insulation workers, found that 
workers' compensation, even in a state with a long- 
established and well-regarded system, was incapable of 
assigning responsibility to an employer who had ceased pro 
duction more than 20 years earlier.
Less detailed data were available on the manner in which 
claims from survivors of the Manville workers were resolved. 
About the same proportion of survivors filed claims and 
received benefits as among the insulators, reflecting the con 
tinued exposure until disability, death or retirement. Sur 
vivors' benefits were paid in 19 of 23 deaths of 
mesothelioma, but in only half of the deaths due to lung 
cancer. No claims were filed by, or direct settlements paid to, 
survivors of workers who died of gastrointestinal cancer.
The period of time between last employment and death ap 
peared to be a factor in whether compensation was sought or 
paid. Of five widows whose husbands had been last 
employed more than 10 years prior to their deaths, only one 
received workers' compensation benefits. Of some note was 
the near uniformity between the death certificate cause of 
death and that established by review of best evidence for 
those Manville workers who had died of mesothelioma and 
asbestosis. 36 The employment of the worker in an asbestos 
products factory rather than as an asbestos products user led 
the physicians to more often correctly list these two asbestos 
diseases as the cause of death.
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These three groups of workers may fairly well represent 
the range of responsiveness that other workers and their sur 
vivors faced in seeking compensation for occupational 
asbestos disease in New Jersey. Clearly, those with con 
tinuous and current exposure were more aware of their rights 
and more successful in meeting the burden of proof. Even 
so, there were a majority of deaths in which benefits were 
not sought or in which survivors' claims were dismissed or 
only partially awarded.
The claim experience of these survivors may be atypical to 
the rest of the country, but the New Jersey statute (with no 
artificial barriers) can be fairly considered to be more open 
to potential claimants than the laws in many other states. 
Among the nationwide group of asbestos insulators reported 
by Earth, claims for workers' compensation death benefits 
were proportionately most often filed in the states of New 
Jersey, Ohio and Washington. 37 While it was found in the 
nationwide survey that few claims were ultimately denied 
and that most resulted in an award or settlement, few details 
were available on the actual resolution of the claim, as was 
the case in New Jersey. 38 One might surmise that claims of 
survivors in other states were reduced to far below their full 
value, as in New Jersey.
The Paterson workers may be representative of many 
workers in other industries and trades in which asbestos ex 
posure was intermittent, brief, noncontinuous or truncated 
for whatever reason. However, many of the Paterson 
workers had participated in a medical research and 
surveillance program that provided some understanding of 
the work-relatedness of the diseases which afflicted the 
workers. Other victims of asbestos-associated diseases, caus 
ed by similar exposure circumstances but without a program 
of surveillance, can be expected to be even less informed and 
even less likely to seek and obtain compensation. Based on
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the outcomes of the claims by survivors of the Paterson 
workers, the potential for swift and equitable resolution of 
claims for survivors of workers with similar occupational 
histories does not appear promising under the workers' com 
pensation mechanisms throughout our country.
The issue of causality and sufficient proof is crucial. The 
divergence between scientific evidence and actual workers' 
compensation practice—particularly evident in the handling 
of claims of insulators from deaths due to mesothelioma, but 
also seen in lung cancer deaths—suggests that in the absence 
of specific medical presumptions, compensation is neither 
certain in amount nor swift in delivery. Nor did the resolu 
tion of the Paterson claims reflect the extensive body of 
scientific evidence documenting the issues of latency, 
etiology, sufficient exposure and increased incidence of 
disease among briefly-exposed workers. 39 Clearly, workers' 
compensation practice in New Jersey, over the decade 
studied, did not reflect scientific evidence establishing the 
parameters of the relationship between these diseases and 
past occupational exposure to asbestos.
Similar findings reported by Earth from the much larger 
nationwide survey of insulation workers who died of an 
asbestos-associated disease, aptly described as a "best case" 
scenario, 40 strongly reinforce the findings from New Jersey 
on the inadequacies of workers' compensation.
Product Liability Suits
It was a mere decade ago, in 1973, that a district court in 
Texas extended the concept of strict liability to include the 
duty to warn both buyers and users of the product. In this 
landmark case (Borel v. Fiberboard Products Corporation) 
the court, in ruling in support of an asbestos insulation 
worker, wrote "the user or consumer is entitled to make his 
own choice as to whether the product's utility or benefits
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justify exposing himself to risks of harm." 41 Since this case, 
a veritable explosion of third party liability suits have been 
filed against manufacturers of asbestos products by those 
who encountered asbestos in their employment. 42 Beginning 
with the initial cases of asbestos insulation workers, third- 
party law suits have been filed by numerous shipyard 
workers and others involved in use, rather than primary or 
secondary production of asbestos products.
The experience of the world's largest asbestos producer, 
Manville Corporation, demonstrates the growth in third- 
party law suits. In 1976, only 159 cases had been filed against 
the company. 43 The growth in the number of law suits led the 
company to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in August 1982. 
In congressional hearings, Manville has testified that they 
were defending against 16,500 suits, which were increasing at 
a rate of 500 per month. 44 Financial studies upon which the 
bankruptcy was based estimated an additional 32,000 suits 
with a potential total cost of $2 billion by the year 2009. 45 
Two additional asbestos manufacturers have also filed for 
Chapter 11 reorganization, and others are expected to do 
likewise, depending on the prognosis for the Manville action.
The growing number of third-party law suits and the 
Chapter 11 reorganization filings have increased the pressure 
to find a better method of compensating victims of asbestos- 
associated disease. Third-party suits exhibit many of the 
same problems encountered by the worker or survivor who 
seeks workers' compensation. State laws govern these ac 
tions, and a uniform product liability law does not exist. 
Restrictive statutes of limitation exist in a number of states. 46 
The recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, 47 declining 
to review rulings by the New York Court of Appeals which 
dismissed asbestos suits based on a three-year statute of 
limitations, underscores the pitfalls to workers who seek 
reparations through product liability suits. Litigation is
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lengthy, and reargument of causation and state of the art are 
necessary in each suit. Expert medical and legal advice is 
necessary in every case.
Statistical data on the efficacy of third party suits for 
asbestos-associated disease are very limited. Among the sur 
vivors of the asbestos insulators the average award or settle 
ment in 60 cases was $71,000, with an average lawyer's fee of 
$26,900, leaving the plaintiffs an average of $44,100. 48 While 
the plaintiff's legal fees took approximately 37 percent of the 
award or settlement, the legal cost to the defendants may be 
even more. Manville Corporation has reported that in 1982 
its costs to dispose of suits was an average of $40,000, 
$19,000 of which was the cost of defending against the suit. 49
In addition to these direct transactional costs, extended 
litigation concerning insurance coverage, pitting members of 
the asbestos and insurance industries against one another 
over the question of who is obligated to defend and indem 
nify the insured, add an unknown cost. 50 There can be little 
argument that having courts of law decide individual suits 
for compensation when there is such a large class of current 
and future injured persons is inefficient. Yet a popular sense 
of justice argues against restricting diseased workers or their 
survivors from seeking reparations from whatever source 
available, especially when workers' compensation is inade 
quate.
Among asbestos insulation workers, it is known that there 
was an interrelationship between the filing of workers' com 
pensation claims and the initiation of a tort suit. Of those 
survivors who filed workers' compensation claims, 25 per 
cent also sought a remedy against the manufacturer. 51 Ten 
percent of those who did not seek workers' compensation fil 
ed third-party law suits. 52 This is not unexpected, as in 
developing the evidence for a compensation claim, the 
worker or survivor gathers much of the factual information
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necessary to pursue an action against the manufacturer. 
However, it should be strongly noted that among the nation 
wide group of insulators, both workers' compensation 
claims and third-party law suits were brought in only 9 per 
cent of the deaths. 53 Whether this same interaction between 
workers' compensation and third-party suits exists among 
other groups of occupationally exposed workers is unknown.
An interesting finding from the awarded or settled suits of 
insulators was the substantially higher average award for vic 
tims of mesothelioma, compared to victims of lung cancer. 
While the average age at death was essentially identical, sur 
vivors of mesothelioma victims received an average dollar 
recovery before legal fees of nearly $100,000, while the com 
parable figure for lung cancer was just $60,000. 54 This may 
reflect the availability of cigarette smoking as a defense in 
lung cancer suits or reflect a subtle difference in treatment 
between a so-called ordinary disease of life and one with 
clear-cut etiology. For whatever reason, the disparate 
recovery begs for an equitable and uniform compensation 
program for victims of all asbestos-associated diseases.
Also of some note is that two claims for workers' compen 
sation for lung cancer in New Jersey (discussed above) which 
had been dismissed for failure to sustain the burden of prov 
ing a causal relationship, resulted in tort suit settlements for 
the survivors. Though the burden of proof might be thought 
to be as stringent, if not more so, in these cases the manufac 
turers were willing to settle even though there was a previous 
denial in workers' compensation proceedings.
Conclusion
Asbestos is foremost among the causes of a growing 
number of well-defined occupational diseases for which our 
current system of workers' compensation has been inade 
quate. It has not met the basic quid pro quo of speedy and
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certain awards in exchange for abrogating common law ac 
tions against employers. Even in the absence of artificial bar 
riers, victims of asbestos-associated diseases fared poorly in 
a state with a well-regarded workers' compensation pro 
gram.
The existence of a limited number of manufacturers of 
asbestos products and a large number of worker-users rather 
than worker-producers has created a large pool of potential 
third-party litigants. The now well-established legal inter 
pretation of strict liability, in which the manufacturer is held 
to the duty of an expert, has opened up an avenue for those 
who have received less than fair treatment under workers' 
compensation to seek further redress. However, the number 
of suits against manufacturers, even if the current figure of 
25,000 is accurate, represents only a fraction of those who 
have been damaged. The experience of survivors of asbestos 
insulators in seeking tort compensation shows that although 
recovery can be substantial in some cases, overall it is ine 
quitable and unavailable.
The detailed estimates of economic losses made by 
Johnson and Heler35 for the nationwide cohort of insulation 
workers clearly show that the losses were primarily borne by 
the disabled, their survivors and the general public, rather 
than by employers and manufacturers. For the minority of 
survivors who received survivorship benefits of some type, 
workers' compensation benefits accounted for only 27.9 per 
cent, and tort suits and settlements 15.9 percent of total 
payments. In the words of Johnson and Heler, "the fact that 
the common law and workers' compensation provide such a 
small proportion of the payments to the victims of occupa 
tional illness from asbestos is a serious indictment of both 
approaches."
Though the "tort problem" has generated new supporters 
for an equitable and swift occupational disease compensa-
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tion program, the past history of asbestos manufacturers 
does not make it easy to find a method to accommodate 
competing equity arguments. The evidence that has surfaced 
in tort suits showing that manufacturers covered up their 
knowledge of the true hazards of asbestos since at least the 
1930s56 57 makes it difficult for worker advocates who wish 
to see an adequate workers' compensation system to support 
barring suits against manufacturers as a fair quid pro quo 
for a nationally administered occupational disease compen 
sation program. Perhaps such a compensation program 
could be supported as the exclusive remedy for pecuniary 
losses and medical care on a no-fault basis if workers retain 
ed the right to sue outside the workers' compensation system 
for additional damages when individuals or corporations 
knowingly and willfully created an unreasonable risk.
Such approaches are not unknown in other parts of the 
world. In some Western European countries the employer 
has immunity from civil suits for normal cases covered by 
their social insurance scheme. But civil action remains possi 
ble where there has been penal sanction (Italy), gross 
negligence (Norway), or serious fault (Switzerland). 58 In still 
other countries, civil action remains possible to cover 
elements of compensation, such as damages for pain and 
suffering, which are not covered by the statutory scheme. 
Under the compensation program established for coal 
workers in the United Kingdom there are lump-sum benefits 
for pain, suffering, and loss of amenity, together with com 
pensation for lost earnings, acceptance of which is in lieu of 
the right to seek tort compensation. 59
The findings in the "best case" examination of the ex 
periences of the insulation workers in New Jersey show the 
need for an independent agency to investigate and adjudicate 
claims and the need to develop adequate and workable 
medical presumptions. The burden of proof must be chang-
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ed to a burden of disproof on the part of the employer when 
statistical evidence shows a higher incidence of disease 
among groups of workers exposed to specific substances, 
and individual workers meet a minimum threshold of clinical 
signs and symptoms.
No asbestos compensation scheme will be truly effective 
unless it creates an outreach program to provide 
surveillance, notification and assistance to those at risk. This 
must be directed particularly to older workers who are less 
likely to seek compensation, even though they are at greater 
risk as asbestos residency time increases. All artificial bars to 
entry and recovery must be eliminated, and income and 
medical benefits must be at a level sufficient for appropriate 
medical care, a dignified standard of living during disability, 
and to survivors upon death.
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The papers presented in this section cover an important set 
of issues in workers' compensation for occupational 
diseases. First, we are presented with data indicating that the 
current state systems have serious problems compensating 
victims of asbestos-related diseases and, by inference, other 
occupational diseases which are even less well understood. 
Then, we are given proposals for solving the problems of 
compensating occupational diseases, solutions proposed to 
be implemented at the federal level.
Spatz's paper presents a "best case" picture of occupa 
tional disease compensation in the United States. He chooses 
a state system with no artificial barriers to compensation; the 
most well-known occupational disease agent; and workers 
who had been under study and were therefore likely to be 
more aware of the occupational origin of their diseases. In 
spite of these favorable conditions, Spatz documents serious 
problems faced by survivors of insulation workers who died 
from asbestos-related diseases. The issues are familiar ones, 
echoing those discussed by Earth and Hunt, 1 and by Earth2 
in his recent study of asbestos insulation workers. In Spatz's
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study, workers' compensation claims for asbestos-related 
disease were generally controverted, resulting in long delays, 
high legal expenses, and uncertain outcomes. Most claimants 
were not paid the full dependency amount, but received a 
smaller award, a settlement, or no award at all. Survivors of 
insulators waited a median period of 19 months to have their 
claims resolved.
Spatz concludes that "our current system of workers' 
compensation has been inadequate" in its handling of oc 
cupational disease. He and Elisburg provide suggestions for 
altering state workers' compensation systems which, in their 
views, will improve the compensation of occupational 
disease victims and their survivors.
These comments will focus on one aspect of occupational 
disease compensation, the uncertainty that leads to many of 
the problems presented in Spatz's paper. Before that, I 
would like to list some basic criteria by which the adequacy 
of occupational disease compensation can be judged.
Criteria for Judging Occupational 
Disease Compensation Systems
Elisburg presents some of the basic goals of workers' com 
pensation: (1) complete coverage of injuries and illnesses 
arising out of and in the course of employment, (2) prompt 
delivery of benefits, (3) a "reasonable" level of benefits, in 
cluding full payment for medical benefits and rehabilitation. 
I would like to add to this list: (4) efficient delivery of 
benefits, i.e., a low expense-to-benefit ratio, and (5) certain 
ty about what injuries and illness are covered. In addition, 
one could suggest: (6) minimal compensation for injuries 
and illnesses that are not work-related.
Spatz's work suggests that the first five goals have not 
been met for asbestos-caused deaths. Survivors often do not 
apply. When they do apply, their claims are often con-
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troverted. Settlements are partial, decisions are apparently 
capricious, substantial legal costs are incurred, and awards 
are delayed for many months. These problems lead quite 
naturally into a discussion of reforms designed to improve 
compensation for occupational diseases. While Spatz does 
not address the sixth goal, the history of the federal Black 
Lung compensation program gives us fair warning that alter 
ing the workers' compensation system does not necessarily 
lead to unambiguous improvement.
The Nature of Uncertainty About 
Occupational Disease Causation
There are many problems involved in occupational disease 
compensation, including the artificial legal barriers to com 
pensation and the apparent widespread ignorance of workers 
and their spouses about the workers' compensation remedy 
for occupational diseases. In these comments, however, I 
would like to focus on one type of problem, the uncertainty 
surrounding occupational illness compensation.
There are several types of uncertainty which affect the 
ability of workers' compensation to function effectively. 
Uncertainty about the agent that caused the worker's illness 
appears to be the primary distinguishing factor. Uncertainty 
about workplace exposures that occurred many years ago 
creates additional problems. Some common characteristics 
of occupational disease that contribute to this problem are:
1. The signs and symptoms of a chronic occupational 
disease are usually not related to a unique occupational ex 
posure. Medical and epidemiological knowledge may be in 
sufficient to distinguish a disease of occupational origin 
from one caused by nonoccupational exposures.
2. A disease can have several causes, both occupational 
and nonoccupational. A worker who smokes and has been 
exposed to ionizing radiation at work may develop lung
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cancer. Since both cigarette smoke and ionizing radiation are 
risk factors for lung cancer, neither can be considered the 
unique cause. Moreover, it may not be possible to determine 
the contribution of each exposure to the risk of developing 
the disease.
3. Even where there is scientific evidence about disease 
causation, the evidence will be presented in an adversarial 
setting, and there is no guarantee about how that evidence 
will be interpreted at hearing, or that all cases with the same 
factual base will receive consistent decisions.
4. The disease may develop years after exposure began, or 
even after exposure ceased. Because of this, records 
establishing employment and exposure may be difficult or 
impossible to obtain, and memories of events and exposures 
may be unclear.
5. Records of exposures to occupational hazards may 
never have existed. Only in recent years, with the promulga 
tion by the federal government of health regulations, have 
exposure data been collected regularly for health hazards 
other than ionizing radiation.
Only rarely can a physician diagnose a disease as definitely 
arising out of and in the course of employment. These excep 
tions occur when the disease has a unique causative agent to 
which there is a documented occupational exposure. Unfor 
tunately, few occupational diseases fall into this category. 
Mesothelioma is apparently one that does, but lung cancer 
and other lung diseases, hearing loss, low back pain, etc. 
may be caused by both occupational and nonoccupational 
factors. It is often difficult or impossible to determine which 
of these factors caused the disease in a specific case, or even 
to determine their relative contribution. This is not caused 
only by the inexactness of the few available epidemiological 
studies of occupational disease. Even when epidemiological 
studies are able to accurately determine excess risks of
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disease in populations, they are not able to determine which 
individuals in those populations would not have developed 
the disease without occupational exposure. In many cases, 
this uncertainty cannot be resolved.
The Impact of Uncertainty on the 
Administration of Occupational Disease Claims
Because it is necessary to demonstrate that an injury or ill 
ness occurred "out of and in the course of employment," 
uncertainty about the etiology of certain diseases implies 
uncertainty about whether those diseases are compensable. 
This uncertainty will often mean that a claim, if filed, will be 
controverted. This controversion, with ensuing delays and 
expenses, is the proximate cause of the symptoms of a poorly 
functioning system, namely, long delays and high legal and 
administrative costs.
Suppose that out of a group of 1000 workers it was known 
that 30 would eventually develop stomach cancer, but that, 
because of occupational exposures, 65 workers actually 
developed cancers. It is not possible to determine clinically 
which of the workers would have developed the cancer in the 
absence of occupational exposure. There are a number of 
toxicological and epidemiological studies that indicate that a 
substance is a carcinogen, but estimates of its potency vary. 
In addition, exposure records are not available on the 
workers. Reasonable and informed workers with stomach 
cancer will attempt to collect workers' compensation, and 
reasonable and informed insurers will controvert their 
claims. The probable outcome is that settlements will be 
reached for substantially less than would have been paid if 
the workers won, but much more than they would have 
received if they lost. The process of negotiation may take 
over a year and cost both claimants and insurers a great deal 
in legal expenses. Neither side will be completely satisfied, 
but both will prefer settlement to the uncertainty of a hear 
ing.
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A profit-maximizing insurer or self-insured employer will 
controvert a claim when the expected gain from controver- 
sion is greater than the legal and administrative costs. As the 
probability of winning at hearing increases, and as the value 
of the claim increases, the advantage to the insurer of con- 
troversion grows. For occupational injuries, there is general 
ly nothing to be gained from controversion. 3 For occupa 
tional diseases, where uncertainty is high and disabilities are 
often permanent and severe, the stakes are high. An insurer 
would be poorly serving its shareholders and customers if it 
did not controvert many of the cases brought.
Proposed Legislative Remedies
The extensive controversion of occupational disease 
claims makes it impossible for workers' compensation 
systems to meet the goals enumerated above, or to follow 
Elisburg's excellent prescription: "I suggest that the 
system ... be designed to keep adjudication to a minimum 
and to focus on eliminating the adversary mentality."
Elisburg suggests two types of legislated changes in the ad 
ministration of workers' compensation designed to reduce 
adjudication by eliminating the legal uncertainty about 
whether diseases are occupational in origin. These changes 
are: (1) the promulgation of legal presumptions and 
(2) establishing expert, impartial medical boards to deter 
mine the cause of, and to evaluate the degree of impairment 
due to, the claimant's illness. Spatz also suggests the use of 
presumptions. He suggests rebuttable presumptions that 
consider the claimant's burden to be met when "statistical 
evidence shows a higher incidence of a disease among groups 
of workers exposed to specific substances." 4
Occupational Disease Presumptions
Workers' compensation presumptions can specify a set of 
conditions that determine when the burden of persuasion is
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shifted from the claimant to the defendant. Experience with 
presumptions is not limited to the federal Black Lung pro 
gram. A number of state workers' compensation systems 
have presumptions linking exposure to hazardous substances 
and illness, linking job and exposure, and even linking job 
and illness. 5 New York law (Section 47) provides that any ex 
posure to harmful dust for a period of 60 days or longer is 
presumed to be harmful in the absence of substantial 
evidence to the contrary. Thus, a worker with lung disease 
who was exposed to silica dust for longer than 60 days would 
be presumed to have silicosis, unless the insurance carrier or 
employer could demonstrate otherwise. Kentucky has a 
similar presumption, which states (Section 342.316(5)) that 
for a worker with pneumoconiosis and employment ex 
posure for 10 years or more to an industrial hazard that is a 
cause of pneumoconiosis there is a rebuttable presumption 
that the disability or death is compensable. In several states, 
including New York, employees in specified jobs are presum 
ed to be exposed to hazards associated with those occupa 
tions, even if there is no evidence to support this assertion. In 
New York, any workers who develop anthrax while working 
with, or immediately after handling, wool, hair, bristles, 
hides, or skins, are presumed to have anthrax caused by their 
work.
The assumption of the papers by Spatz and Elisburg is that 
presumptions are favorable to the claimant. This may not be 
the case. Twenty states have negative presumptions for some 
diseases. The typical negative presumption states that there 
must be minimum exposure to the relevant hazard for com 
pensation to be paid. About half of these negative presump 
tions are rebuttable, while in 10 states there is no opportunity 
for workers with less than the mandated exposure to receive 
compensation.
Presumptions, whether stringent or liberal, should reduce 
uncertainty. For claimants who meet the criteria of the
320 Occupational Disease Compensation
presumption, more cases may be brought, since the 
presumption will serve to educate workers and attorneys 
about the possibility of successful claims. In addition, the 
rate of controversion for these claims will be lower, since the 
probability of the claimant's winning at hearing would be 
quite high. As a result, claims should be paid more rapidly 
than now, and there should be lower legal costs. Where there 
are settlements, the amounts will probably be higher. The ex 
istence of presumptive criteria may also serve to discourage 
prospective claimants who do not qualify, even if there is no 
explicit negative presumption. The criteria would reflect 
legislative policy in workers' compensation, and are likely to 
influence decisions even in cases to which they do not direct 
ly apply.
A presumption may be relatively generous to claimants, or 
quite restrictive. And herein lies the problem. Any presump 
tion is likely to include in its scope workers without occupa 
tional disease, and is likely as well to exclude workers with 
occupational disease. Occupational disease experts can 
evaluate and summarize knowledge about the relationship 
between occupation, exposure, and disease, but they cannot 
decide on the basis of their scientific expertise whether to 
compensate fewer occupational disease victims in order to 
compensate fewer "undeserving" claimants.
The fact that such political decisions must be made does 
not, however, mean that future occupational disease 
presumptions will suffer from the same problems as the 
Black Lung program. Apparently, states with occupational 
disease presumptions have not experienced an explosion of 
successful claims as a result. Given current knowledge, one 
can only speculate on what would happen. While the concern 
of employers and insurers is understandable, most statisti 
cians would be hard pressed to make predictions on the basis 
of a single observation.
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Existing presumptions in state programs have not ap 
peared to dramatically reduce litigation and substantially in 
crease compensation of occupational disease claimants. The 
Black Lung program appears not to have distinguished ade 
quately between occupational and nonoccupational disease. 
If any conclusion is supportable from these sparse observa 
tions, it is that the drafting and administration of presump 
tions is very important, and that their mere existence means 
little. The politics of legislation and of implementation are 
critical.
Medical Boards
The same may be said for medical boards. While the prin 
ciple of impartial, expert evaluation appears to be a good 
one, achieving that goal may not be easy. In the highly con 
tentious climate surrounding occupational disease compen 
sation, expert medical boards have several drawbacks not 
shared by presumptions. First, they do not provide clear and 
objective guidelines to claimants and defendants prior to the 
decisions about filing and controversion. In addition, deci 
sions over time and by different medical boards may not be 
consistent. On the other hand, consistent decisionmaking 
over time by medical boards may help to narrow the range of 
dispute and thus reduce the costs of resolving occupational 
disease claims.
A Bolder Approach
The development of workers' compensation early in the 
twentieth century created administrative systems where legal 
systems had previously existed. Certainty increased for 
employers and workers; transaction costs declined. While 
coverage of all workers and adequate benefit levels have re 
mained important issues in the compensation of workplace 
injuries, the system has clear advantages for all parties over 
the tort system.
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This argument is more difficult to make for occupational 
diseases. While workers' compensation handles over 90 per 
cent of injury cases administratively, with resultant certain 
ty, speedy payment and efficient delivery of benefits, well 
over half of chronic occupational disease cases are con 
troverted. Proposed reforms are uncertain in effect and ar 
bitrary in nature.
Perhaps it is time to accept this fact and consider reforms 
in occupational disease compensation that focus on the most 
seriously disabling and fatal diseases, creating an ad 
ministrative system that reduces or eliminates the require 
ment of demonstrating specific workplace causation. Such 
an approach would be more like mandatory first-party 
disability and medical insurance than workers' compensa 
tion. As long as such a program were carefully phased-in, 
with appropriate general funds, similar to second-injury 
funds to handle pre-existing disease, it could greatly reduce 
uncertainty and get payment quickly and efficiently to peo 
ple who need them. An excellent argument for a mandatory 
first-party insurance scheme for occupational diseases has 
already been put forth by Peter Earth. 6 Earth proposes such 
a program, but limits it only to deaths from cancer. While 
this is a reasonable place to start, it is not apparent why the 
same arguments for covering deaths caused by cancer should 
not apply as well to cancer-induced disabilities, and to deaths 
and major disabilities from other chronic illnesses with oc 
cupational causes.
Removing these diseases from workers' compensation 
coverage would eliminate uncertainty to workers, employers, 
and insurers caused by the difficulty of determining work- 
relatedness. Administrative and legal expenses would be 
lower than the current system, although at the cost of com 
pensating workers with nonoccupational diseases. On the 
other hand, such a program has several potential drawbacks.
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First, it may be very costly, if not constrained to a limited 
number of chronic diseases and only to deaths and major 
disabilities. Second, to the extent that there are incentives to 
reduce workplace hazards in current workers' compensation 
for chronic occupational diseases, such incentives would be 
reduced or eliminated.
The incentive effect would be small, in my opinion, since 
incentives for prevention appear ineffective under the cur 
rent system of occupational disease compensation. The first 
problem is potentially the more serious. In some sense, the 
Black Lung program provided coverage for total disability 
and death from respiratory disease similar to the plan 
discussed in this section, but was more narrow in coverage of 
diseases and populations. This fact alone serves as adequate 
warning of the dangers of a plan that reduces or eliminates 
the necessity of demonstrating work-relatedness. As in the 
case of other reforms, the precise structure of the program, 
its implementation and its administration, would determine 
whether its costs were limited and its benefits targeted in a 
manner acceptable to workers, employers, and insurers. The 
political process would once again play a critical role.
Concluding Comments
The apparent unfairness and inefficiency of workers' com 
pensation of occupational diseases arises in great measure 
from the inherent uncertainty about whether many chronic 
diseases are work-related. Changes in workers' compensa 
tion that attempt to cope with this uncertainty must, by their 
nature, be arbitrary. In creating legal certainty from essential 
scientific and factual uncertainty, violence must be done to 
both the science and the facts. Some reforms, like presump 
tions, have the potential to increase efficiency and fairness. 
However, the implementation of reforms occurs in the 
political arena, and experience with the Black Lung program
324 Occupational Disease Compensation
has left many observers with grave doubts about whether the 
political process can devise any reforms that adequately ad 
dress the goals described in the first section of this paper.
There may be no satisfactory resolution to the problems of 
compensating occupational disease within the traditional 
workers' compensation framework. Since the limitations of 
the work-relatedness criterion are so great, more serious at 
tention should be paid to reforms that attempt to remove oc 
cupational disease compensation from the workers' compen 
sation umbrella. Such a move would be in the spirit of the 
change from the tort system to workers' compensation. At 
first, many employers objected to the idea of automatic 
payments to injured workers when the employer was 
blameless. Others were probably concerned about the costs 
of compensating all workplace injuries, regardless of fault. 
Yet the change from the tort system to workers' compensa 
tion is, I believe, a positive one. Similarly, research and ex 
perience may validate the utility of an analogous step for 
compensating occupational diseases.
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Background
In very recent years, the topic of occupational diseases has 
become a subject of discussion at the various conferences 
and seminars that are held on workers' compensation. This 
reflection of the considerable interest in the adequacy of the 
state workers' compensation systems in terms of diseases 
associated with the workplace represents a dramatic change 
from the disinterest in the subject that characterized the 
period before the mid-1970s. The reasons for the remarkable 
growth in attention to this subject need not occupy us here. 
What is of interest, however, is that the context of these 
discussions seems to be, invariably, the problems and dif 
ficulties of providing a sound, adequate and fair public pro 
gram to compensate victims of such disabling and killing 
diseases. In the presence of such widespread concern, much 
discussion has focused upon efforts to reform workers' com 
pensation. The purpose of this essay is to describe the essen 
tial questions that potential reformers must resolve as they 
design alternative mechanisms that seek to improve the func 
tioning of the compensation system. Most of the efforts to
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broadly change occupational disease compensation have not 
been successful. This failure is partly due to the complexity 
of these questions and to the broader implications of the 
possible answers.
Efforts to reform occupational disease compensation can 
not be analyzed in vacuo. Beginning in about 1969, a variety 
of steps were taken that were designed to fundamentally alter 
the nature of state workers' compensation laws. In the wake 
of the Farmington, West Virginia coal mine disaster, Con 
gress enacted the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act that year. 
Title IV of the law dealt with the widely perceived inability of 
state laws to compensate victims of coal workers' 
pneumoconiosis by creating a federal compensation pro 
gram, with coverage ostensibly limited to a single disease, for 
a single occupation, and with eligibility limited in several im 
portant respects. For example, benefits were to be paid only 
for death or permanent total disability, thereby totally ex 
cluding any direct involvement with temporary disability or 
partial disability.
The Black Lung program initially attempted to split up 
compensation by paying benefits out of federal general 
revenues to victims with "old cases," and by turning over to 
the states newly developing cases after a short period of tran 
sition. The law was significantly amended in 1972, 1977 and 
1981. For our purposes, it is sufficient to observe that it has 
become a permanent federal program, one whose presence 
serves as a constant reminder of federal activity in the 
workers' compensation field.
The second major impetus for reform in that era was the 
Report of the National Commission on State Workmen's 
Compensation Laws issued in 1972. The Commission owed 
its existence to Section 27 of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970. More specifically, it was the product of 
several persons in the Congress who believed that such a
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body would unlock the gates that historically had kept the 
federal government out of the domain of state compensation 
systems (Black Lung aside). It is a mark either of this group's 
optimism, or of its total frustration born of an inability to 
breech these gates till then, that its hopes rested with an 
essentially conservative Commission appointed by President 
Richard Nixon.
The Commission found many areas in need of overhaul. 
Of its 84 recommendations for reform, 19 were deemed to be 
essential ones. Most significant for our needs, the Report 
urged the states to act as soon as possible to clean up their 
laws and to comply at least with the "essential recommenda 
tions." Issued on July 1, 1972, the Report added that the 
Congress should step in and act if the states had not com 
plied (at least broadly, presumably) by July 1975. The Com 
mission supported the principle that the Congress should im 
pose a set of minimum standards on each of the states if 
there was a lack of compliance with the "essential recom 
mendations" in the three years. The 19 recommendations 
were the key to the potential standards.
It is instructive to observe the reform experience since July 
1972. Clearly, no federal legislation of any sort dealing 
directly with state workers' compensation laws has come 
close to congressional passage. State-by-state progress has 
not been the cause of federal inaction. While many states did 
enact legislation since 1972 that moved them closer to the 
Commission's goals, the average state still meets only about 
two-thirds of the "essential recommendations." The hope 
that states would largely comply of their own accord by July 
1975, obviating the need for federal minimum standards, has 
clearly not been met. What factors explain this apparent in 
ability to achieve full-scale reform, either through voluntary 
state action or by the federal government?
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At the state level I would point to several developments 
that made full compliance with the "essential recommenda 
tions" particularly difficult to achieve. First, the reforms 
were seen as being expensive, thereby raising insurance costs 
to employers. Such increases were difficult for state 
legislatures to justify in the decade following the Commis 
sion's Report, when state unemployment rates were reaching 
and holding levels not experienced since the outbreak of the 
Second World War. Interstate competition for jobs made 
such reforms unattainable on a state-by-state basis.
Many states did at least partially implement some reforms, 
and a number of these changes led to higher employer com 
pensation costs. These changes, occurring as system utiliza 
tion expanded, served to place limits on the extent of reform 
by the various states. The unexpected cost increases even led 
some advocates of the "essential recommendations" to 
withdraw their support of them.
At the federal level, efforts to enact minimum standards 
failed even more completely. The same fears about costs, 
particularly in the economically stagflated environment of 
the 1970s and early 1980s, contributed to congressional inac 
tion. That aside, three other factors in particular deserve 
some note, though the list of the causes of failure is longer 
than this. First, any effort to enact federal legislation must 
contend with the various interest groups that have developed 
within the states during the decades that these programs ex 
isted. The issue goes beyond simply the reluctance to accept 
change by those individuals and organizations accustomed to 
earning a living from the compensation system. It is the sheer 
number of such groups and the inability to fashion com 
promises when so many parties have a stake that makes any 
federal reform legislation so difficult to achieve. Recall that 
substantial clout can rest with not only labor and manage 
ment, but that it may reside also with state administrators, 
the plaintiff and defense bars, several elements within the in-
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surance industry, the health professions, municipal officials 
and others. This is not to suggest that this kind of numbers 
problem exists solely when federal reform efforts emerge. It 
also exists as a problem when efforts for reform are made at 
the state level.
A second source of difficulties is the nature of the stan 
dards that can be administered by the federal government. It 
is quite apparent that those types of standards that are quan 
tifiable are simpler to set, easier to target on for states, and 
less likely to be controversial when their compliance is 
evaluated. By contrast, a variety of possible standards in 
volving a qualitative character would pose considerable dif 
ficulty in monitoring for a federal agency. As an example, 
employers and insurers that might be attracted to some 
federal involvement as a means of achieving reform often 
speak of the need for an improved "delivery system" in 
workers' compensation. Whatever is meant by this, it 
represents a qualitative sort of change that the federal 
government is not well equipped to impose on the states. 
Consequently, the relative ease of raising benefit levels, and 
the difficulty of assuring a better delivery system, have 
meant that orchestrating compromises aimed at legislating 
federal standards are necessarily harder to achieve.
The greatest stumbling block en route to any federal 
minimum standards has been the inability to find a 
mechanism whereby the federal government can enforce 
compliance. The experience under OSHA and Black Lung 
apparently have left many persons somewhat wary of "tem 
porary" federal takeovers of existing state programs. Since 
there is no existing federal support of state compensation 
agencies or programs, the threat of a withdrawal of federal 
government monies has no meaning for the states. Moving 
claims into the already overburdened federal courts from 
state agencies or courts is also highly problematic.
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Behind all these difficulties is the obvious aversion of Con 
gress to making workers' compensation a federal program. 
It is hard to believe that the widespread extent of this view in 
Congress does not derive, in part at least, from the problems 
encountered in administering the three federal workers' com 
pensation programs, Black Lung, the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers' Act and the Federal Employees Compensation 
Act. These programs serve as a constant reminder that 
nothing guarantees that a federal compensation program will 
operate more effectively than a state program.
The Need for Reform 
in Occupational Disease
While a large variety of potential reforms have been pro 
posed, the most frequently cited ones are relatively few. Sur 
prisingly, there appears to be little disagreement among most 
of the parties about the nature and the desirability of these 
most obvious areas of reform. This is not to minimize the 
differences of views when one leaves the general for the 
specific, nor the reluctance of the parties to hold back their 
endorsement of reforms as part of a bargaining strategy. In 
stead, this is to suggest that the substance of the reforms that 
have been and will be proposed are well understood.
There exist a variety of limitation rules in some state laws 
that can serve to bar otherwise obviously worthy claims. As 
such, they render affected workers or survivors unprotected 
under this social insurance program. Such rules take several 
forms. One such barrier requires that a claim be filed within 
some time period after the last workplace exposure to the 
source of the disease. A second sort of unrealistic require 
ment might deny eligibility unless the worker has been 
employed and exposed to the hazard for at least a minimum 
specified and arbitrary period of time. The limitation may be 
medically unsound, having no justification in terms of how
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the disease is contracted. A third barrier involving timing 
may require that a claim be filed within a relatively short 
period of time subsequent to the development of the disease, 
even if the worker is not immediately disabled by the illness 
or aware of its presence. Such statutes of limitation may also 
bar claims from survivors who are not immediately aware of 
the work-relatedness of the killing disease.
A second cluster of barriers arises from the character of 
workers' compensation historically, as a mechanism for 
dealing with injuries caused by accidents. Such limitations 
have made it more difficult to receive compensation, and 
have even eliminated the possibility where the claimant could 
not demonstrate that an "accident" gave rise to the disabili 
ty. Related to such barriers has been the denial of claims 
where a disease is thought to be an "ordinary disease of 
life," providing the claimant with little or no opportunity to 
prove that the specific instance was work-caused.
Another area in need of change involves the benefit struc 
ture. It is hardly possible to justify differential benefits for 
victims of industrial injuries and diseases, either in terms of 
compensation or medical-health treatment. It is also difficult 
to justify benefit payments for workers or survivors that are 
based on earnings levels at the time of (last) exposure, when 
the disease develops one or two decades later. The combina 
tion of inflation and productivity gains render such 
historically-based benefit levels hardly worthy of the extend 
ed and costly controversy that can follow the filing of a 
claim.
Another set of problems that is widely acknowledged to 
exist for certain claimants involves the burden of proof need 
ed to sustain a claim. It is not possible in so short a space to 
indicate the myriad difficulties that (potential) claimants 
may have in establishing what hazard caused the disease, or 
that the disablement or death from disease arose out of and
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in the course of employment. In many instances the problem 
of proof relates even to the diagnosis of the impairment. 
This was the foremost issue that led to the passage of the 
Black Lung law, and this remains a central problem in claims 
for asbestosis and byssinosis.
Problems in Reforming 
Occupational Disease Compensation
Earlier in this paper a number of reasons were cited as to 
why workers' compensation reform efforts have en 
countered difficulties and why no federal legislation has been 
adopted of the sort recommended by the National Commis 
sion on State Workmen's Compensation Laws. All of these 
reasons exist as well, and impede progress toward reform in 
occupational diseases. Additionally, a variety of other prob 
lems exist that must be resolved if the process of reform is to 
be successful. In this section of the paper four sets of issues 
on which there is little agreement are described. They are 
treated in the context of possible federal legislation.
A. Coverage Issues
Any attempt to reform workers' compensation for oc 
cupational diseases immediately confronts issues of equity, 
costs and politics as it relates to coverage. At one pole are 
those proposals that would specify a single disease, or set of 
diseases attributable to a single hazard, or a single occupa 
tion or industry as the target of legislation. The advantages 
of so narrow a focus are thought to be political. By strictly 
limiting coverage in some such a manner, the costs of such a 
program will likely be more modest, an unambiguous virtue 
in an era of governmental austerity, at least as it might affect 
new programs. The other principal political virtue is that 
narrow and tightly bounded programs are seen as less 
threatening in the long run to those who advocate the reten-
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tion of fully state-controlled workers' compensation 
systems.
The most obvious disadvantage of such narrow coverage is 
the inability to provide horizontal equity (equal treatment of 
equals) to those not covered. For example, the same disease 
that is compensable to a worker who loads a train with coal 
at a mine may not be compensable under the federal law for 
the worker unloading it at the electric utility or steel mill. 
How does one justify compensating an insulation worker 
with lung cancer but not a worker with the same disease who 
was formerly employed on the top side of a coke oven? The 
answer, clearly, is based primarily on the pragmatic assess 
ment of what might get through the U.S. Congress, and not 
on the disparate excesses in standard mortality rates for the 
two groups of employees.
At the other pole in terms of proposed coverage are the 
schemes that would pull all occupational disease cases out of 
existing state workers' compensation systems and put these 
under some federal program. This proposal also violates the 
principle of horizontal equity, as it differentiates between 
workers with work-caused injuries being covered by the dif 
ferent state programs, leaving those with diseases subject to 
the federally determined criteria for eligibility and benefits.
Far more problematic is the question of how and where 
the line is drawn between disease and injury. It takes almost 
no effort to identify the many areas of ambiguity that arise 
when one seeks to cover all occupational diseases with a 
separate statute. In which grouping would one place the 
disabilities resulting from cumulative trauma? Are "back 
cases" instances of injury or disease? Where would hearing 
loss cases fit? Even where these grey areas are anticipated by 
the drafters of a statute, what logical criteria would they 
employ so as to explicitly place a category of harms under or 
outside of coverage? A wealth of experience exists to suggest
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that no reasonable degree of foresightedness will be suffi 
cient to prevent considerable litigation and uncertainty from 
arising over the issue of the appropriate jurisdiction for 
specific cases.
Somewhere between these polar positions on coverage is 
the one whereby the statute would cover only one or two 
diseases initially, but would allow for possible expansion 
subsequently, without the need of new legislative action. An 
approach of this sort, as found in Congressman Miller's pro 
posed bill, has the apparent political virtue of compromising 
between those who would support occupational disease 
reform legislation only if coverage were very limited and 
specific, and those who would opt for very wide if not all- 
inclusive coverage. By initially moving only asbestos-caused 
(work-connected) diseases to the federal arena, but leaving 
open the possibility of future expansion of coverage of other 
specific classes of disease, the question of appropriate 
coverage is not eliminated but is simply transferred to a less 
direct and obvious position.
Once one allows for possible future enlargement of scope, 
the subsidiary issues begin with determining who shall decide 
when and if coverage is to be broadened. Shall it be the 
Secretary of Labor, the head of an autonomous commission, 
the National Institute of Health? Presumably, congressional 
veto will not be available to assure those who fear that deci 
sions about future expansion could run amok if left ex 
clusively in the hands of the executive branch. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has made this sort of assurance useless. In 
any case, the core of the question is, shall the expansion of 
future coverage be primarily in the hands of scientists and 
health professionals, or will it be left to those more sensitive 
to the political winds. One could design such a scheme where 
both types have an input, but one cannot avoid confronting 
the final step of some such process where it will be either the 
politicians or the epidemiologists who must decide.
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Aside from the question of who shall decide what future 
coverage will be, a number of secondary questions must also 
be faced in preparing such reform legislation. Given some 
decision about who shall decide, one has to define what 
possible issues can be considered. For example, suppose the 
Secretary of Labor is given the responsibility to decide what 
new coverage may be. Would the Secretary be empowered to 
consider specific areas based solely on his/her own discre 
tion? Could others force the Secretary to review certain 
issues? Could anyone block the Secretary from considering 
the review of possible areas of extension? Would the same 
rules apply for expanding coverage as for cutting it back? To 
what extent would possible expansion parallel the protracted 
and litigation-filled model of the OSHA standard-setting 
process?
Behind all these questions is the accumulated experience of 
all the interest groups in dealing with the federal government 
in the areas of workers' compensation and in occupational 
health. From the vantage point of organized labor, there is 
the frustration of not having been able to get any sort of 
federal involvement in state workers' compensation pro 
grams (Black Lung aside). Additionally, there is a sense that 
OSHA standards have been too few, too slow and difficult 
to develop, and too timid. All the parties are aware also, that 
since the passage of OSHA in 1970, the law has not been 
amended at all. For labor this suggests that the need is to do 
more than to pass a marginally acceptable piece of legislation 
with the hope of accomplishing one's basic goals in subse 
quent amendments.
From the vantage point of industry, the asbestos sector 
aside, there is considerable concern about the federal govern 
ment's possible expansion into broader areas of disease. The 
Black Lung experience is repeatedly cited as an example of 
politics dominating sound judgment. The extent to which 
Congress allowed the program to expand in the 1972 and
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1977 amendments serves as a red flag to those who would 
prefer either no federal role in occupational disease or a nar 
rowly defined one with no opportunity to widen it.
A different question regarding coverage that any reform 
must tackle is the range of exigencies for which benefits can 
be paid. While most proposals call for benefits to survivors 
in deaths from occupational disease, as well as benefits for 
permanent total disability, there is less agreement among 
supporters of reform beyond this. Potential areas for 
benefits include "medical only," temporary disabilities, and 
permanent partial disability. If a federal occupational 
disease bill provides coverage for any of these, the ad 
ministrative burdens become far greater as the potential 
number of claimants is much larger in any of these categories 
than in death or permanent total disability. Further, com 
pensating permanent partial disabilities can be especially dif 
ficult, whether it be for diseases or for injuries. If one takes 
the expedient route and does not cover such cases, however, 
serious problems develop in aligning the federal and the state 
programs where jurisdiction is based on subjective and wide 
ly varying estimates of the extent of impairment or disability.
A final question of coverage that needs resolution is the 
treatment of "old cases." Specifically, to what extent would 
a new federal reform law seek to deal with deaths and 
disabilities that occurred in earlier years? By covering such 
old cases, one is assured both that the costs will be higher 
and that problems of available evidence and proof become 
more complicated. Organized labor seems adamantly com 
mitted to having old cases covered.
If one decides to cover old cases, are all cases formerly 
under state jurisdiction to be opened or reopened? The 
Miller bill opts for some compromise by extending coverage 
to old cases only where no benefits have been previously 
paid. The potential for problems and for questions of equity
Reform for Occupational Diseases 339
are too numerous to detail, but some must be noted. For ex 
ample, suppose a worker had earlier received a "medical on 
ly" benefit through the state law, but was denied any 
benefits at a later date when claiming to be permanently and 
totally disabled. Suppose a worker received $500 for a tem 
porary total disability. If the worker later dies, allegedly 
from the disease, will the survivor be able to claim federal 
benefits when state benefits are denied in the death claim?
B. Medical Issues
Once the questions of coverage are decided, a variety of 
issues emerge regarding eligibility. Specifically, aside from 
any potential federal legislation operating without the ar 
tificial barriers to compensation that have existed in some of 
the states, what would make a federal program more accessi 
ble to claimants than some of the state systems? Essentially, 
the answer would have to be that more rational or 
manageable (from the applicant's view) standards of 
evidence be required in such claims than exist currently.
Several sorts of changes are likely under any federal 
reform. Most likely there would be some resort to presump 
tions that would ease the claimant's evidentiary burden. 
While the presence of presumptions seems likely to be found 
in almost any reform proposals, a host of questions about 
them needs to be resolved before incorporating them in new 
legislation. Just as in the case of coverage, support for 
reforms will hang on how these are answered.
The most significant questions parallel those raised about 
coverage. Are presumptions to be limited to what is placed in 
the original statute, or is there some way of adding to or 
modifying them administratively? Who is to determine what 
the presumptions are to be, who can initiate the process of 
changing them, what is the process to be of setting them, and 
what challenges to them will be permitted? Are presumptions
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to be limited to medical issues and exposure questions? Can 
the presumptions be rebutted or not? The constitutionality 
of an irrebuttable presumption has been upheld, but the 
clamor over the single one found under Black Lung has 
never subsided. In the presence of rebuttable presumptions, 
the administrative agency will likely determine in the regula 
tions that it sets, precisely how academic it may be to seek to 
rebut. One possibility is that rebuttable presumptions are de 
facto impossible to rebut. Alternatively, they may be written 
in such a way that they are of little help to the claimant. In 
large measure, this issue depends upon whether it is a 
government agency that is in a position to rebut an invoked 
presumption, or if it is a private sector employer or insurer 
that is defending the claim.
A second set of health issues involves the use of medical 
panels. To what extent is it appropriate to use such panels of 
objective and technically qualified experts in cases where 
there is some dispute about a medical question? One of the 
most controversial issues that arose under Black Lung was 
the use made by the government of "B" readers to evaluate 
the quality of and diagnoses from chest X-rays.
There are three basic sets of medical problems that may 
arise in occupational disease claims. Disputes about them are 
not equally well dealt with by impartial medical persons. 
Questions of diagnosis are probably the best ones to be set 
tled by such specialists. Issues relating to etiology are prob 
ably much less amenable to resolution by a panel. The third 
area depends upon the principle of compensation used by the 
agency in question. Medical panels are ideal for settling 
disputes regarding the extent of impairment, but they are not 
at all suited to deciding whether the claimant's degree of 
disability has been fairly assessed.
Aside from issues of how to use such experts, questions 
arise regarding their selection, remuneration and tenure. Ad-
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ditionally, some decisions must be made about the ability of 
the parties in a claim to challenge the findings of such ex 
perts.
C. Financing Issues
Any federal occupational disease legislation that goes 
beyond simply requiring the states to meet certain standards 
implies that a new financial obligation will be incurred by 
some party or other. The need for new funding sources is 
especially significant where old cases are to be covered. 
Presently, there appears to be a universal antipathy to having 
this burden fall on the U.S. Treasury, as was done in the case 
in the Part B segment of Black Lung.
A variety of possible options have been weighed. On one 
side are those who wish to apply some variant of experience 
rating to a funding scheme so as to make only "responsible 
employers" pay where their employees developed disease. 
Such an approach has appeal to those who view this as fur 
thering the safety and health goals of a compensation system 
through the use of appropriate incentives. This sort of fund 
ing plan also satisfies the needs of some who want to mete 
out punishment to responsible employers. A variation of 
this, as found in the Miller bill, would seek needed funding 
from an entire industry but not try to establish who the 
responsible employer was on a case-by-case basis, nor 
employ any experience rating at the level of the firm.
There are several grounds for objection to either of these 
funding approaches. The experience under the Black Lung 
Act demonstrated the enormity of the task of identifying 
responsible employers, particularly in older cases. Alleged 
responsible parties challenged and fought almost every single 
old case attributed to them. In many of the cases the only 
possible employer (where the worker had been exposed to 
coal dust) was no longer in business or unable to pay the
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compensation. Where the workers had been employed by 
several different employers, the choice of the liable party 
often could appear to be capricious or a matter of conve 
nience, but not justice. (In a building trade such as insulation 
work, asbestos workers can work for several different 
employers within a single year!)
To overcome some of these problems, the Miller bill opts 
for a sort of superfund, financed by a tax levied on the entire 
industry from which the disease originated. This approach 
immediately encounters some immense problems. First, on 
what basis does one allocate the tax on the industry? Does 
one use current levels of employment, sales, profits? What 
criteria are employed to split these among importers, 
manufacturers, distributors, fabricators, and possibly cer 
tain users? What of firms that were formerly in the asbestos 
industry, for example, but are now no longer involved? And 
unlikely though it may be, new firms could enter the industry 
without any past history of usage, thereby having no 
reasonable probability of generating claims against the fund 
in the next few years. Are they to be absolved of the tax, and 
accordingly given a competitive edge on the industry?
Aside from the question of who, specifically, is to pay, 
there are a number of questions regarding the nature of the 
fund itself. Either a fund of this sort builds up reserves prior 
to or as future obligations develop, or it operates on a pay- 
as-you-go basis. The former approach pushes many of the 
costs onto the front end of the program and is not attractive 
to existing firms that would bear the brunt of these costs. 
The latter approach shifts some of these direct tax burdens 
into the future and could thereby shift them to other 
employers. With no basis for determining what the costs of 
an occupational disease bill will be under a pay-as-you-go 
basis, revenues would need to be adjusted frequently, 
perhaps annually, in order to avoid significant surpluses or
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shortfalls in the fund. All this implies a highly flexible 
scheme of taxation. Understandably, employers, members 
of Congress and others are loathe to provide this sort of 
discretion to set tax rates to a Secretary of Labor or any 
other political appointee, especially where the rate may not 
be made uniform in the industry, where the industry is dif 
ficult to define, and where exit and entry to the industry by 
some firms may have an immense impact on the costs borne 
by other firms therein.
The superfund approach is also not likely to be endorsed 
by those who seek to use the tax as the source of incentives to 
employers to maintain a healthy and safe workplace. So long 
as each taxed employer pays the same rate as other firms in 
that sector, there is no reason for the firm to reduce the ex 
posure to the hazard in question.
D. Exclusive Remedy Issues
Efforts to achieve reform of workers' compensation prac 
tices in cases of (occupational) disease owe much to the dif 
ficulties spilling over from the tort system. It is no coin 
cidence that those employers who have shown some will 
ingness to move toward federal reforms are those now facing 
huge costs from tort actions brought by (alleged) victims of 
occupational diseases. Their support for such change 
emanates from a realization that any options to bar further 
suits must be accompanied by the guarantee that the remain 
ing remedy, workers' compensation, be made more accessi 
ble to potential users. If such a quid pro quo were not possi 
ble, there would be no reason for those employers who sup 
port federal action to do so. Similarly, without such a 
bargain, organized labor would never willingly accept the 
principle that workers' compensation be the exclusive 
remedy in disease cases. Indeed, it will be a challenge for 
reform-minded parties to move some elements of organized
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labor to this compromise. If labor cannot be budged from its 
current public position of seeking to retain the right to sue 
third parties, however, the prospects for federal reform are 
reduced considerably.
The difficulty of achieving a compromise between labor 
and at least some employers is complicated by other factors. 
Organized labor, particularly at the state level, has never in 
vested significantly in the development of an understanding 
of the workers' compensation system. There was little ap 
parent need to do so as long as expert opinion was available 
to them, typically provided by plaintiffs' attorneys familiar 
with state practices and issues. The interests of such practi 
tioners were generally consonant with those of the unions 
and their members. On this issue, however, there is con 
siderably less overlap of mutual needs. The trial bar has no 
apparent interest in having future lawsuits by workers or sur 
vivors barred in disease cases. Any promise of a more effec 
tive workers' compensation system holds less interest for 
them than maintaining and expanding the opportunity to 
sue. If organized labor is to move towards the quid pro quo, 
they will have to do so without guidance or support from 
their traditional ally and source of expertise.
At the time of this writing, it is probably true that only a 
small proportion of U.S. employers, weighted by any 
criterion, are attracted to the quid pro quo of reforming 
workers' compensation through federal intervention, and 
being absolved of liability under tort in future occupational 
disease cases. This small group consists primarily of 
businesses involved with asbestos. There exist, however, 
firms in other industries that are very sensitive to these issues 
out of a concern that other industries will eventually be drag 
ged down by third party suits for occupational diseases. For 
a number of reasons, these firms are loathe to identify 
themselves or the basis for their interest.
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Other Needs
One of the principal shortcomings of how compensation 
systems have dealt with occupational diseases is the 
underutilization of this remedy by potential applicants. The 
problem is one that appears to be large and well identified. 
None of the potential reforms noted above bear directly on 
this issue, at least so far as underutilization has resulted from 
worker (or survivor) ignorance of their rights to compensa 
tion for diseases, or of the cause or nature of the illness. If 
this matter is not addressed in reform efforts either at the 
state or the federal level, the reforms will have relatively little 
impact on the usage people make of the system. Much more 
is known about the existence of underutilization for these 
reasons than how to ameliorate it. Perhaps that is why pro 
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Governments legislate remedies when other segments of 
society fail, or are perceived to fail, to respond to a par 
ticular need. A prime example is in the area of health and 
safety. The belief that there were excessive industrial ac 
cidents was taken as evidence that the private sector was not 
doing enough with health and safety in the work environ 
ment, and remedies were not only insufficient but difficult to 
secure. Throughout the 1970s sensitivity to the suffering 
caused by industrial accidents and the lack of recourse led 
many countries to direct more attention to the problem. In 
New Zealand, this response resulted in the most extensive 
no-fault accident compensation legislation in existence to 
day. All persons who suffer a personal injury by accident are 
compensated, regardless of whether or not the injury is 
employment-related.
Certainly the intent of New Zealand*s legislation is 
laudable, but it is critical to examine the manager's ex-
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perience within such a system because legislation does not 
always result in the intended consequences. For example, 
rather than reducing lost time from industrial accidents, 
comprehensive compensation provisions may, in fact, have 
the opposite effect. Since compensation becomes the acci 
dent victim's entitlement and right, there may be an increase 
in the number of accidents reported and/or the duration of 
time off resulting from an accident. If the legislation results 
in this behavior, the economic burden on the employer is 
greater and this shift may, in turn, cause the employer to 
reduce prevention program initiation and/or compliance. In 
this case, the number of accidents may go up and the out 
come is opposite the original intent of the legislation to 
reduce suffering.
Obviously, employers are a critical link in implementing 
and financing the provisions of health and safety compensa 
tion legislation. Thus, one must determine to what extent 
health and safety legislative provisions influence manage 
ment's perceptions concerning employee behavior and their 
subsequent decisionmaking in the health and safety area. Do 
employers perceive that the provisions facilitate or hinder 
organizational health and safety activities? Do the legislative 
provisions shift a greater economic burden onto the 
employer because employee behavior changes? Are other in 
stitutions or groups more influential than the government in 
the firm's administration of health and safety programs?
The answers to these questions obviously have both 
management and public policy implications. Management's 
response within the context of multiple external pressures 
will affect future legislation as it is modified to achieve the 
intent of the original law and vice versa. Understanding the 
influence exerted by other factors, including other firms, 
unions, employee groups, and other government rules and 
regulations, will also provide insight into the most effective 
implementation approaches. Not only the government but
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the employers themselves may be able to use these groups to 
cooperatively improve health and safety records.
This paper examines employer perceptions and behavior in 
response to New Zealand's comprehensive accident compen 
sation legislation. In the first section the background of the 
Accident Compensation Act is briefly reviewed, followed by 
a discussion of the provisions of the legislation. Provisions 
for levy rates and incentive rebates under the Safety Incen 
tive Scheme are outlined. The second section examines the 
current data on industrial accidents in New Zealand, 
highlighting the data on seven high-risk industries. The third 
section then outlines the methodology used in collecting 
survey data on management's perceptions and responses 
within these high risk industries. The data are reported and, 
finally, conclusions are drawn.
New Zealand's Accident Compensation Act
Prior to the 1972 Accident Compensation Act, New 
Zealand's personal injury remedies under the law were 
fragmented and generally considered insufficient.
• A victim was entitled to a limited form of compensation 
payable under workers' compensation legislation but 
only if the accident or disease arose out of work and in 
the course of employment.
• A victim could claim damages in the Courts if 
negligence on the part of some other person could be 
established.
• A victim could draw on funds administered by the 
Crimes Compensation Tribunal if the injury was caused 
by the criminal acts of others.
• A victim could receive social security 1 if none of the 
above remedies was available.
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• Owners of motor vehicles were required under the 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of 1928 to insure against 
death or injury liability (Fahy 1982).
The litigation and inequitable treatment resulting from 
this fault-based approach (i.e., that an action in law for 
damages arising out of personal injury or death could only 
be sustained if negligence on the part of the defendent was 
proven or admitted) ultimately led to a Royal Commission of 
Inquiry on Compensation for Personal Injury in New 
Zealand report in December 1967 (the Woodhouse Report)2 
and passage of the Accident Compensation Act (ACA) in 
1972. The 1972 Act and its Amendments were supplanted by 
the Accident Compensation Act of 1982 which became effec 
tive April 1, 1983. The 1982 Act did not alter the concept of 
the system but rather simplified previous complex wording 
and improved administrative provisions (Fahy 1983).
The Royal Commission set down several principles upon 
which the legislation rests:
• Community responsibility;
• Comprehensive entitlement;
• Complete rehabilitation, which would be encouraged by 
an award not being revisable downward after an initial 
assessment;
• Real compensation (adequate benefits); and
• Administrative efficiency (Royal Commission 1967).
The purpose of the Accident Compensation Act is thus to 
provide accident prevention, compensation, and rehabilita 
tion for every man and woman, and protection 24 hours a 
day. The compensation itself is governed by the personal cir 
cumstances of the accident victim. If there is a loss of earn 
ings or a loss of earning power, the compensation payable
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under the accident compensation scheme is related to that 
loss of earnings and earning power. Rehabilitation assistance 
is also tailored to meet the actual and continuing needs of the 
accident victim, so the nonearner is covered in this way (In- 
glis 1982).
To insure this coverage, three schemes have been im 
plemented: An Earners' Scheme for employed or self- 
employed persons, a Motor Vehicle Scheme for persons in 
jured in accidents involving motor vehicles, and a Sup 
plementary Scheme for persons not covered under the first 
two schemes, including homemakers and visitors to New 
Zealand (Dahl 1976). Broadly, the Earners' Fund and the 
Motor Vehicle Fund are independently financed and self- 
supporting, and each is charged with all amounts paid in 
claims which arise under the respective schemes. 3 The Sup 
plementary Fund is financed from money appropriated for 
that purpose by Parliament.
Employer's Contributions
Since the focus of this paper is on employer costs and fac 
tors influencing their behavior, it is important to examine the 
Earners' Fund, which is financed by levies on employers and 
self-employed persons. Through this fund employers finance 
the earnings-based compensation which is paid to employees 
who suffer an injury, whether or not such injury arises in the 
course of employment. The levy paid by the employer is paid 
at a rate specified for that particular industry activity 
classification or classifications. All industry, trade, business 
and professional activities are classified so that the amount 
of levy collected for each class and the amount of compensa 
tion, medical expenses, and other payments provided can be 
recorded. Work accident accounts are kept by industrial ac 
tivity classification. A separate nonwork accident account is 
kept and the costs (compensation, medical expenses and
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other payments) are spread equally over all industrial ac 
tivities. It should be noted that industrial activity refers to 
the employer, not the occupation of the employee. Thus, the 
nature of the goods produced or services rendered deter 
mines the industrial activity under which the leviable earn 
ings of the employees are classified. The levy rate per $100 of 
wages ranges from $.50 for the provision of actuarial ser 
vices, the practice of accountancy, the services of ad 
ministrative agencies, clerical, management activity, etc. to 
$5.00 for mining underground, exploring, prospecting and 
development works (natural gas, minerals, oil) in, on, or 
above the continental shelf, and tunneling (Accident Com 
pensation Corporation 1983). While higher rates are set for 
more dangerous activities by the ACC Board, there is not a 
strict multiplicative relationship between the degree of 
danger and the levy. In other words, as evidenced in the in 
jury rate (see tables 2 and 3) mining is more than 10 times 
more dangerous than actuarial services. To some extent 
then, "safe" activities subsidize more dangerous activities.
The Accident Compensation Act does fix a maximum 
amount of individual earnings on which the levy is payable. 
The Accident Compensation Order of 1981 (S. 1981/338) 
raised this maximum to $39,0004 applicable to payments due 
May 31, 1983. Prior to this, the maximum amount of in 
dividual earnings on which the levy was payable was 
$18,720. The leviable earnings include wages and salaries, 
overtime pay, holiday pay, piecework payments, long- 
service leave pay, bonuses or gratuities, gross commissions, 
honoraria and allowances for boarding, lodging or housing.
The Earners' Fund gross levy revenue ($149,317,624) 
made up 62 percent of the total income ($242,388,617) 
received by the Accident Compensation Corporation for the 
year ending March 31, 1982. At this time there was a credit 
balance of $218.2 million in the Earners' Fund, but forecasts
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indicated that the fund would be inadequate to meet the long 
term run-off of claims in years ahead. The shortfall was 
$62.7 million (Fahy 1982). The financial implications of this 
for employers may be very serious.
While a financing deficit is projected, it is interesting to 
note, as indicated in table 1, that the number of work acci 
dent claims remained fairly constant from 1975 through 
1981. The proportion of claims on the Earners' Fund for 
nonwork accidents, however, has been steadily increasing, 
from 31 percent in 1975 to 43 percent in 1981.
Table 1 





























SOURCE: ACC Statistics, Wellington, Accident Compensation Corporation Vol. 1, No. 
1, March 1982, p. 12.
NOTE: Not all claims result in compensation being paid—especially those made to protect 
the claimant's entitlement in the future.
In addition to paying levies into the Earners' Fund, an 
employer is also responsible for directly compensating 
employees 100 percent of their earnings on the day of the ac 
cident and during the following six days if the employee is 
unable to work because of an injury arising out of and in the 
course of employment (ACA& 112). Effective April 1,1983, 
the employer's first week compensation liability also in 
cludes any overtime the employee would have worked (Fahy 
1983). In practical terms, this means the employer must pay
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the employee the full amount he/she would have received 
had he/she been working. In 1982 it was reported that the 
cost of this first week's compensation still averaged about 10 
cents per $100 of the leviable payroll (Fahy 1982, p. 32). If 
the earner is incapacitated for more than seven days the 
Commission pays the compensation regardless of whether or 
not the accident arose out of and in the course of 
employment5 (ACA & 113).
Safety Incentive Scheme
The Safety Incentive Scheme rewards those employers 
whose work-related accident records are significantly better 
than other employers paying the same industrial activity 
levy. This is not a no-claims bonus system, but rather is bas 
ed on actual performance relative to expected performance. 
In other words, an employer with a perfect record (no ac 
cidents for which claims are filed in the period) does not 
necessarily receive a bonus. If the employer is engaged in low 
accident activities, no claims would be expected. A signifi 
cant improvement is thus more likely from employers engag 
ed in activities where the accident rate is expected to be high.
In 1982 the ACC paid out 190 Safety Incentive Bonuses 
totaling $1,145,661, based on accident and wages informa 
tion for the period of April 1, 1978 to March 31, 1981. The 
bonuses were calculated at 12.5 percent of the net work levy 
paid for the year ending March 31, 1981.
Accident Rate Data
It is logical to hypothesize that the first week provisions 
and the Safety Incentive Scheme would provide the employer 
with an incentive to actively seek health and safety im 
provements and reduce the accident frequency rate. Unfor 
tunately, it is not possible to make valid comparisons be-
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tween data published preceding and following the passage of 
the Accident Compensation Act. Unlike current provisions, 
claims made under the old Workers' Compensation Act, for 
example, included first-week incapacities but excluded in 
juries to the self-employed (notably farmers). Injuries receiv 
ed traveling to and from work were also not included in 
previous statistics but are now deemed to be 
"work-related." These last two factors are significant con 
tributors to the "fatalities" now recorded. The exclusion of 
the first-week incapacity also means that injury frequency 
and severity statistics are not compiled as in the past (Acci 
dent Compenstion Corporation 1982). As shown in tables 2 
and 3, an "injury rate" is currently calculated based on the 
number of compensated accidents per 1000 workers, which 
does allow comparisons across industries and occupational 
groups, however.
The industry data in table 2 shows that while the injury 
rate averages 35 for all industries, it ranges from 86 for min 
ing and quarrying to 5 for finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services. Manufacturing had the second highest in 
jury rate in 1981, 60, with a total 18,672 compensated ac 
cidents. More than one-third of all compensation paid went 
to manufacturing workers. The highest number of fatalities, 
44, was in forestry and fishing but this industry did not have 
the highest accident rate (compensated claims per 1000 
workers) as previously discussed.
By occupation group, the highest injury rate and number 
of fatalities were recorded for transport equipment operators 
and laborers as shown in table 3. This occupational group 
also received nearly two-thirds of the compensation paid in 
1981, $21.2 million. Forest workers, fishermen and hunters 
had the second highest injury rate, 43, with 45 fatalities. 
Compensation paid to this occupational group totaled only 
$5.1 million, however.
Table 2 
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SOURCE: Derived from Summary Report—Compensated Accidents, 1981, Accident Compensation Corporation, Wellington, New Zealand, 
1982.
•Compensated claims per 1000 of labor force (1981 census).
**Reported in thousands as of May 31, 1982.
Table 3 
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SOURCE: Derived from Summary Report—Compensated Accidents, 1981, Accident Compensation Corporation, Wellington, New Zealand,
1982.
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Employer Decisionmaking
Given the universal coverage of the Accident Compensa 
tion Act, the levy system, the employer's responsibility for 
compensation during the first week, and the presence of an 
incentive scheme, it is important to examine the employer's 
response to this legislative initiative. Specifically, four ques 
tions need to be addressed:
• To what extent does the availability of accident compen 
sation and government legislation, in general, influence 
management's response to health and safety compared 
to other factors such as the union, other firms, 
employee concerns, and other government rules and 
regulations?
• To what extent do employers believe that the provisions 
of the AC A change employee behavior? That is, does 
the existence of compensation prolong the absence of 
injured workers, or are more accidents reported as a 
result of the compensation?
• To what extent do employers believe that their expen 
ditures in the health and safety area are offset by lower 
accident rates?
• To what extent are the influencing factors and the 
employer's cost benefit assessment correlated with ac 
tual accident behavior in the organization?
The answers to these questions are all related to one 
another. In terms of cost considerations, price competition 
and the employment relationship, the employer is going to be 
influenced by other firms in the industry, government rules 
and regulations (as distinct from compensation provisions), 
unions, and other employee groups. Employee behavior can 
be expected to be influenced by the benefits provided 
through the government's accident compensation legislation.
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This behavior will in turn affect the employment relation 
ship. The interactive relationship between these factors is 
shown in figure 1.
Figure 1
External and Internal Factors
Influencing Employer Perceptions and Behavior










As suggested in the questions above, it is hypothesized that 
factors influencing an employer's reaction do not have a 
direct impact; this influence is instead filtered through the 
employer's overall assessment of the costs and benefits of 











Employer cost benefit analysis moderates the effect of factors influ 
encing employer behavior and resultant accident record.
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With respect to costs, economic theory suggests that 
organizations assume a proprietary strategy and seek to max 
imize their return. This classical assumption about economic 
self-interest does not automatically prescribe a particular 
treatment of health and safety within the organization, 
however. On one hand, the employer driven to minimize 
costs has no incentive to invest in safety programs, machine 
safeguards, new selection procedures, etc. Accident preven 
tion has explicit costs which can be avoided. On the other 
hand, accidents themselves are an expense. Accidents may 
involve disrupted production, damaged equipment, lowered 
morale resulting in overall lower productivity, compensation 
payments, recruiting and selection replacement costs, and 
the payment of wage differentials. The employer may thus 
choose to invest in accident prevention because "the benefits 
derived from the safety expenditure are costs which are not 
incurred" (Berkowitz 1979, p. 53). Certainly some invest 
ment in health and safety is economically rational, and it is 
assumed that these expenditures will have an impact on the 
organization's accident record.
Methodology
In order to assess the impact of New Zealand's accident 
compensation provisions in the context of other factors in 
fluencing an employer's cost benefit assessment and accident 
record, intensive information was collected within seven in 
dustries, including forestry, pulp and paper, construction, 
steel, rubber, oil exploration, and chemicals. The distribu 
tion of firms between industries was balanced, and within 
each industry the number of foreign-owned versus domestic 
firms was also balanced. Data were collected from 19 cor 
porations, as well as from their respective plant operations, 
for a total of 38 organizations. Eighteen of these organiza 
tions were foreign-owned. Six were headquartered in 
Australia, six in Britain, two in the U.S., two in Holland and
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two in Japan. Twenty of the surveyed organizations were 
domestic enterprises.
Two- to three-hour structured interviews were conducted 
with the corporate president or chair of the board and/or the 
senior executive responsible for health and safety within the 
organization. A second copy of the questionnaire was sent to 
the general manager of one of the organization's operating 
facilities. This questionnaire was returned directly to the in 
vestigator. Employers responded to detailed questions on 
organization structure and behavior, and perceptions of fac 
tors influencing health and safety administration. Health 
and safety performance was measured by the level of ac 
cidents. Employer response was measured by the hierarchical 
level of the position of the individual charged with primary 
responsibility for health and safety, and the percent of this 
individual's time spent on health and safety issues. Percep 
tual questions about influential factors, union relations, etc., 
were measured on a 7-point scale.
Results
It has been suggested that multiple factors moderate the 
effect of legislation on management's behavior and their 
perceptions of this effect. Across the industries sampled, 
government rules and regulations and the provisions of acci 
dent compensation legislation were reported as having a very 
high influence on health and safety decisionmaking within 
the firm. The mean influence rating for each of these factors 
was X = 5.21 and X = 3.77, respectively, as shown in table 4. 
Evaluated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all influenced, 
7 = influenced to a great extent), employers also reported be 
ing influenced by employee concerns and demands (X=4.08) 
and to a slightly lesser extent, the union in the plant 
(X=3.52). Employers did not indicate that employee turn 
over (X=1.79) had an impact on the decisionmaking. The
362 Compensation in New Zealand
impact of other firms in the industry (X = 2.78) was also low. 
This may be explained, however, by the fact that when 
employers were asked to compare themselves with other 
firms in the industry, the mean response was X = 5.49, with 7 
indicating that they believed they placed much more em 
phasis on health and safety than did other firms.
Table 4
Overall Mean Score Evaluation of Factors Influencing 





Employee concerns and demands 4.08
Employee turnover 1.79
Other firms in industry 2.78
Accident compensation 3.77
Government rules and regulations 5.21
An analysis of these influential factors by industry, as 
shown in table 5, revealed that government rules and regula 
tions were most important across all industries. In both rub 
ber and forestry, the accident compensation and the govern 
ment rules and regulations were linked as the top two in 
fluential factors. In the remaining industries, employee con 
cerns and demands constituted the second most important 
factor. The oil and chemical industries indicated that other 
firms in the industry was the third most important factor in 
fluencing their health and safety decisionmaking, while the 
other industries, steel, construction, pulp and paper and rub 
ber, rated the union as being the third most influential factor 
in their respective industries. The mean response in forestry 
indicated that employee concerns and demands was the third 
most important factor in that industry.
Table 5
Extent to Which Factors Influence Health and Safety Decisionmaking 





Other firms in industry
Potential law suits
Accident compensation
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In order to assess the nature of this perceived influence, 
the question was asked whether the influence exerted by 
these factors was positive or negative. In other words, did 
the managers believe that other firms, the union, employees, 
etc., facilitated or hindered their efforts in the area of health 
and safety administration. Certainly it would be possible for 
one of these factors to be exerting a great deal of influence, 
but in a counterproductive fashion. In fact, in no case did 
the 34 employers respond that these factors hindered their 
health and safety efforts. With the exception of the response 
to government rules and regulations (X=5.49), employers 
viewed these factors as fairly neutral, that is, neither 
facilitating nor hindering their health and safety efforts. The 
mean ratings on the other factors were between X = 3.64 for 
employee turnover and X = 4.97 for employee concerns.
Cost-Benefit Assessment
Obviously one or two factors, whether internal or external 
to the organization, will not in and of themselves change an 
employer's behavior with respect to health and safety deci- 
sionmaking. These factors interact with each other and 
organizational factors such as the amount of time spent on 
health and safety and the position level of the individual with 
primary responsibility for health and safety within the 
organization. The employer then considers these aspects and 
screens their impact in the context of the economic return to 
the organization.
As previously discussed, legislation affects not only 
employer compliance behavior but also employee behavior, 
which in turn has an economic impact on the firm. One 
reservation about the accident compensation legislation, for 
example, is the fear that the system will be abused. If 
employees view the provisions as benefits to which they are 
entitled, which in fact they are, more accidents which the
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employee would previously have simply worked through 
may be reported. It is also possible that the employee will be 
absent from work longer with a given accident because he or 
she is receiving compensation. In fact, when the employers 
were asked, "To what extent do you believe that more ac 
cidents are reported as ajesult of accident compensation?," 
the mean response was X = 5.31, with 1 indicating "not at 
all" and 7 indicating "to a great extent." The mean response 
to the question, "To what extent does the existence of acci 
dent compensation prolong the absence of injured workers," 
was also high (X= 5.00).
In order to assess the overall economic impact of accident 
compensation legislation and other influential factors, 
employers were asked "To what extent do you believe that 
your expenditures in the health and safety area are offset by 
your accident rates?" The perception of worker's absence, 
given the presence of a compensation system, was not 
significantly correlated with this overall cost-benefit assess 
ment, but was significantly correlated with beliefs about the 
number of accidents reported. The greater the extent to 
which employers felt more accidents were reported, the less 
likely they felt that their costs in the health and safety area 
were offset by the benefits. As shown in table 6, the overall 
assessments of the influence of accident compensation 
legislation and government rules and regulations were not 
significantly correlated with the employer's cost-benefit 
analysis. Other factors influencing health and safety deci- 
sionmaking which are significantly correlated with the 
employer's cost-benefit assessment include the union and 
employee turnover.
Organizational characteristics which were positively cor 
related with the manager's cost-benefit analysis at a 
significance level less than .05 included the size of the cor 
poration measured in terms of number of full-time
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employees (r= .28 p< .05). If the firm was headquartered in 
New Zealand, the employer was also more likely to feel that 
the costs were offset by the benefits or lower accident rates 
(r=.27p<.05).
Table 6
Correlation Between Factors Influencing Health and Safety 
Decisionmaking and Employer Cost-Benefit Analysis 








Accident compensation -.04 
Government rules and regulations -.01
*p<.10
**p<.05
Influencing Factors, Cost-Benefit Analysis 
and Accident Record
The impact of legislation and other factors is important 
not only in terms of the degree of influence on decisionmak- 
ing and the employer's subjective assessment of the costs and 
benefits. More significant is the relationship between these 
elements and actual accident behavior in the organization. 
Given the number of factors influencing health and safety 
outcomes, is accident compensation correlated with lower 
accident rates, or is the direct effect erased by the economic 
impact of unintended consequences, i.e., more accidents be 
ing reported and longer absences by those who claim com 
pensation?
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Table 7 shows that accident compensation legislation, as a 
factor influencing employer decisionmaking, is positively 
correlated with the accident rate (r= .33 p< .05). This find 
ing may simply reflect the fact that the more accidents in an 
organization, the more likely it will have transactions with 
the Accident Compensation Corporation. The relationship 
between government rules and regulations and the accident 
rate in 1982 was significant and in the expected direction 
(r = -.39 p<.05). The greater the reported influence of the 
government, the lower the accident rate. Another external 
factor significantly correlated with the accident rate was the 
influence of the national union (r = .55 p < .05). The relation 
ship is not in the expected direction. The coefficient indicates 
that the national union influence was stronger in those 
organizations with higher accident rates.
Table 7 
Correlation Between Factors Influencing Employer Health and Safety
Decisionmaking and the Accident Rate in 1982 








Accident compensation .33** 
Government rules and regulations -.39**
Other structural variables:
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As an internal influencing factor, employee turnover 
(r=.29 p<.10) was positively correlated with the accident 
rate in 1982. In other words, the greater the influence of 
employee turnover, the higher was the accident level and vice 
versa. Other organizational structural variables which were 
significantly correlated with the level of accidents in 1982 in 
cluded the locus of ownership and the position level of the 
person given primary responsibility for health and safety. 
The locus of ownership variable revealed that New Zealand 
organizations were more likely than foreign-owned organiza 
tions to have accidents (r = -.34 p<.05). The position level 
of the individual primarily responsible for health and safety 
also indicated that for the organizations sampled, the higher 
this assignment, the higher the number of accidents 
(r = -.25 p<.10).
Conclusion
Accident compensation legislation does not always result 
in intended consequences. Survey research conducted in 38 
organizations shows that the New Zealand Accident Com 
pensation Act is not, in and of itself, perceived as a major in 
fluence on employers' health and safety decisionmaking. 
Government rules and regulations are a major influence, 
however, along with employee concerns and demands and 
the plant union.
The impact of the accident compensation legislation is evi 
dent in employers' assessments of resultant employee 
behavior and their own subsequent cost-benefit analyses of 
health and safety expenditures within the organization. 
Employers reported that they believe more accidents are now 
reported as a result of accident compensation (X = 5.31 on a 
7-point scale) and that the existence of accident compensa 
tion prolongs the absence of injured workers (X = 5.00 on a 
7-point scale). The employer's overall assessment of the costs
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and benefits of health and safety activities within their 
organization was significantly correlated with the employers' 
beliefs about the number of accidents reported, but not with 
the employers' beliefs about extended absences. This finding 
supports the notion that the overall benefits derived from 
comprehensive compensation provisions outweigh the cost. 
Despite the belief that more accidents may be reported, 
employers felt that their expenditures in the health and safety 
area (including the first week compensation requirement) are 
offset by lower accident rates.
Further evidence of the impact of accident compensation 
legislation is found in the significant correlation between the 
influence of this legislation and the level of accidents in the 
firm. Government rules and regulations and national unions 
were also significantly related to the number of accidents 
reported in 1982.
The policy implications of the findings reported here are 
that government agencies and the Accident Compensation 
Corporation may be able to strengthen their influence on 
health and safety in the firm even further, through increased 
cooperation with the unions. The data show that this effort 
would be best directed toward the individual plant union 
organization rather than the national federations. The find 
ings further indicate that efforts to help employers address 
employee concerns should also prove useful. Across all in 
dustries, employers reported a high level of influence exerted 
by perceived employee concerns and demands. An example 
of such an involvement would be facilitating policy formula 
tion, such as the New Zealand Employers Federation policy 
statement on health and safety in the workplace adopted in 
1983 ("NZEF Adopts Policy" 1983).
From the employer's perspective, the finding that the 
stronger the union influence on health and safety decision- 
making the more likely the employer reported that the
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benefits outweighed the costs in health and safety ad 
ministration, suggests that employers may also find it useful 
to strengthen the union's role in this area. A second recom 
mendation, which fits with working more closely with the 
workers, is to place management responsibility for health 
an'i safety administration at lower levels within the organiza 
tion. This suggestion flows from the finding that the higher 
the assignment of responsibility for health and safety within 
the organization, the higher the level of accidents. A third 
recommendation is that employers may find it useful to work 
with other firms on resolving health and safety problems. 
The majority of firms reported that they believed that they 
placed more emphasis on health and safety than did other 
firms. This suggests that organizations may be able to learn 
from one another. The unions may also be able to provide a 
mechanism for this linkage.
NOTES
1. Under Part 1 of the Social Security Act of 1964, injured persons able 
to qualify under the relevant means test had modest monetary benefits, 
and all New Zealand residents normally had access to medical, hospital 
and other related benefits under Part 2 of the Act (Fahy 1982).
2. The Woodhouse Report characterized the adversarial fault system as 
being cumbersome, erratic, and extravagant in operation. The negligence 
action was labeled a lottery producing an adequate indemnity for only a 
relatively small group of injured persons.
3. Prior to the revisions effective in the Accident Compensation Act 
1982, the Earners' Fund was charged with all amounts on claims where 
workers suffered injury in motor vehicle accidents in New Zealand aris 
ing out of and in the course of the injured person's employment. Now all 
compensation resulting from motor vehicle accidents is financed through 
levies on vehicle owners.
4. New Zealand dollars are reported. The NZ/US exchange rate was ap 
proximately $.64 (NZ) per $1.00 (US) as of April 1984.
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5. For the individual, the legislation stipulates that the earnings related 
compensation for all periods of incapacity extending beyond the first 
week is calculated by reference to the amount of "relevant earnings" 
(ACA & 104). In December 1978, the limit on relevant earnings deter 
mined under S. 104 was removed, however. Instead a limit was placed on 
the amount of weekly compensation paid. In December 1981, the max 
imum amount of earnings-related compensation was increased from 
$288 per week to $600 per week. The ACC may at its discretion fix a 
minimum amount of earnings for the self-employed, and for the period 
March 1983 to March 1984 this minimum was set at $12,324 or 
$2377week. Earnings-related compensation may in general be paid until 
a claimant reaches the age of 65 years, but where the injured earner is 
over 60 special provisions apply.
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